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Abstract 
The public focus on domestic violence has been one of the most successful 
campaigns of the modern women's movement.  This success was achieved in part through 
the creation of strategic alliances among agencies and organizations responding to partner 
violence.  One of the most contested of these alliances involved partnering with the 
criminal justice system.  While representing an advance in holding police accountable in 
protecting all citizens (Coker, 2006), this alliance has had problematic consequences, 
particularly as it has extended state power into the lives of women of color (e.g. Richie, 
2005). This problem is exacerbated by new collaborations between law enforcement and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Federal mandates like the Secure 
Communities program bring together local law enforcement and ICE throughout the 
United States, to increase deportation rates (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
2009). As a result, many recommendations by domestic violence advocates to survivors 
now potentially include the presence of ICE in that referral. 
This dissertation explores how domestic violence advocates within the tri-county 
area of Portland, Oregon are responding to law enforcement-ICE partnerships. Advocates  
remain understudied in the domestic violence literature, in spite of the complexity of their 
roles.  This dissertation fills this research gap in examining the processes advocates 
employ in responding to dilemmas faced by marginalized survivors. A total of twenty-
five advocates from three separate agencies participated in the study, which centered on 
focus groups carried out in the agency settings.  
The dissertation pursues three research questions: 1) How do advocates work 
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through a key dilemma that has emerged in their practice?  2) What are the discursive 
strategies enlisted by advocates in addressing a dilemma at the border of domestic 
violence and immigration politics? 3) What is the relationship between each group’s 
proximity to working with undocumented survivors and their decision-making process? 
A case study methodology was used to evaluate proximity to work with 
undocumented survivors and the organizations’ general orientation to domestic violence 
work.  Transcripts of the focus groups were analyzed using a discursive method centered 
on identifying how the groups worked through a set of dilemmas presented in the focus 
groups, which involved a crisis call scenario involving an undocumented woman and an 
agency practice common to many domestic violence service providers. 
 In the analysis of discursive strategies of the groups, a key finding centered on the 
groups’ use of a decision-tree heuristic to work through dilemmas of practice presented in 
the two scenarios. This discursive strategy facilitated the process of group decision-
making at points where the actions required were clear and concrete.  However, as more 
complexity, ambiguity or ambivalence were introduced, the limitations of the decision-
tree strategy become more apparent.   
         Findings related to the agency’s proximity to undocumented workers suggest that 
this affinity was less important than was the agency’s working relationship to the 
Criminal Justice System (CJS). Closeness to the CJS was associated with reliance on a 
discourse that places the police at the center of services for all survivors of domestic 
violence, regardless of documentation status, and a heightened focus on the risk of 
lethality to rationalize the risks associated with referrals involving law enforcement-ICE 
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collaborations.  
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 Chapter One: Introduction 
“Boundary: In political geography, an imaginary line between two nations, separating the 
imaginary rights of one from the imaginary rights of the other” (Bierce 1911). 
 
 A border begins with a boundary – a line drawn to indicate difference.  This 
demarcation is always imaginary, even when it takes on the illusion of permanence, like a 
border fence carefully constructed of concrete, wire, and weapon.  The imaginary is not 
without real consequences, however, and negotiating the border can be perilous, whether 
it is a border between countries, groups, or individuals. 
 Intimate partner violence is all about border crossings.  Intimacy creates its own 
border, marking the space between two people and others in their surroundings.  These 
boundaries can be ruptured by violence and their crossing made unavoidable in the search 
for safety and peace. Survivors become a kind of refugee – persons who leave the country 
of their home, seeking the promise of a better life.  In doing so, they must reach out and 
seek assistance, as they maneuver the terrain of this new land.  It is often the domestic 
violence advocate who guides women through this unknown territory. Offering aid to 
those leaving a violent situation requires border negotiations as well, as diverse service 
providers are brought together to work collaboratively.  The advocate must act as 
translator, interpreting both the language and culture of different organizations and 
individual women, as she makes recommendations. 
Border Tensions and Advocacy 
When groups with cultural differences or conflicting philosophies negotiate a 
common space, the site of dissonance that arises has been called a place of border 
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tensions (Haaken & Yragui, 2003).  This border tension can be a site of conflict, and it 
can also offer a space for resistance.  It is often the domestic violence advocate who is 
charged with navigating these places, managing the relationships between their own 
agency and the partnering groups.  Not unlike other areas of politics, advocates working 
in the domestic violence field confront multiple border tensions as they work at the 
crosscurrents of agency mandates and movement commitments (Haaken & Yragui, 2003; 
Haaken, 2010).  As multidisciplinary teams in the DV field continue to grow, advocates 
experience most acutely the stresses in navigating relationships between their agencies, 
the partnering groups, and one another. 
This dissertation studies decision-making at the border, using an issue especially 
critical to the current DV movement.  New collaborations between law enforcement and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) target immigrant people, who unwittingly 
engage ICE when they encounter law enforcement, either deliberately or unintentionally.  
Any recommendation an advocate might make that involves the use of the criminal 
justice system must include the potential for the presence of ICE in that referral.   
This dissertation centers around three research questions: 
1. How do advocates work through a key dilemma that has emerged in their 
practice? 
2. What are the discursive strategies enlisted by advocates in addressing a 
dilemma at the border of domestic violence and immigration politics? 
3.  What is the relationship between each group’s proximity to working with 
undocumented survivors and their decision-making process? 
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The first question asks how advocates within the battered women's movement are 
responding to law enforcement-ICE partnerships within the tri-county area of Portland, 
Oregon.  The second examines the discursive strategies advocates use during crisis calls 
and safety planning with women, when such decisions must be made quickly and 
decisively.  The third question examines the relationship between how closely advocates 
work with undocumented survivors and the decisions the advocates make.
 Undocumented women and their children are potentially being placed at more risk 
by the domestic violence movement's continuing reliance on the criminal justice system.  
This endangerment may well exceed that which women face from their intimate partners.  
At the same time, although advocates carry a complex understanding of the risks of 
enlisting the police and courts in advising women, there is great pressure, born out of 
history, habit, and individual fear of causing harm, to keep this practice in place. 
 Preliminary research indicated that Latina-focused organizations had more 
information about the effect of law enforcement collaborations with ICE as well as more 
experience working with survivors experiencing the adverse effects of these partnerships.  
Because of this affinity, it was my assumption that advocates working more closely to 
undocumented survivors would offer more complex responses.   I also assumed that the 
advocates’ use of an intersectional perspective – one that considered multiple social 
factors such as racism, sexism, classism, and immigration status – would emerge as an 
indicator of the group’s use of a more complex way of thinking about the dilemma posed 
by law-enforcement collaborations with ICE. 
For this project, focus groups were held during regular staff meetings with crisis 
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advocates from three domestic violence service organizations, chosen for the work they 
do around domestic violence and with undocumented survivors. I introduced a dilemma 
of practice – a conflict point where responses cannot be effectively managed through 
established protocol.  I asked advocates to address some of the dilemmas of working with 
undocumented women, which are exacerbated by new collaborations between law 
enforcement and ICE.  I enlisted the group in working through the dynamics of the 
problem, offering two scenarios: one that mimicked a crisis call and one describing a 
common agency practice. 
Because the research questions focus on how advocates respond to law 
enforcement/ICE collaborations in their discursive strategies, the data is analyzed using a 
discourse analysis approach.  This methodology focuses on the ways that advocates use 
language in response to the scenarios and how the group attends to issues particular to 
undocumented survivors.  The groups share a domestic violence discourse that centralizes 
the role of the criminal justice system in responding to survivors.  The use of the 
discourse varies, depending on the agency’s partnership with the criminal justice system. 
My assumption was that proximity to work with undocumented survivors would be 
related to more complex responses to law enforcement/ICE collaborations.  Instead, 
findings of the study suggest that proximity to the criminal justice system is a more 
important relationship. 
Background to the Study 
 I bring to this project a history of advocacy on the borders.  Advocates are those 
who provide direct service to survivors experiencing violence from their intimate partner, 
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implementing any policies created by their respective agencies. For ten years I worked as 
an advocate, first answering the crisis line in a shelter and finally as part of a coordinated 
community response team, riding along with sheriff's deputies as they responded to 
domestic violence calls.  I also worked at a university center for survivors of sexual 
assault and relationship violence and facilitated trainings for police officers, attorneys and 
teachers.  Throughout this work experience I became increasingly aware of the 
complexities underlying the prototypical simple story that circulates in the DV field – 
stories that cast victims and perpetrators as one-dimensionally either good or bad.  And I 
struggled to negotiate the irreducibly variable realities I encountered, and my own 
resistances to fitting each person and situation into a unified and uncomplicated narrative. 
Subsequently, it was difficult to offering formulaic advice to survivors, even in carrying 
out the basic work of information and recommendations. 
 Crisis calls are made up of a series of questions and answers. Advocates try to 
provide support for women as they make complex decisions based in part on the 
advocate's suggestions.  These suggestions often come in the form of referrals for 
housing, food and other material concerns, but also include recommendations for how to 
stay safe from an abusive partner (Bennett et al., 2004).  Guided by statistics indicating 
that domestic violence is the leading cause of injury for women (Goldsmith, 2006), 
providing safety has been at the heart of domestic violence advocacy.  This principle has 
led to sweeping policy decisions around partnering with the criminal justice system 
(Schechter, 1982; Pence, 2000).  However, as I describe in more detail within this 
document, the effect of these partnerships has been different for survivors, depending 
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upon their social location.  Women of color, in particular, have exhaustively critiqued the 
reliance among DV advocates on the criminal justice system (Incite, 2005; Richie, 2005; 
Smith, 2002). 
 This decision to advise women experiencing violence from their intimate partner 
to enlist law enforcement by calling 911 has even more onerous implications now that 
law enforcement has entered into alliances with the Department of Homeland Security's 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  Since 2008, and across much of the 
United States, when a call reporting domestic violence is made to law enforcement and 
an arrest is made, the caller enlists ICE as well.  Federal mandates, such as the Secure 
Communities program, bring ICE into local jails.  When a person is booked for a crime, 
his or her fingerprints are entered into the immigration database, potentially generating a 
hold, regardless of whether or not the persons are charged with a crime. 
 I became aware of the partnerships between law enforcement and ICE through the 
work I have done with Jobs with Justice (JwJ), a coalition of labor and community 
organizations working for economic justice and worker rights.  JwJ is closely aligned 
with immigrant rights groups and is part of the Safe Communities coalition (now the 
ACT for Justice and Dignity Network), formed to address these partnerships.  I began 
attending the Safe Communities meetings in May 2010, just after the announcement that 
a local sheriff's office had entered into an agreement with ICE, implementing the Secure 
Communities program.  Beginning immediately, anyone booked into the jail has his or 
her fingerprints sent to the ICE database.  I was concerned about the effect this 
partnership would have on women reporting domestic violence and was surprised by the 
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silence around the issue. There was never any mention of domestic violence in the 
accounts of those affected by Secure Communities.  Immigrants were spoken of in 
general, with a particular focus on low-wage workers.  Not surprisingly, then, there was 
no one from DV services present at the Safe Communities meetings.  I do not believe that 
this was a deliberate omission, but one likely to have been borne out of the traditional 
divide between DV work and more male-dominated struggles such as the labor and 
immigrant rights movements. 
I am interested in the ways new alliances among DV providers and other groups 
not traditionally part of DV services may be created in this climate of law 
enforcement/ICE partnerships.  Although domestic violence service providers have 
collaborated with other groups throughout the history of the movement, they have 
traditionally remained separate from other social justice organizations, particularly those 
comprised primarily of men.  This may be because alliance with these organizations 
might indicate complicity with those who might be abusers, themselves.  In the early 
years, as activists described the ubiquity of intimate partner violence against women, they 
foreclosed the possibility for alliance with men, who all carry this potential for abusing.  
Outside the U.S., this division has diminished over time but in the U.S., particularly in 
DV service provision, the segregation still persists. 
Ironically, however, one of the strongest collaborations created between the DV 
movement and an outside group has been with the criminal justice system, a highly male 
dominated world, particularly within law enforcement and corrections.  This relationship 
remains indirect, however, through constructing the advocate as the intermediary that acts 
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as the liaison between the criminal justice system and the DV movement.  The 
partnership can remain removed from the day-to-day working of the movement that takes 
place primarily in shelters, which continue to be the private domain of the battered 
women's movement.  The advocate becomes the gatekeeper – deciding when and how to 
engage or recommend enlisting law enforcement, as a system, despite recognition of the 
potential for individual law enforcement agents to be abusers (Stinson & Liederbach, 
2013). 
 Common to any proposed intervention, be it the on-going use of the criminal 
justice system or alternative practices, is the presence of the DV advocate. Generally 
women, and often survivors of violence, advocates work in shelters, community settings 
and within the criminal justice system.  Regardless of their location, their roles are 
necessarily complex, as they intervene within the system on behalf of the women with 
whom they work (Haaken, 2010).  Advocates are often thrust into multiple roles 
simultaneously, particularly as domestic violence work has continued to become the site 
of numerous partnerships. 
There is little research literature on the role of the advocate, despite their central 
role in the DV field. There is a small body of literature focused on advocates as 
gatekeepers (Kendrick, 1998; Loseke, 1992), storytellers (Haaken, 2010; Rothenburg, 
2002), and as more professionalized staff (Wies, 2008).  In the psychology literature, 
some work has focused on the positive effect of working with advocates (Allen, Bybee & 
Sullivan, 2004; Bybee & Sullivan, 2005) but the emphasis is largely on accessing 
services.  Advocates, for the most part, remain understudied, mentioned primarily in an 
9 
 
undifferentiated way, which belies their complexity.  This dissertation fills this research 
gap in examining the processes advocates employ in responding to dilemmas faced by 
marginalized survivors. 
Border Crisis 
 Because the stakes are even higher when an advocate recommends that survivors 
call law enforcement in situations of partner abuse, it is important to understand how 
advocates are reconciling the need for immediate assistance with the risks in bringing in 
the criminal justice system.  Much like the questions framing my earlier work on safety 
and shelters (Rempe, 2001), the idea that practices are immutable because of their 
perceived connection to safety frames the questions of this project.  The ubiquitous use of 
911 is one of these highly protected and unexamined practices. 
 It is common to be given the advice to call 911 when reaching the initial recorded 
answer at most human service providers, from therapists to primary care physicians to 
dentists. This advisory also holds true for domestic violence service providers.  I called 
multiple service providers in my local area and, with very few exceptions, first reached a 
recording that almost immediately instructed, “If this is an emergency, hang up and dial 
911”.  Though less common, this was also the advice given on several of the agency 
websites, particularly on their safety planning pages.  Despite this practice, the policy of 
indiscriminately recommending 911 does not appear to be the procedure during an in-
person crisis call.  As I describe in more detail at the end of this section, I spoke with 
shelter directors and staff at several local organizations about their crisis line protocols.  
Each described a more nuanced practice for determining the advice to be given, though 
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most were unable to cite specific procedures.  It is apparent that the advocate answering 
each call must make the decision where to direct individual callers, via agency practices 
learned in staff and volunteer trainings.  However, the automatic recommendation to call 
911 persists.  It remains up to the advocate on the crisis line to reconcile the potential 
contradiction presented by the recorded information and crisis line practice. 
 Responding to a crisis call defies simple formulation.  The moment of crisis 
brings together multiple, potentially contradictory commitments: the advocate must 
juggle the needs of the individual woman, the agency for whom she works, other allied 
agencies, and her own beliefs and ethics.  And the stakes can be extraordinarily high, 
particularly for undocumented women.  If an undocumented woman in crisis describes 
herself as in immediate danger, for example, the advocate must decide between 
recommending the woman call 911 and risk deportation for herself and her family or 
advising her to manage the potential crisis herself, with its concurrent dangers.  The 
advocate must potentially go against current practice and agency prescriptions in 
deciding how to act.  And, she must live with the outcome of her decision-making 
process. The woman could die or be deported, the advocate could lose her job or get in 
trouble, or she simply might never know what happened to the woman, leaving her to 
wonder if her advice had the desired effect. 
   Pennell and Kim (2010) describe how advocates must assess each situation and 
measure the cost and the benefit to the individual survivor, depending upon her particular 
context and situation.  Advocates must continually negotiate this complexity.  The authors 
offer an example of an advocate's decision not to make a mandatory child abuse call 
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because she recognized the potential harm this would do to all the members of the family. 
Yet the authors fail to explain how an advocate arrives at such a decision, or what effect 
this daily negotiation might have on the advocate. 
This dissertation examines this site of negotiation via unpacking the decision-
making process during crisis calls and safety planning when the decision to involve the 
criminal justice system becomes complicated by collaborations between law enforcement 
and ICE. This critical lens does not rule out the potential for alliances with law 
enforcement.  Certainly, as Buzawa & Buzawa (2003) note, reliance upon the criminal 
justice system (CJS) is an important response to domestic violence and continues to 
shape intervention strategies.  Additionally, the collaboration with the CJS has been very 
effective in addressing intimate partner violence, particularly against middle class white 
women.  However, throughout the history of the movement tension has been created 
around whether to continue to maintain practices that positively affect only one part of 
the population, while potentially causing more damage to those holding a more complex 
set of needs.  Partnering with the criminal justice system remains one of the greatest sites 
of dispute (Incite!, 2005; Pence & Paymar, 1993).  This project enlists advocates to 
reflect on this controversy.  By examining advocates' decision-making processes, the 
dissertation illuminates a dilemma at the borders of domestic violence advocacy and the 
criminal justice system. 
 The dissertation is grounded in the foundational works of the innovative, early 
social psychologist, Kurt Lewin, both epistemologically and methodologically.  Lewin's 
insights around group dynamics and processes of change offer a means of excavating the 
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social-psychological barriers or forces that may compel advocates as they negotiate crises 
with women experiencing violence from an intimate partner (Lewin, 1997).  In analyzing 
interactions and generating a picture of how places of crisis or conflict are managed, it is 
possible to understand how decisions are made and how advocates may act in ways that 
may go against their best interests and/or the interests of those they represent. 
 These interactions take place against the backdrop of the political strategies 
negotiated throughout the history of the DV movement in relation to the criminal justice 
system.  The grassroots domestic violence movement was shaped by a feminist 
orientation that reframed violence in the home as a structural rather than an individual 
issue, looking to societal relationships of power in locating primary causes of the problem 
(Dobash & Dobash, 1992; Haaken, 2010; Schechter, 1982).  A similar feminist 
epistemology grounds this dissertation, which has at its core a recognition that knowledge 
is necessarily shaped by culture, class, disability, ethnicity, race and gender, which are 
themselves affected by interactions of power (Collins, 1991; Crenshaw, 1991, Harding, 
2004).  Therefore, I will begin by briefly describing my position as researcher. 
 I am a middle-aged, upper middle class, white woman who worked as a DV 
advocate from 1995 until my return to graduate school in 2005.  These demarcations of 
privilege give me an insider/outsider perspective that affects the research at all stages of 
the process.  My relationship with the participants in the study is affected by our differing 
places of power but there remains an opportunity for connection along our shared 
emancipatory political values.  Assiter (2000) describes what she calls “epistemic 
communities,” places of commonality or unification, created out of shared political 
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affiliations, bound together by context rather than a similar social identity.  This 
recognizes the commonality present through engaging in domestic violence work, 
without smoothing out the differences inherent to the multiple ways in which we are 
situated. 
 This attentiveness to context arises in Lewin's (1997) description of the life space 
of the individual and the group.  Behaviors are produced by their immediate context, 
continually emerging out of interaction between individual and the environment.  This 
individual level description is extended to groups, which are also subject to the aggregate 
effect of multiple, continuous forces.  Although Lewin does not overtly describe the 
effect of disparate power relations articulated by feminist theorists, his articulation of a 
dynamic process continually shaped by the interplay of person and environment leaves 
room for such an understanding. 
 Throughout this study, advocates describe their practice and consider the 
possibilities for negotiating the demands of multiple agencies in a way that is both 
creative and practical.  They perform a delicate balancing act, managing their own needs 
with those of the client and the larger agencies.  This research attends to the theoretical 
implications and the ideological aspirations along with the practical realities of 
undervalued social service work, particularly in this time of massive cuts to support of 
social programs.  This work arose in response to a practical question that came from my 
fieldwork as an advocate and the preliminary research I conducted as I planned this 
dissertation.  Because this project is focused on both the theoretical and the practical, 
Lewin’s oft repeated quote ‘There is nothing so practical as a good theory’ (quoted in 
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Marrow, 1977) provides the foundation for this inquiry. 
 In the following section I describe the preliminary research for this dissertation.  
In addition to my years of advocacy work, I consider the results of a focus group I had 
conducted with Dr. Haaken in 2005, in which advocates described their complicated role 
in negotiating the multiple partnerships between their agencies and other systems 
providers.  I also assess the veracity of assumptions I held entering into this project.  
Because it has been several years since I have done crisis work, I felt I needed to 
determine if crisis calls and safety planning were still conducted in a manner similar to 
my experience as a DV advocate.  In addition I was interested in determining if law 
enforcement/ICE collaborations presented an issue to advocates providing domestic 
violence services.  I followed the phone interviews with in-person interviews speaking 
with women from two organizations that provide DV services in a rural county where the 
Secure Communities program had been entered into voluntarily. 
Preliminary Research 
Advocate research.  In 2005 I conducted a focus group with Dr. Jan Haaken as 
part of her field research around domestic violence and storytelling, held in Portland, 
New York City, Germany, England, and the Pine Ridge reservation in South Dakota 
(Haaken, 2010).  The focus group brought together advocates across a range of positions 
within the greater Portland metropolitan area. I was working as an advocate at the time 
and suggested possible participants based on the work I knew they were doing within the 
community.  The rest of the group was gathered via a snowball technique, in which 
participants recommended others who might be interested in the subject.  The group 
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included advocates from child protective services, several domestic violence agencies 
that offered shelter, outreach and culturally specific programs, the county’s domestic 
violence coordinator’s office and an elder abuse agency.  The focus group was facilitated 
by Dr. Haaken and held at Portland State University in the Psychology department.  
Rather than casting advocates as merely witnesses or translators of the experience of 
survivors, we began with the assumption that advocates face a range of dilemmas in how 
to frame the experiences of survivors. 
 Advocates in the focus group brought the conversation back to a recurrent and 
familiar theme – discussion of the complexity of their own role as advocates, who were 
cast into what they described as either “good” or “bad” advocates, a dichotomous 
division based on their willingness to fulfill agency expectations around their role, 
particularly with respect to their work with individual women.  They described the same 
binary distinction in their work with women.  Advocates described the pressure to fit each 
woman into the category of either “good” or “bad” victim.  This simple categorization 
then delimited the services available to her: good/deserving women could access multiple 
services within the DV field, while bad/undeserving women were given the phone 
numbers of homeless shelters.  In a shelter I worked at in Arizona, this practice was 
codified through the use of index cards – the caller's name was written down and on the 
back was inscribed “homeless”.  If she called again, or someone from another shelter 
called to check her name (a common practice for determining if a woman was eligible for 
shelter services) we would check the file cards.  If she had previously been given that 
moniker, she was denied.  Those deemed eligible for services still found their choices 
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shaped by the partnerships of the movement that were, in turn, prescribed by other 
factors.  Women with children were given priority and, in many cases, able to access 
services not available to single women.  Undocumented women faced even more 
restricted options. 
 Advocates described this delineation of “deserving” and “underserving” victims 
as playing out even more markedly within the criminal justice system.  They expressed 
ambivalence about working with the system, explaining the way in which they were 
expected to push women to file restraining orders and follow through with prosecution, 
even if this did not conform to the wishes of the women with whom they worked.  They 
described frustration with the lack of choices available to women and the expectation that 
they would offer the same range of services to each, regardless of circumstance. 
 This preliminary research provided insight into the ways in which advocates felt 
bound by larger agency and movement commitments, which in turn shape their responses 
to survivors.  In this dissertation, research questions one and two build on this, through 
assessing how advocates manage the demands placed on them by their agencies and 
partnering groups and the limitations created by law enforcement collaborations with 
ICE. 
Phone interviews.  From July 2010 through March 2011, I conducted phone 
interviews with crisis line advocates at eight, non-culturally-specific domestic violence 
shelters in the Portland metropolitan area.  I chose to speak specifically with agencies on 
the mainstream because my previous work experience had been entirely within such 
agencies and I was interested in determining if the assumptions I had about shelter 
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policies around answering crisis calls were still accurate. 
 I called each shelter and explained that I was a former advocate who was now in 
graduate school in psychology, conducting research around crisis line policies regarding 
law enforcement.  I explained that it had been several years since I had done direct 
service and I was interested in ascertaining whether practices were still similar to those in 
place when I was doing the work.  I added that this was research for my dissertation 
project, which I planned to carry out the following year.  Each call lasted approximately 
ten minutes. 
 My experience as a crisis advocate was that each crisis call began with the 
advocate asking, “Is this a safe time to talk?”  The caller’s subsequent response shaped 
the direction of the call.  If affirmative, the advocate went on to get some context for the 
call, made referrals and generally engaged in safety planning prior to hanging up.  If 
negative, however, the tenor of the call changed dramatically and the advocate began 
intensive safety planning, determining if children were present and working out strategies 
for immediate responses, primarily around enlisting allies, which invariably included 
calling 911 or asking a neighbor to call 911, should the danger become emergent. 
 I began by asking if it was still the practice to begin a call by asking if the person 
was safe to talk.  In each shelter setting this was the case.  I followed this by inquiring 
about the response should the person answer in the negative, indicating s/he was in 
danger.  The answers to this were also quite similar.  Advocates described each call as 
unique, saying that they try and work with the individual explaining options, asking what 
has worked in the past, and determining the level of danger through questions about 
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weapons and past violence.  Each said there was no specific protocol for crisis calls, and 
described the training each advocate completed prior to answering the crisis line.  I then 
asked if they would recommend a caller phone 911, if they were in immediate danger. 
Advocates answered equivocally.  One said, “I don’t recommend she call 911, but I don’t 
not recommend calling the cops.”  Another said, “I would not necessarily recommend a 
woman call 911.  Definitely the police are someone we view as allies.” 
 At the same time that advocates expressed their own ambivalence around enlisting 
law enforcement, they registered sensitivity to the different needs of survivors, depending 
upon the survivor’s social location.  Each described groups who might be reluctant to call 
police, citing prostitutes, lesbians or trafficked women and describing the groups’ 
disparate experience with the criminal justice system.  However, none referenced 
immigrant or undocumented survivors or referred to issues around documentation or 
deportation. 
At the end of each interview I asked if it was common practice to inquire about a 
caller’s documentation status.  Each advocate said it was not, and one described that the 
caller might “feel fearful about revealing her immigration status.”  However three 
indicated documentation status figured into their choice of referrals, implying that they 
gathered that information in some way.  Five advocates said that they generally referred 
all Spanish-speaking callers to the Spanish language crisis line. 
In addition to confirming my assumption that responding to crisis calls remained 
similar to my experience as an advocate, the results of these phone interviews helped me 
generate the first two research questions:  how could advocates reconcile their awareness 
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that their agency policies potentially conflicted with the needs of the most marginalized 
survivors?  Would employing an intersectional perspective help them work through this 
conundrum? 
In-person interviews. I followed this series of phone interviews by assessing 
whether law enforcement/ICE collaborations were regarded as a problem by 
representatives of the DV movement.  Staying close to the Lewinian insight that conflict 
opened a space for change (Lewin, 1997), I looked to a rural county where the sheriff of 
the local law enforcement division had just announced a voluntary Secure Communities 
partnership.  I spent two hours, separately, with the shelter program director of an 
organization located on the mainstream of the DV movement and the director of a Latina-
specific DV program, in this county. I found that the awareness of the collaboration 
between law enforcement and ICE, and the analysis of it as a problem varied 
dramatically. 
 The non-culturally specific agency runs a crisis line, emergency shelter, 
transitional housing program and community advocacy, including legal and rural 
programs and support groups.  This agency has a strong history of collaboration with 
police, including a former position on a CCR team.  Their mission statement articulates 
an ideology based on women's self-empowerment and the reduction of domestic violence 
via service provision.  The shelter director described serving a large Latina population 
both within the shelter and in the community.  Despite this, she had never heard of the 
partnership and looked to me for information.  She also reported talking with the Latina-
specific advocate at their shelter, who did not appear to be familiar with the partnership 
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either.  In addition, this advocate was described as working closely with ICE in the past 
on cases involving the Violence Against Women Act's (VAWA) provision for immigrant 
women, and reported these experiences as very positive. 
 The Latina-specific program also offers a crisis line, temporary emergency shelter, 
and community support groups.  However the response from the director of the Latina-
specific shelter was very different.  She was intimately familiar with law 
enforcement/ICE collaborations and the distinct programs within this partnership.  She 
described the Latina community as “under siege” and gave numerous examples of 
deportations, detentions, and the fear that had arisen within the community as a result of 
these occurrences.  Women were unwilling to call the police for any reason and many had 
begun keeping their children out of school for fear of being picked up by the police while 
they were in school.  She described them as unwilling to access social services or use any 
of the public safety net for which they were eligible – eschewing public health offerings 
like dental work, immunizations and health clinics for themselves or their children, out of 
fear of deportation.  In addition, she described the way she felt abandoned by the other, 
mainstream service providers in the county.  Because of this practice, she had turned for 
assistance to non-DV providers, forging alliances with immigrant rights organizations 
and labor groups instead, working with them to change state policy around the 
collaborations. The two agency directors expressed radically different understandings of 
the complicated problems undocumented survivors faced because of law enforcement 
collaborations with ICE.  This led to my articulation of the third research question, and 
the question of how closeness to work with this population might shape practice. 
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 The results of this preliminary research shaped the research questions that guide 
this dissertation.  The division around awareness and response to law enforcement/ICE 
collaborations, together with the ambivalence advocates expressed around implementing 
policies generally when situations called for more nuanced decision-making, led to the 
following: 
1. How do advocates work through a key dilemma that has emerged in their 
practice?   
2. What are the discursive strategies enlisted by advocates in addressing a 
dilemma at the border of domestic violence and immigration politics?  
3.  What is the relationship between each group’s proximity to working with 
undocumented survivors and their decision-making process? 
 The following section describes the relevant literature that provides a background 
to this dissertation.  I begin with literature establishing context, followed by the project’s 
broad conceptual orientation.  Each of these sections is connected to the three research 
questions. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 This chapter situates the research both contextually and conceptually.  I begin 
with the context, describing the history of the DV movement’s collaboration with the 
criminal justice system, including the ongoing critiques of such decisions.  I then lay out 
a brief history of immigration and its connection to criminalization, returning to the way 
in which the DV movement has taken up the issue.  I move on to the dissertation's 
theoretical orientation, beginning with the early articulation of Action Research as a 
methodology and moving into current descriptions of qualitative research practices.  I 
then describe the way in which intersectionality provides a theoretical framework for the 
project and explain my conception of border tensions as a means of furthering this 
conceptual structure. 
Domestic Violence, the Criminal Justice System and Immigration 
 The public focus on domestic violence has been one of the most successful 
campaigns of the modern women's movement (Haaken, 2010).  In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, feminists challenged the notion that all actions within the home were private, 
bringing intimate partner abuse into the public sphere and reframing the problem as a 
public health issue (Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Schecter, 1982).  In doing so, feminists 
created the possibility for radical social change in multiple social domains. 
 This change was possible in part through the creation of strategic alliances and 
partnerships among agencies and organizations that respond to partner violence.  One of 
the most effective and simultaneously most contested, was the decision among women's 
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advocates to partner with the criminal justice system.  While important for the way it held 
police accountable as the state agency mandated to protect all citizens (Coker, 2001), this 
alliance has had multiple problematic consequences as a result of the increased state 
power in the lives of those experiencing partner violence (Ferraro, 1987; Haaken, 2010; 
Richie, 2005). 
 This criminal justice collaboration has been particularly problematic for women of 
color, who often feel the presence of the state more acutely than do white women.  Many 
women of color experience poverty, which causes them to rely more heavily upon social 
services and government programs.   In addition, communities of color have a more 
contested relationship with the police and men of color are subject to far higher rates of 
incarceration than white men
1
 (Lindsey, 2006).  The relationship between communities of 
color and law enforcement can be more antagonistic than that of white people, 
particularly white people of higher social economic status.  People of color are killed 
more often by law enforcement and are the subject of closer police scrutiny (Richie, 
2005; Ritchie & Mogul, 2007)
2
. 
 Because of these differences, women of color have questioned the strategy by the 
grassroots DV movement to erase all differences, in describing violence against women 
as something that happens to all women.  This sole reliance upon a gender analysis, the 
                                                 
 
1
 This disparity can be broken down as follows:  approximately 12 percent of black males 
between the ages of 20 and 39 are either in prison or jail, 4 percent of Hispanic males and 
1.6 percent of white males.  However, given the recent rise in immigrant detentions, the 
number of Hispanic males is likely to be higher now. 
2
 A 2007 joint study by Colorlines and the Chicago Reporter found that in major urban 
areas, black people were killed at double their percentage of the population. 
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idea that women as a category share a common oppression, was based on the aim of 
diminishing the emphasis on race and class.  The history of race and class differences 
carried conservative political freight, including the argument that battering took place 
because of some defect in oppressed racial or ethnic groups.  Instead, battering was 
reconceptualized as a social problem, affecting all women equally, regardless of race or 
class (Sokoloff & Dupont, 2005). 
 Haaken (2010) and Richie (2005) describe the ways this strategy, though 
effective, has had unintended consequences that mask real differences in women's lives.  
These differences not only made them more vulnerable to battering, but also left them 
further victimized by the programs and policies set up to help survivors.  Richie (2005) 
suggests that this aggregate approach allows white middle class women to become 
symbolic of the survivor, both as victim and movement leader.  This has shaped the 
specific policies and constructed public sentiment as to who a “deserving” victim of 
intimate partner violence should be.  It also moves the discussion around violence against 
women away from a structural one, rooted in a systemic imbalance in the larger societal 
system, to a more individual model, in which each woman possessed the ability, and the 
responsibility, to shape her own future.  This individual empowerment model reflects a 
larger, conservative telling of the role of the state in the lives of women.  Public 
assistance is replaced by a focus on crime control, and as welfare, housing, food stamps 
and employment programs are cut, prison, military and law enforcement spending is 
increased. 
 This conservative political focus on crime control has been mirrored within the 
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DV movement since the beginning.  The early emphasis on changing law enforcement's 
response to violence against women came out of an historic disregard by police to 
assaults on women by an intimate partner.  From the beginning of the movement, activists 
demanded that domestic violence be treated as a crime, calling for reform within law 
enforcement policies that ignored violence against women and legal practices that failed 
to hold men accountable for violence against their partners (Schecter, 1982).  Early 
advocates criticized mediation, the common police practice that positioned the officer as 
a peacekeeper and rarely resulted in anyone being arrested at domestic violence calls.  
Using research showing that mediation did not lower rates of abuse, they called for law 
enforcement to provide meaningful safety measures for women experiencing violence 
from their partners (Steinman, 1991).  At the same time, there was a focus on legislation 
and by 1980 most states had created laws specifically addressing domestic violence 
(Koss, et al., 1994).  
 Concurrently, three successful lawsuits pushed police departments to make 
significant policy changes (Daniels & Brooks, 1997).  Two were filed against police 
departments in Oakland and New York City, citing failure to respond to women, 
particularly women of color, who were victims of DV.  These changed police policy 
locally.  Finally, Tracy Thurman's successful 1984 $2.3 million civil suit against a 
Connecticut police department for failure to protect her from her abusive partner resulted 
in significant changes, nationally, in law enforcement response to domestic violence calls. 
 Additionally, beginning in 1980, the Reagan administration began dismantling 
social programs and instilling crime control models in their place.  This resulted in an 
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increased focus on criminal justice responses in general and a concurrent shift in the 
power of the state over individuals and communities (Ferraro, 1996).  Such practices as 
pro and mandatory arrest policies became normative, and no-drop prosecution was 
introduced, a strategy that removed the desire of the abused woman in determining if a 
case went forward for prosecution (Davis, et al., 2002).  Many of these policies emerged 
out of an experiment in rural Minnesota called the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention 
Project (DAIP) and a study examining the efficacy of couple separation or arrest called 
the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment (MDVE). 
 DAIP began as a community experiment, overhauling the criminal justice 
response to violence against women by an intimate partner in Duluth, Minnesota in the 
early 1980s (Pence & Paymar, 1993).  The DAIP, or as it came to be known, the Duluth 
Model, drove a range of changes that were adopted in addressing domestic violence 
throughout the US and in countries around the world.  The Duluth batterers' intervention 
program, Coordinated Community Response teams (CCR) and the Power and Control 
Wheel are among the now ubiquitous programs that emerged from the DAIP. 
 The Duluth approach was positioned outside the mental health system, within the 
criminal justice system.  Haaken (2010) describes the way that feminist activists became 
increasingly vocal in their critique of therapeutic approaches to batterers. As a corrective 
to therapeutic models that interpreted battering as a form of individual pathology, Duluth 
framed male battering as a symptom of the larger system, as a component of patriarchy, 
which creates the entitlement men use to control and dominate their female partners, both 
physically and emotionally.  This allowed the reframing of the power motive as a choice, 
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rather than a result of a temporary loss of control, effectively moving it away from the 
realm of therapeutic treatment. 
 The Duluth model focused, instead, on the coordination of all services that would 
potentially intervene in domestic violence cases.  In this way, the framers sought to hold 
the community responsible for controlling violent men, shifting responsibility away from 
survivors.  Despite the emphasis on social change, rather than simply social management 
of violent men, the result of the DAIP has been to build multidisciplinary teams focused 
almost exclusively around the criminal justice system (Pence & McDonnell, 1999; 
Thelen, 2000).  The Duluth model basically codified the alliance between the mainstream 
DV movement and the criminal justice system, while creating specific roles for each: the 
criminal justice system has the responsibility for managing the perpetrator, mandating 
educational and support systems for offenders and victims; the social service agencies, in 
turn, are responsible for maintaining these mandates, even if their structure comes in 
conflict with agency philosophies.  And, because the Duluth model is posited on 
consistent and forceful consequences for the batterer, policies like mandatory arrest and 
no-drop prosecution were quickly taken up across the country after the findings of the 
MDVE (Sherman & Berk, 1984). 
 Mandatory arrest policies began in Oregon in 1977 when a bill was passed 
requiring that police make an arrest if an assault had taken place during at domestic 
violence call (Daniels, 1997).  This policy of preferred, or mandatory, arrest did not get 
taken up nationally, however, until the MDVE study conducted in Minneapolis in 1984.  
This measured the efficacy of three different responses to misdemeanor domestic 
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violence cases.  Significantly less recidivism was found among men who were arrested 
and temporarily incarcerated, as compared to those who received mediation or couples 
who were simply separated by the police.  This experiment received wide attention and 
was quickly adopted by police departments across the country.  The laws gained purchase 
among DV advocates for the way they removed the decision to arrest away from 
individual police officers once probable cause was determined (Buzawa & Buzawa, 
2003).  Within two years, 46% of cities with populations in excess of 100,000 had 
implemented this policy (Steinman, 1991).  Currently, all states in the U.S. have a 
preferred arrest policy and twenty states plus the District of Columbia have a mandatory 
arrest policy (Goodmark, 2004). 
 These policies remain controversial, particularly because replication has remained 
equivocal, proving impossible to get the same results for all segments of the population.  
Follow-up studies have resulted in outcomes showing that arrest deterred recidivism in 
only a small fraction of the population – married men who are middle or upper class 
(Salter, 2012).  More troubling, arrest has been seen to increase violence in unmarried 
men of lower social and economic standing, who make up a majority of those coming 
into contact with police (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2001; Iyengar, 2009; Sherman, Schmidt & 
Rogan, 1992).  An additional problem is the inconsistency shown by police departments 
faced with implementing legislated mandatory and pro-arrest policies.  Divergent 
frameworks remain for deciding when arrest is mandatory.  These differences have been 
exacerbated by failure to train police officers how to respond to these cases, despite their 
potential role as arbitrator.  In cases in which it is not overtly obvious who the perpetrator 
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is (for instance, where both parties are injured, or neither are), the officer is forced into 
the role of judge and often simply arrests the couple.  This practice is particularly onerous 
in light of law enforcement/ICE partnerships in which an ICE hold may be generated 
even if the charges are subsequently dropped against one or both of those arrested. 
 Additionally, the emphasis on arrest fails to account for the ambivalence many 
women articulate about enlisting law enforcement.  Ford (1991) describes the way that 
mandatory arrest laws may come in conflict with the strategies of women trying to keep 
themselves and their families safe.  Further, the complexity of an intimate relationship 
makes the application of the law uniformly particularly difficult.  An abusive partner is 
often much more than an abuser: s/he is possibly parent, economic provider, and lover.  
These multiple identities preclude easy categorization into criminal or innocent.  Entrance 
into the criminal justice system, with its accompanying no-contact orders, fines and, for 
undocumented people, potential detention and deportation, may be much more onerous a 
response than many women desire. 
 Despite ongoing questions about the efficacy of mandatory arrest and no-drop 
prosecution programs, the Duluth model and multidisciplinary teams quickly took hold 
and remain persistent.  Throughout the 1990s and 2000s use of the model continued to 
spread, especially in the form of coordinated community response teams (CCRs) and 
one-stop family violence centers, which were held up as a model by the Bush 
Administration and given prioritized funding (OVW, 2007), particularly through 
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act. 
 CCRs have spread across the country and are the norm in many urban areas.  A 
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common model, particularly in Oregon, is the Domestic Violence Enhanced Response 
Team (DVERT).  DVERT is billed as a partnership between multiple service 
organizations, with an emphasis on the providing advocacy services.  Though described 
as egalitarian, with power distributed equally among participating organizations, it was 
my experience as an advocate on a DVERT team that the criminal justice arm quickly 
became the leader of the group, with arrest and prosecution as the primary objective. 
In 2002 I was hired by a non-profit domestic violence service organization to be 
the women's advocate of a nascent DVERT team in a rural county contiguous with a 
major urban area in northwest Oregon.  The team was collaboration between the non-
profit, the sheriff's department, and the District Attorney's office.  Though the model 
called for the non-profit to be the central organizing body, with women's safety as the 
guiding principle, from the beginning it was clear that the sheriff's and District Attorney's 
offices were in control.  The sheriff’s department managed the office and we were called 
the DVERT unit, with a detective in the role of overseer.  There was an additional 
detective assigned full-time, along with a deputy, and a clerk from the records department 
also had an office on-site.  There were two full-time district attorneys (DA) and their two 
advocates, who worked with women going through with prosecution.  I was the sole 
representative of the non-profit agency. 
 The division of labor further highlighted this focus on arrest and adjudication.  In 
my experience as a DVERT advocate, we met daily as a team to review police reports 
generated the night before.  Any arrests were assigned to the DA advocates, whose focus 
on ensuring participation included beginning by informing women of our “victim-less 
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prosecution” policy, despite repeated assurances from the DA's office that they would 
never proceed without the woman's agreement.  My role involved working with all 
women not formally in the system, meaning a 911 call had been generated but that no 
arrest had been made.  At morning meetings there was pressure on me to contact women 
and encourage them to recount an arrest-able assault, so that the system could kick in. 
 In Oregon confidential communication between an advocate and survivor is not 
legally protected as it is with a therapist or attorney.  However, in this CCR team, it was 
the practice that the district attorney would never subpoena me for information a survivor 
might have shared.  Because of this, I was allowed to provide the assurance of 
confidentiality to the women with whom I worked.  However, many on the team expected 
me to provide her information to them, particularly if the woman did become part of the 
criminal justice system at any point.  And, the assumption was that she would be 
convinced to become part of the system and cooperate in any investigation and 
subsequent legal process. 
 These examples highlight the ways the immersion in the criminal justice system 
can subsume the advocacy process.  It was nearly impossible to escape the presence of 
the system in my work.  In order to come to my office, women had to walk by multiple 
sheriff's cars, pass a deputy at reception and make their way through uniformed officers 
enroute to my tiny office.  To alleviate this police presence, I took to meeting women all 
over the county – at fast food restaurants and coffee shops and in myriad parks and 
playgrounds.  For I was the sole community based advocate for the entire county.  If 
women were not in a temporary emergency shelter and wanted to access domestic 
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violence advocacy services, they had to work through me.  And, for many women – 
particularly women of color – my connection to the criminal justice system potentially 
deterred them from making contact.  As I describe below, the reluctance of women of 
color to access traditional domestic violence services has been well articulated.  And, in 
the two years I was an advocate in the program, I saw very few minority women, despite 
ongoing outreach by my agency.  The few women I did work with chose not to participate 
in the criminal justice system process and used advocacy services only from me in 
locations other than my office.  Despite this, advocacy services continue to be located 
within CCRs and one-stop centers, with an emphasis on the criminal justice system. 
 One-stop service centers follow the practice of the CCR in bringing together 
multiple organizations addressing intimate partner violence against women.  In a one-stop 
center, all services are located in a single place, with the intention of making access easier 
for women experiencing violence from an intimate partner.  As with the CCR, however, 
this practice requires a woman to come to a place overtly connected to law enforcement.  
In 2009, a one-stop center opened in Multnomah County, Oregon, offering women the 
option of obtaining a restraining order, legal aid, housing assistance and counseling in a 
single place.  When I visited the site indicators of the criminal justice system were 
pervasive, including armed, uniformed officers. 
 At the same time, partnering with the state has brought greater visibility to the 
issue of violence against women by an intimate partner.  The DV movement has been 
quite efficacious in demanding changes in laws and law enforcement responses, which 
have had positive effects on women's lives.  For example, programs that offer restraining 
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orders remotely via videoconference alleviate the need for women to appear in court, 
which can reduce both emotional stress as well as exposure to violence. 
 From the beginning, however, this focus on the criminal justice system has been 
critiqued by many activists within the DV movement, especially women of color.  
Concerns were raised about the disproportionate way that the emphasis on treating 
violence against women as a “crime problem” diminished its social and political 
significance (Ferraro, 1996).  As I described earlier, women of color, in particular, 
challenged the emphasis on partnering with the criminal justice system, citing the way in 
which it ignored women on the margins – at the intersection of race, class and sexual 
orientation (Crenshaw, 1991; hooks, 1984).  They questioned the expectation that women 
of color call on the criminal justice system for help, when it had such a long history of 
oppression within these communities (Incite, 2006; Richie, 2005; Sudbury, 2003).  
African American women point to disproportionate rates of incarceration of African 
American men and the wider expansion of state power into the everyday lives of women 
(Richie, 2005).  And increasingly, Latina women continue to describe the way in which 
fears of deportation compromise their willingness to access the state for assistance 
(Orloff & Little, 1999; Vidales, 2010). 
 In the following section I describe growing concerns about the increased risk of 
deportation and detention for immigrant women experiencing violence.  I begin by laying 
out a brief history of the connection between immigration and criminality, describing the 
way Latino immigrants, in particular, have been cast as criminals and subjected to anti-
immigrant sentiments in the U.S.  I also review recent changes in the relationship 
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between the federal immigration agency and local law enforcement, especially in the 
context of current state legislation targeting immigrants and specifically those who are 
undocumented. 
Immigration and Criminality 
 The link between immigration and criminality in public discourse has a long 
history within the U.S. (Hagen, Levy & Dinovitzer, 2008).  The Naturalization Act of 
1790 limited naturalization to “free white persons” of “good moral character,” describing 
not only those who were welcome in the U.S., but those were not and must be kept from 
remaining (Library of Congress website, 2013).  In the mid-1800s, Chinese immigrants 
came to the United States during the western gold rush.  The Chinese were allowed to 
remain for a prolonged amount of time, as their labor was used for the mass railroad 
construction that enabled the western expansion of the United States.  However, after the 
work was completed, the Chinese were no longer welcome and the first law was created, 
excluding a specific race from entering, or remaining in, the U.S.  The Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1882 was accompanied by local laws against property ownership by all Asians in 
California, which later became the Asian Exclusion Act of 1924. 
 In the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Congress enacted strong anti-
immigrant laws in response to the large groups of mainly European immigrants who had 
arrived in the U.S. and found work in emerging industrial settings like factories and mills.  
In the 1920s, strict laws were passed, limiting immigration. These restrictions had the 
effect of maintaining fairly consistent levels of immigration and keeping public fears 
about immigrants relatively subdued.  Beginning in the 1960s, however, immigration 
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began to increase and by the 1970s, the numbers had doubled. This was a new group of 
immigrants, arriving primarily from Mexico, Central and South America.  Concurrently, 
the crime rate began rising in the US and anti-immigrant rhetoric began to focus on these 
growing numbers, linking them to the new tide of immigrants entering the country.  
Despite the impressive decline in crime that began and continued throughout the 1990s, 
this connection persisted, manifesting itself in intensified anti-immigrant sentiment and 
conservative legislative changes. 
In the late 1990s, following the implementation of the North American Free Trade 
Act (NAFTA), movement across the southern border of the US shifted dramatically.  This 
border had historically been relatively porous.  People migrated north seasonally, 
working in the fields during harvest and planting, and returning to the south to their home 
communities in the interim (Bacon, 2008).  NAFTA's provisions lifting the restrictions on 
US exports of corn into Mexico, for example, resulted in a flood of cheap corn into the 
Mexican market, wiping out small Mexican subsistence farmers who could not compete 
with the heavily subsidized US growers.  These farmers and their workers headed north 
in search of work.  The US responded to this large number of immigrants by militarizing 
the border, so that the workers, who had traditionally flowed back and forth as the 
seasons demanded, were forced to stay in the U.S. (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006).  This led to 
a 300% increase from 1993-2000 in the number of undocumented Mexicans living in the 
US (International Labor Rights Forum, 2011). 
This influx of people was greeted with the same animosity faced historically by 
all large immigrant groups over the course of U.S. history.  Latino immigrants have been 
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blamed for larger social problems including the economic recession, the collapse of the 
housing market, and voter fraud, among other issues.  The response to this has been the 
creation of punitive laws targeting immigrants, such as Arizona's HB1070 which 
comprehensively targeted Latino immigrants in the state, requiring immigrants carry 
documentation with them at all time, followed by Georgia's HB 78, and Alabama’s HB 
56, both of which extend the Arizona law adding stricter sentencing to those using 
fraudulent identification to obtain work and increased restrictions on access to social 
services (Rieser-Murphy & DeMarco, 2012).  Currently there is anti-immigrant 
legislation proposed in multiple states, including legislation directed at denying children 
born in the U.S. of undocumented parents access to education and other rights of citizens, 
despite their constitutional protection via the 14
th
 amendment. 
 The increase in anti-immigrant laws is exemplified by the changes in the 
relationship between what is now called Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
and local law enforcement.  Historically, these have been relatively disparate domains.  
ICE has operated as a federal body, which since its formation in 2002, via the merging of 
customs enforcement and immigration and nationalization services (INS) has been 
charged with policing the border, enforcing customs and tariff violations and detaining 
and managing immigrants.  Prior to this merger, INS operated relatively autonomously, 
partnering only peripherally with local police (Romero & Serag, 2005). 
 As public sentiment against immigrants increased, this distance between the 
policing institutions of the state began to shrink. ICE and local law enforcement began 
working together on sweeps targeting immigrants, particularly on the southern border of 
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the US (ibid, 2005).  Following the 2001 bombings in New York, these partnerships 
became codified through a small provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.  The federal 287(g) program allowed for certain 
state and local law enforcement agencies to engage in federal immigration enforcement 
activities.  Originally intended for trafficking cases and violent crimes, by 2006 the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began to use this program more widely, 
deputizing local law enforcement officers to perform immigration officer duties. 
 In 2008 DHS introduced a new collaboration between law enforcement and ICE 
called Secure Communities. The program was described as a technological tool for law 
enforcement that gave law enforcement the ability to check an arrestee's fingerprints 
against a DHS database and automatically notify ICE if fingerprints match those in the 
database (ICE website).  The program was used in conjunction with the 287(g) 
agreement, but also served as a means of circumventing state laws like Oregon's statute 
181.850, which prohibits law enforcement from acting as immigration agents (ORS. 
181.850).  Secure Communities requires law enforcement to contact ICE when an 
arrestee has questionable immigration status, which has been interpreted as a great 
enough separation to be immune from the statute (Rural Organizing Project website, 
2011). 
 All descriptions by DHS of the Secure Communities program emphasize the focus 
on people who have already been convicted of level 1 crimes, such as homicide, rape, 
kidnapping or robbery (DHS website).  However, DHS' own numbers show that the 
program is being applied indiscriminately to both criminals and non-criminals.  In the 
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first year of the program, 100,000 of the 110,000 identified were people booked for minor 
offenses such as traffic violations or property crimes (ROP, 2009).  Numbers of deportees 
remain high, with many being deported pre-conviction or after facing charges on minor 
crimes.  In addition, despite calls for regulation to avoid issues of racial profiling, protect 
civil rights, account for the negative effects on community policing and general 
oversight, DHS pushed ahead with unregulated implementation nationally in 2013 (DHS 
website, 2013). 
 Secure Communities and 287(g) are part of a comprehensive shift in the way law 
enforcement and ICE work collaboratively.  In addition, there are many similar law 
enforcement-ICE programs, operating under the umbrella of the Criminal Alien Programs 
(CAP).  All of these programs have been widely criticized, by both immigrant rights 
groups and Sheriff’s organizations, on multiple levels, including their opacity and lack of 
accountability, the way they codify racial profiling, the potential failure to offer due 
process through enhanced detainment and deportation prior to conviction, as well as the 
way they make communities more unsafe through limiting an individual's ability to report 
crimes and work with local law enforcement.  This is particularly true for immigrant 
women experiencing battering. 
 In the next section, I describe how the grassroots DV movement has addressed 
problems particular to immigrant women experiencing violence from an intimate partner.  
This highlights the important legislative changes written into the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA). I also discuss how undocumented women came to be excluded 
from these benefits.  This has also led to confusion among advocates about who is 
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eligible for the VAWA provisions. 
Immigration and Domestic Violence 
 In 1990, DV advocates began addressing legislatively the issue of the interplay 
between battering and immigration (Bhuyan, 2008).  This came partially in response to 
the 1986 Immigration and Marriage Fraud Amendment (IMFA) which required that any 
foreign nationals who joined their U.S. Citizen or legal resident spouse in the United 
States remain with conditional resident status for two years, if they had been married less 
than two years prior to emigrating.  Advocates argued that this did not allow women 
experiencing battering any recourse, forcing them to remain within the relationship or 
face deportation.  This had the effect of giving the abuser a powerful means of further 
controlling his partner. 
 In what Bhuyan (2008) describes as an “unprecedented collaboration” (p. 158) 
DV advocates began partnering with immigrant rights groups to respond to the IMFA.  
This resulted in both the battered spouse waiver for the IMFA and the subsequent 
provision within the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994, which offered 
women a means of responding to a deportation notice and self-petitioning for enhanced 
citizenship.  While this legislation fundamentally altered existing immigration law, 
which, prior to this, had entirely ignored battering, it is important to consider who 
remains excluded from accessing these provisions. 
 These exceptions to immigration law recognize only those legally bound within a 
marriage of “good faith” as so defined under the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).  
In addition to requiring that the partnership be codified in this particular, state sanctioned 
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manner, any same sex marriage is ineligible, regardless if it is recognized under 
international or US domestic laws, such as those in Canada, Massachusetts or Hawaii.  In 
addition, the marriage must be to a U.S. Citizen or legal permanent resident, thus 
excluding the estimated 12 million undocumented people living in the U.S. access to this 
legislative recourse.  This delineation of who is a “deserving victim” is crucial, for 
confusion remains around eligibility for the VAWA provisions.  Advocates in several of 
my preliminary conversations expressed uncertainty about whether there was language in 
the VAWA addressing undocumented women.  One advocate said that to alleviate 
confusion she recommended all women with questions about documentation try and use 
the VAWA provision.  While not directly harmful, this practice has the effect of raising 
women's expectations about the relief possible through this legislation.  Additionally, this 
can also lead to a more widely held belief that the issue of battering and immigration has 
been comprehensively addressed by the VAWA and is no longer a pressing matter for the 
movement. 
 Outside the mainstream movement, however, activists have called for alternatives 
to reliance upon the criminal justice system and particularly law enforcement, in 
responding to violence against women.  Promising alternative interventions have been 
described, focused especially on restorative justice programs where the perpetrator of 
violence is held responsible both to the woman who has been injured and the greater 
community (Ptacek, 2010).  Other ideas focus upon tapping the resources of family and 
community, eschewing legal remedies in general (Pennell & Kim, 2010).  Some Native 
American communities incorporate traditional practices, making use of storytelling as 
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part of both intervention and reparation (Haaken, 2008).  Despite these alternatives, 
however, partnerships between much of the domestic violence movement and the 
criminal justice system remain normative. 
 Even as partnerships with the state have had negative effects for many 
marginalized survivors, especially undocumented immigrants, little is known about how 
advocate practices operate within those partnerships.  This unmapped terrain provides the 
basis for my first two research questions.  The dissertation examines the strategies by 
which advocates make decisions by proposing a dilemma of practice at these border 
regions.  This information is critical in filling the gap in the literature. 
 Next I focus on the epistemological stance guiding the research choices I made 
during this project.  Research begins with multiple decisions, predicated on beliefs about 
the production of knowledge and the role of power within such practice (Rabinowitz & 
Weseen, 1997).  The choice to conduct qualitative or quantitative research is not neutral, 
but is loaded with the researcher’s beliefs about issues around bias, subjectivity and 
reflexivity.  Informed by this tradition of inquiry, my discussion of epistemological 
premises begins with a description of role of the researcher, followed by a description of 
Action Research, the larger philosophical framework guiding this project.  The discussion 
of the methodological paradigm is laid out historically, from its beginning in the U.S. in 
the 1930s, with special attention given to its collaborative practice and focus on group 
processes.  I then describe the way conceptions of intersectionality and border tensions 
enhance Lewinian concepts of group processes. 
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 The Role of the Researcher 
 This dissertation asserts a critical feminist position predicated on the 
understanding that knowledge production is value-laden and research is necessarily the 
site of ongoing power differences (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003).  I use the word critical in 
relation to the production of knowledge, both generally and in regard to psychology 
specifically (Fox, Prilleltensky & Austin, 2009; Nelson and Prilleltensky, 2005; Teo, 
2005).  A critical epistemology considers the ways multiple axes of a social system 
intersect to create subjectivity, and pays close attention to how power flows throughout in 
unequal distribution.  Critical psychology, in turn, reflects on the ideological limits of our 
own practice, as psychologists, producing psychological knowledge and the potential to 
(re)produce systems of oppression.  As a feminist research project, the study is also 
oriented toward emancipatory social change (Fine, 1992; Maguire, 2001; Piran, 2001). 
 Social scientists often deny or mask the political nature of their research practices.  
Fine (1992) challenges this stance, describing the way that all social scientists necessarily 
come out of a specific epistemological position that carries with it political premises.  
These often go unarticulated, registered in what is omitted as well as embedded in the 
questions or modes of analyses.  Yet the researcher inevitably constructs a world through 
the collection and analysis of data.  Feminist and action researchers attempt to make such 
processes explicit. 
 Research is a dynamic process that carries all of the participants’ histories and 
identities into the process.  As a researcher, I am always-already determining the 
trajectory and affecting the findings.  Therefore my ongoing reflection on the process is 
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crucial.  I can look at the dynamic interventions and make interpretations based on my 
epistemological understandings of the phenomenon. 
 As one key premise, this dissertation takes an activist stance – one that is explicit 
as a lens through which questions are raised, interpretations are made, and stories are 
told.  My aim is to attend to “local meanings, changes over time, dominant and 
suppressed frames, and contextual contradictions” (Fine 1992, p.220), and also to identify 
emergent possibilities.  Through envisioning potential for new practices, there can be a 
disruption of commonsense assumptions, making space for a radical change in 
expectations and possibilities. 
 This space cannot be created, however, without considering the way in which 
discussion has been limited in order to build a coherent movement.  Haaken (2010) 
describes the necessity of creating solidarity around specific foundational premises when 
building a social movement.  While coherence is important, particularly in a nascent 
movement that is highly politically charged, the practice has other potentially damaging 
consequences.  This apparent unanimity can have the effect of producing scripted and 
potentially simplistic responses, which serve to mask complexity through creating a kind 
of gag order around what can be said. 
 Lifting these prohibitions can be difficult, however.  DV advocacy is, for many, a 
political act that carries with it a loyalty to the movement that may preclude overtly 
questioning some of the foundational principles bound by silence.  In addition, the DV 
movement has been critiqued for being a movement led by white, middle class women 
that is too often silent around structural issues that affect oppressed and marginalized 
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groups differently (Richie, 2005).  Discussion of these intersectional places and their 
connection to power and privilege may create anxiety that results in self-censorship and 
repression of others.  As a researcher I pay attention to this history of verbal suppression, 
at both the individual and group levels. 
 Compounding this, the grassroots DV movement has a long and uneasy 
relationship with academic researchers, including psychologists (Hamberger & Ambuel, 
2000).  Although there are many examples of collaborative endeavors between 
psychologists and the grassroots DV movement (Fine & Gordon, 1989; Gondolf, 1997; 
Haaken, 2010; Mankowski, Haaken & Silvergleid, 2002) there is also evidence, 
particularly from the early years of the movement, of psychologists pathologizing women 
experiencing violence from their intimate partners (cited in Hamberger & Ambuel, 2000).  
Because of this, it has been necessary to engage in a project that is collaborative, enlisting 
the experts working in the field, at all stages of the project.  Additionally, the focus of the 
project is on analyses at the group, rather than the individual level, which also addresses 
the association of psychology with clinical and pathologizing stances. 
 As an activist-informed project, this dissertation is grounded in the action research 
tradition.  Action research offers a means for attending to the collaborative process 
through employing a dialectical approach that engages the community and the researcher 
in creating and sustaining emancipatory change, as it is attentive to discursive practices 
that may impede or limit such change (Boog, 2003; Goodley & Parker, 2000).  In the 
following section, I describe a history of action research in the Lewinian sense, outlining 
its particular praxis – an orientation grounded both in the theoretical and practical. 
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Action Research and the Lewinian Tradition 
 Action research emerged simultaneously out of the work of John Collier and Kurt 
Lewin, as they worked separately in the 1930s and 1940s (Pasmore, 2001).  Collier's 
work centered on race relations, particularly between whites and Native Americans.  He 
believed that research must be participative, involving both researchers and laypersons.  
It was not enough to simply engage the participants in dialogue, however, as differences 
in opinion would inevitably emerge, stifling the potential for change.  Only by involving 
participants would it be possible to see how to create the actual conditions for making 
change. 
 Around the same time, Lewin emigrated to the U.S. from Germany.  Much of his 
work revolved around his struggle to make sense of fascism, through understanding the 
way in which people behave within groups (Lewin, 1997).  Working from a Gestalt 
tradition, with its emphasis on the totality of an individual's situation as a means of 
understanding behavior, Lewin described a more democratic research process that recast 
the participant in a more egalitarian, active role within it.  Like Collier, he described the 
necessity for including the voices of participants in articulating their own struggle, 
denying the artificial separation of the researcher from the researched and refiguring 
social science research as inherently political and fundamental to the process of 
maintaining democracy. 
 Lewin described both social fields and phase spaces as a tangible way of mapping 
the diverse forces present within group interactions.  Rather than focusing solely on the 
inner workings of an individual, he emphasized what he calls the total situation: a focus 
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on the person within the entire, immediate, context.  Although Lewin was responding 
directly to the Freudian practices of his time, this focus on context is consistent with 
currents in social psychology – with its emphasis on roles and situational dynamics – but 
enlists the inclusion of power and larger contexts described by community psychologists 
(Trickett, 1994) and feminist critical theorists who describe the idea of intersectionality as 
a means of reconciling the disparate factors affecting women's subjectivity (Collins, 
1991; Crenshaw, 1991).  Lewin's description of field theory appears at first to be fairly 
static and mechanistic, through his use of a physical model that assumes equilibrium in 
the system both preceding and following the change.  However, he describes the way the 
addition of forces compelling change will add an increase in tension that the system then 
struggles to bring to equilibrium (Lewin, 1997).  The forces shaping the person, or group, 
are not additive, however, but are described by Lewin using the language of calculus, as 
happening over time, dynamic and continuous.  This is analogous to the biological 
concept of homeostasis, which is best understood as a range that fluctuates, depending 
upon the conditions at the moment.  In Lewin's “life space,” the total factors influencing a 
group are fluid, adjusting according to the context. 
 The fluidity of Lewin's life space works well with the concept of intersectionality 
as a lens for understanding the dynamic forces present within decision-making.  
Intersectionality highlights interaction, transforming the notion of a single cause into 
multiple, shifting determinants.  The affinity between the Lewinian model and the 
construct of intersectionality offers a critical theoretical space for pursing the questions 
guiding this study. 
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Intersectionality 
 Intersectionality was described by feminist legal theorist, Kimberle Crenshaw 
(1991), as a means of reconciling the way that black women's experience could not be fit 
neatly into either the feminist or anti-racist movements (Davis, 2008).  Rather than 
articulating identity based on binary or dichotomous categories of difference, 
intersectionality attends to the multiple, contradictory structural and individual aspects of 
experience that people continually negotiate via interactions and differing positions of 
power (Collins, 1992; Crenshaw, 1991).  This dynamic approach offers a more critical 
lens and deeper understandings of “the complexity of social inequalities and identities” 
(Bilge 2010, p.12). 
 The multiple axes of difference cannot be understood separately – each category, 
alone, is unrepresentative of the whole.  Instead, they are interwoven, multiple axes 
operating simultaneously as oppression or privilege, depending on ones social location.  
For example, a white woman's experience of patriarchy, though oppressive, may not have 
equal resonance to that of a woman of color, who does not experience race as a privilege 
like a white woman. 
 Work on intersectionality often takes up race, class and gender as particularly 
defining, but this dissertation offers a reminder of the shifting salience of particular lines 
of oppression.  In this case, legal status marks the bearer with a distinct weight that may 
shift her experience of violence from her intimate partner.  Any intersectional analysis 
must consider multiple factors as “social processes that inform each other but operate in 
distinct and particular ways” (Nash, 2008).  Only in doing so is it possible to suggest a 
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point of intervention. 
 This dynamic approach offers a more critical lens and deeper understandings of 
“the complexity of social inequalities and identities” (Bilge, 2010, p.12).  In the study of 
psychological phenomena, a focus on intersectionality involves attending to both the 
person and her/his context along multiple dimensions.  These axes cannot be understood 
separately but rather as part of a whole.  They are interwoven, multiple axes operating 
simultaneously as oppression or privilege, depending on one’s social location.  
Intersectionality holds important implications for domestic violence work because it calls 
into question the assumption that domestic violence is the primary danger faced by the 
survivor seeking services (Bograd, 1999; Crenshaw, 1991; Davis, 2000; Haaken, 2010; 
Smith, 2005). 
 Mainstream DV discourse has traditionally considered patriarchy as the primary 
source of violence against survivors, reducing other indicators of social location, such as 
ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, to subordinate issues or stressors (Arnold & Ake, 2013; 
Bogard, 2005).  By not privileging gender as the sole explanatory framework, a focus on 
intersectionality recognizes the interplay between differing social dimensions and how 
they shape the experience of domestic violence for all affected by domestic violence: 
survivors, perpetrators, families, friends and the larger community.  This can result in 
recognition of the need for a range of disparate responses to the survivor’s hierarchy of 
needs. 
 More recently community-focused organizations, primarily made up of 
marginalized women, have inserted an intersectionality-oriented perspective into DV 
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work.  Organizations like INCITE, Sista II Sista, and CARA, for example, have critiqued 
the mainstream focus on responding rather than preventing or ending DV(Arnold & Ake, 
2013; Smith, 2006).  These groups have worked within communities, organizing against 
broader issues of police brutality and targeting of communities of color, often through 
organizing other related groups with those focused on DV issues, alone. While the groups 
frame domestic violence in the same way as mainstream organizations—as a problem 
that emerges from believes around privilege and power that are rooted in institutional 
practices – their focus extends from a gender analysis to an emphasis on multiple, 
intersecting structures of domination (Collins, 1991; Crenshaw, 1991). 
 I enlist the construct of intersectionality as a lens for examining the single-issue 
politics of DV work as well as an indicator of the group’s use of a more complex way of 
thinking about the dilemma posed by law-enforcement collaborations with ICE.  As 
advocates consider ways of making decisions at a time of crisis, it is helpful to 
understand their use of intersectional thinking that considers violence against women, 
both broadly and in relation to individual women, as it is constituted by multiple social 
factors like, racism, sexism, classism, and immigration status. 
 The concept of intersectionality provides a framework for analyzing interactions 
present within the focus groups.  Lewin (1997) suggests attending to the contextual 
processes dynamically shaping group and individual interactions. Intersectionality offers 
a lens for revealing power dynamics as they flow throughout the decision-making 
process, both in the group and within the larger ideological frames, which shape the kinds 
of discussions that take place and are silenced. 
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 Even as scholarship has developed on intersectionality, the concept also has been 
critiqued for being too broad and undefined, potentially resulting in a laundry list of 
broad social factors that lack specificity (Davis, 2008). To mitigate this, I bring in the 
concept of border tensions, as a means of narrowing the broad ideological sweep 
potentially present in an intersectional analysis.  Rather than an intersection, with its 
implication of movement through, border tensions highlights the collisions, drawing 
attention to the point of impact and the injury that is possible at this concussive 
encounter.  These intersections at the border need not be neutral nor negative, but can be 
sites of productive, generative, creative conflict offering the impetus for positive change. 
 Border tension (Haaken & Yragui, 2003; Haaken, 2008; Haaken, 2010) is a 
concept that describes the conflicting ideologies and practices that people, individually 
and as representatives of institutions, bring to doing work around social problems.  
Haaken and Yragui (2003) introduce the concept of border tensions as a way of 
describing the conflict that that arises when feminist ideology around domestic violence 
work encounters policy practices.  In interrogating the boundary drawn between hidden 
domestic violence shelters and the wider community, the authors describe an ideological 
divide that encompasses far more than the practical consideration of whether a shelter 
should be hidden or not. 
 The authors describe shelter locations as an area of border tensions in which the 
shelter operates both practically and symbolically. On the one hand, the division over 
whether or not to hide a shelter includes the practical argument as to whether shelters are 
viable responses to violence against women and should continue to be funded.  On the 
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other hand, the discussion of shelter location contains more symbolic loading, including 
notions of safety, care and refuge, as well as larger understandings of women as a 
category. 
 By looking at the way in which women of color bring a multidimensional analysis 
to the question of shelter location policies, the authors emphasize the variability present 
within a practice often presented as accepted and unchallenged.  Additionally, by 
examining the multiple symbolic meanings inherent to the practice, the authors reveal the 
way that the focus on safety through drawing boundaries around it based entirely on 
“good women” and “bad men” ignores other important divisions that may have more 
salience, and provide increased safety, for survivors in varying social locations. 
 This encapsulation of both material and symbolic concerns is integral to the 
concept of border tensions.  Because it refers to the collisions that occur when multiple, 
often conflicting, interests negotiate things like policy, services, and ideology, 
understanding border tensions means unpacking the dimensions, both practical and 
symbolic, present at these encounters. 
 We all carry with us multiple, sometimes contrary, beliefs about the work we do.  
These beliefs have the potential to come into conflict with other’s beliefs in any 
collaborative practice.  The importance of this concept for this project lies in the focus on 
what Haaken (2010) describes as acute border tensions, places in which conflicts become 
rigid and conversation around alternatives are difficult, if not impossible.  These can 
bring about a kind of battle fatigue (Haaken 2010), a weariness that precludes 
examination.  Additionally, these places can be marked by commonsensical assumptions 
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that come without interrogation, as the bearer simply assumes them to be true. 
 Until now, work on border tensions has been primarily theoretical, focused on 
unpacking the concept and delineating its social psychological component, its 
construction at the group level and the historical forces occurring at moments of border 
tension (Haaken & Yragui, 2002; Haaken 2008; Haaken et al. 2008; Haaken 2010).  
Making use of this heuristic, this project applies the concept of border tension to a current 
social problem affecting the domestic violence movement.  Through introducing 
scenarios that bring forth acute border tensions, the dissertation examines the way in 
which advocates reconcile multiple competing claims, paying close attention to their 
discursive practices. 
 Border tension is felt more keenly the closer one is to the border.  As one becomes 
more engulfed in the dominant system it can become harder to recognize the pressures 
affecting discrete groups.  In this study, the proximity the group has to the border affects 
both the decisions made around how to respond to a problem as well as the way in which 
the issue, itself, can be discussed.  As I describe in the following sections, this project will 
examines the proximal and distal effects – the varying border tensions – on advocates’ 
decision-making processes.  In addition to asking how advocates respond to the dilemma 
presented by collaborations between law enforcement and ICE and examining the 
discursive strategies used to manage this dilemma, the project focuses on whether a 
group’s location related to the way in which the problem is articulated and addressed. 
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Chapter Three: Research Methods 
 This section describes the project's methodology. The research questions are as 
follows: 
1. How do advocates work through a dilemma that has emerged in their practice? 
2. What are the discursive strategies enlisted by advocates in addressing a 
dilemma at the border of domestic violence and immigration politics? 
3. What is the relationship between each group’s proximity to working with 
undocumented survivors and their decision-making process? 
 Research questions one and two examine the ways in which advocates respond to 
the dilemma presented by law enforcement collaborations with ICE.  I begin by 
discussing how advocates manage the problem and then explore their responses in greater 
depth, to understand the dynamics, through determining if they enlist strategies that keep 
the needs of the undocumented survivor in the forefront. In order to do this I conducted 
focus groups in which dilemmas of practice at the border of DV and immigration were 
presented.  These were in the form of two scenarios: one that mimicked a crisis call and 
one that presented a policy common to all the groups. 
 Research question three asks what relationship each group’s proximity to work 
with undocumented survivors has to the complexity of their decision making process.  
My preliminary phone interviews with advocates indicated that they employ an 
intersectional orientation to work with survivors that considers survivor needs across a 
range of dimensions.  However, preliminary research with directors of two DV agencies 
indicated that staff at a Latina-focused agency had a greater understanding of the 
54 
 
increased risk of deportation and the effect on undocumented survivors than staff at a 
more mainstream agency.   I hypothesized that the closer the advocates’ work was to 
undocumented survivors, the more salient the survivors’ particular needs would be to the 
group.  I assumed that advocates whose work was more proximal to undocumented 
survivors would articulate more complex suggestions for how to respond to the effects of 
collaborations between law enforcement and ICE. 
 I used a case study methodology as a means of both evaluating proximity and 
examining the organizations’ orientation to domestic violence work, in general.  
Determining if the agencies had a similar general orientation to doing DV work was 
important for understanding if agencies were employing a similar theoretical framework 
for approaching DV work.  It has been my experience, both in my work as an advocate 
and my preliminary research that advocates, in general, approach DV work with a similar 
political orientation that is rooted in a feminist conception of the dynamics of DV.  I 
assumed the advocates involved in this study would assume a similar orientation, which 
would be reflected in their agency policies.  This determination of shared orientation was 
important for responding to all of the research questions. 
 Additionally, this case study method was used to determine proximity to work 
with undocumented survivors.  This was important for understanding if the organizations 
were, in fact, differently related in their closeness to work with undocumented survivors.  
This allowed me to respond to research question three and the issue of proximity. 
 The results of the focus groups were analyzed using a discourse analysis.  In the 
analysis I examine the findings for evidence of intersectionality and determine if it is 
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maintained within examples of practice and policy.  In the following I begin by 
describing the sample, the case study and focus groups.  This is followed by the analytic 
strategy. 
Sample 
The sample was drawn from the domestic violence service agencies in the tri-
county Portland, Oregon area.  Each organization has provided domestic violence and 
sexual assault services in Portland for at least twenty years.  Two of the organizations are 
the oldest providers in the area.  The organizations were chosen purposively, both for 
their multi-dimensional set of practices around DV service provision, including 24-hour 
crisis lines, and their work with undocumented survivors.  As I describe in more detail in 
the case study, each of the participating organizations offers a wide range of domestic 
violence services.  Collectively these include crisis lines, emergency shelter, transitional 
housing, outreach, and education services.  Additionally each agency offers specific 
services, not provided by the other organizations:  Portland Women’s Crisis Line provides 
the primary crisis line for the Tri-county Portland area; Project UNICA is Latina-focused 
and offers a 24-hour Spanish language crisis line; and Bradley-Angle has a stated 
commitment to doing work with survivors of color and offers services specifically for 
African refugees. 
 The focus groups were comprised of twenty-five advocates from three 
organizations in the metropolitan area of Portland, Oregon.  Each group consisted of 
between six and thirteen people, depending upon the size of the larger organization.  For 
example, PWCL is a small organization with only ten staff members.  There were six 
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participants at that meeting. 
 Within each organization, participants work in multiple, varied roles, however all 
have answered the crisis line and done safety planning with survivors as part of their 
work.  Among the advocates there was a range of experience doing domestic violence 
work, from housing to court advocacy to direct case management. 
Case Study.  This dissertation includes a case study methodology in order to 
determine the proximity of each organization to doing work with undocumented 
survivors.  The case study also provides evidence of the shared orientation groups bring 
to doing DV work, which make possible similar approaches to survivors, including an 
intersectional perspective.  Case study designs are suitable for studies that center on 
multiple perspectives within a shared context (Lewis, 2003).  The descriptions of the 
organizational contexts provide important frameworks for analysis of the responses and 
data for answering the research questions.  Yin (2003) suggests that the case study 
methodology is well suited for capturing context and its effect upon participants.  In this 
dissertation a case study of the three participating organizations serves to situate each 
group in relation to each other as well as to their work around the issue of law 
enforcement/ICE collaborations’ effect on undocumented survivors of domestic violence. 
 The organizations were chosen purposively, both for their similar set of practices 
around DV service provision and their differing proximity to the phenomenon.  Proximity 
is indicated by their varying emphases on work with immigrant survivors.  The three case 
studies are based on a range of available sources, including published materials, volunteer 
and staff training manuals, websites, informal interviews with staff, former staff and 
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volunteers and other ethnographic methods.  This material is used to situate the groups 
and connect the organizational claims and practices to the findings from the focus groups. 
 On the basis of this systematic treatment of the materials it is possible to identify 
the extent to which each agency focuses specifically on work with immigrant survivors.  
By gathering data on each of the organizations – their histories, current practices and how 
they describe themselves on websites and in print – the dimension of proximity, or 
closeness to the phenomenon, emerges.  The case studies of the agencies include 
descriptions of trainings and materials offered in languages other than English, as well as 
whether specific trainings are offered around immigrant issues, and delineation of staff 
time around immigrant issues. The case study includes determining overall training and 
the amount of staff time given to issues pertinent to immigrant populations. 
 The case study is guided by the concept of intersectionality in examining how 
much the organizations serve or interact with minority populations, particularly 
immigrant, as well as their alliances with other organizations that work on issues relating 
to these groups.  Additionally, I examine whether the agency connects domestic violence 
with other social problems and if that manifests itself in work with other organizations 
and agencies not traditionally aligned with domestic violence service providers.  Finally, 
if agencies have existing policies specific to undocumented survivors, I assess these 
policies to determine if they reflect awareness of ICE/law enforcement collaborations. 
 All of the research questions are focused on the ways that groups manage the 
dilemma presented by collaborations between law enforcement /ICE.  Research questions 
one and two ask specifically about process, while research question three examines 
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whether that process is related to the advocates’ work with undocumented survivors.  In 
the following section I describe my choice of a focus group methodology as a means of 
responding to the research questions.  I then describe the dilemmas of practice I 
introduced within each focus group.  I follow this with a description of the procedure I 
adhered to in the three focus groups and the conceptual and subsequent methodological 
choices I made in structuring them. 
Focus group rationale. Focus groups offer a means to observe the intersection of 
individual and group processes that can reveal the dynamic interactions between group 
members (Morgan, 2010).  In addition, working with groups, as opposed to individuals, 
offers a means of seeing more synergistic interactions.  The interaction of group members 
can support access to information and insights that may not arise in an interview setting, 
while allowing observation of social interactions within the group. 
 These group collaborations also serve to diminish the potential emphasis on the 
researcher's role in data collection.  Group meetings can allow for a more egalitarian 
relationship between researchers and participants, as power is potentially more equally 
distributed throughout the group and the facilitators, as opposed to individual interviews 
in which the interviewer may be perceived as having a privileged position of power 
(citation).  In addition, groups generally have a greater number of participants than 
facilitators, which can also support this power shift. 
 Focus group research has been critiqued for typically removing the participants 
from the settings where interactions commonly take place, bringing them into an 
unfamiliar space and asking them to interact with people they have never met (Madriz 
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2001).  To address this problem, I conducted the three focus group meetings during 
regular staff meetings, which allowed me to stay as close as possible to the organic 
phenomenon, by meeting with advocates where they work, among those with whom day-
to-day decisions are made. 
 This project took place in the familiarity of the workspace, among co-workers 
engaged in similar practice.  In addition, domestic violence work carries with it shared 
goals, which suggest a similar political orientation towards violence against women.  This 
orientation can reflect that of the larger agency and diminish the possibility for 
disagreement along fundamental issues, which could prove insurmountable to other focus 
groups.  In addition, the familiarity of the group may help to diminish power imbalances 
that might emerge in groups along the lines of race and ethnicity (Madriz, 2001). 
 Simultaneously, it was important to consider the role the workplace may play in 
creating power hierarchies that can stifle participation.  The staff meetings include people 
in varying power roles – supervisors and staff.  Work roles may have affected the degree 
to which a staff member felt comfortable suggesting departures from agency policy and 
may have precluded unfettered critiques of existent policies and practices.  The presence 
of other staff members may have kept advocates from revealing any actions they may 
have taken that conflicted with agency policy and practice. 
 The power dynamic present in staff meetings may have been mitigated in the 
focus group meetings through staying focused on the dilemma presented by law 
enforcement/ ICE collaborations and the subsequent effect on advocate’s work.  At the 
beginning of each meeting, I provided a description of the subject we would be 
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discussing, including a brief history of the collaborations between the DV movement and 
the criminal justice system, as well as the recent partnerships between law enforcement 
and ICE.  This helped broaden the contextual frame of the meeting, taking the focus off 
of individual responses and placing it upon larger structural issues.  Then, as the 
scenarios describing a dilemma of practice were introduced, and throughout the focus 
groups, the moderator prompted the group to consider the issues collectively and work 
through them as a group.  The scenarios are described in more detail within the following 
section. 
Focus group procedures.  I called the executive directors of each organization, 
explained my project and requested that a single focus group be held during the time of 
their regular staff meeting.  They were given an offer to learn more about the project in an 
in-person meeting with the principal investigator.  None of the directors requested an in-
person meeting. 
 In the initial phone call to the executive directors of the potential participating 
agencies, I briefly discussed the purpose of the study.  I explained that I was interested in 
conducting the study with staff members only, and described the way that staff members 
might feel more comfortable speaking openly about difficult dilemmas among their 
colleagues.  Each director expressed interest in having staff members participate.  I 
described the study in greater length, explaining the audiotaping, types of scenarios, 
transcript review, confidentiality, and the use of quotes.  I offered to answer any questions 
the directors had and discussed the proposed length of time for the focus group.  I sent 
each director a letter of consent (appendix B) that they could give to each staff member 
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prior to the meeting.  Along with my letter I offered my contact information, should they 
have additional questions.  I was not contacted again by any of the directors. 
 When staff members arrived for the focus group, they were offered an additional 
copy of the letter of consent.  At the beginning of the meeting, we discussed 
confidentiality. I suggested that individual confidentiality was the goal, and outlined 
practices such as expunging all names and identifying information from the transcript.  I 
cautioned, however, that I could not insure that others would not discuss the meeting after 
leaving.  I also talked about the way that confidentiality is difficult to achieve in a small 
community like the domestic violence service provision community of the Tri-county 
area.  The staff members were offered an opportunity to refrain from participating if they 
did not desire to be part of the focus group.  Of the three groups, one person opted not to 
participate.  She explained that she was the agency’s bookkeeper and rarely answered 
crisis calls.  Those who participated were audio taped and a co-facilitator was present 
who moderated as advocates worked through scenarios. 
 In the groups, I introduced dilemmas of practice (Haaken 2010) – conflict points 
where responses could not be effectively managed through established protocol, in the 
form of scenarios describing a crisis call and a current agency practice.  I described the 
larger problem of how advocates are addressing some of the dilemmas of working with 
undocumented women and enlisted the group in working through the dynamics of the 
dilemmas. 
The first scenario focuses on a caller who describes emotional and physical 
violence to herself and her children by her partner/their father.  He is the family’s primary 
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economic provider and deportation would result in extreme hardship for the family.  
Additionally, she, her partner, and their oldest child are undocumented. 
 The second scenario describes the recorded message one receives at many 
agencies, if the line is busy.  The recording instructs the caller, “If this is an emergency, 
hang up and dial 911.” I asked the group to consider this advice, given what I had 
presented about the Secure Communities program.  I also described organizations outside 
Oregon that have made the decision not to refer undocumented survivors to law 
enforcement.  Please see appendix A for copies of the scenarios. 
Focus group framework. I enlisted a Lewinian framework to guide my 
construction of the focus group format.  In his articulation of action research Lewin 
describes working with individuals from organizations and institutions committed to 
addressing “minority problems” – the inequity and segregation present in the U.S. in the 
1940s.  He argues that although many organizations are well-meaning and determined to 
face the issues directly, they share an uncertainty that renders them unable to act.  As he 
notes, 
…these eager people feel themselves to be in a fog. They feel in a fog on 
three counts: 1. What is the present situation? 2. What are the dangers? 3. 
And most importantly of all, what shall we do? (Lewin 1997, p. 143)  
 
 It has been my experience both an advocate and researcher that DV advocates 
often share the questions Lewin describes.  Problems can appear so vast and ubiquitous, 
that determining how to begin to intervene can feel insurmountable.  It is possible that 
through understanding the way advocates process crisis calls and the manner in which 
decisions are made around seemingly unanswerable questions some clarity can emerge 
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around how to respond. 
 Lewin poses the three questions as a framework for his delineation of the process 
necessary for researching social practices, with a focus on repeated planning, action and 
fact-finding (ibid, p. 146).  He suggests that after articulating the research problem, a kind 
of reconnaissance is required, which allows the researcher an understanding of what is at 
stake and how to potentially address it.  Following Lewin, I introduce these questions as a 
guide for framing the focus group meetings, using the first two to structure my 
contribution to the meeting and asking advocates to work through two scenarios in 
response to the third. 
Lewin’s first two questions help in describing the total situation, what he refers to 
as the entire, immediate, context (Lewin, 1997).  Lewin’s first question asks, “What is the 
present situation?” (p.143). In introducing this question, I described current law 
enforcement/ICE partnerships with a focus on the Secure Communities program and its 
effects both nationally and in Oregon. 
 Lewin’s (1997) second question, “What are the dangers?” (p. 143) further draws 
out the total situation, via asking for articulation of what is at stake as a result of law 
enforcement/ICE collaborations.  I explained the way in which throughout the DV 
movement, danger has been located primarily in the batterer, with services focused on 
getting women away from their abusive partners.  I described how critiques by women of 
color, especially, have broadened the narrow focus on batterers, describing the various 
structural conditions that affect people unequally, based on social location. 
 I explained that law enforcement/ICE partnerships extend this complexity further 
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in complicating the role the state takes in providing safety or creating additional danger 
for already marginalized populations.  This contextualized the problem for the advocates 
and prepared the group to begin to respond to the scenarios.  Prior to asking each group to 
begin responding, I brought in Lewin’s third question saying, “In light of these 
collaborations between law enforcement and ICE, what shall we do?” 
 The following section describes my analytic strategy for the focus group data.  I 
begin by describing discourse analysis, my analytic orientation.  I follow this with a 
delineation of the analytic process, including the data organization. 
Data Analysis 
Because my research questions focus on discursive practices and the location of 
DV workers to work with undocumented survivors, I combine a case study method with a 
discourse analysis approach.  Discourse analysis lends itself to the analysis of focus 
group data because these data stem from discursive interactions that occur among focus 
group participants (Cowan & McLeod, 2004). 
Willig (2003) describes the way in which discourse analysis has become more 
common in psychological research.  As psychologists moved away from cognitivism and 
its focus on the internal states of individuals, the study of language shifted.  Rather than 
viewing language as simply the manifestation of inner states, it was reconceptualized as 
productive – something people do rather than have. 
Discourse refers to the use of language that carries assumptions shared by others 
in a specific communicative context.  It acts as a framework for making sense of the 
world and the way in which a particular group talks and thinks about itself and its 
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experiences.  A discursive approach recognizes that language assists in constructing 
objects and phenomenon in our social world through socially, culturally and historically 
specific discourses (Weedon, 1987). 
Discourse analysis (DA) offers a lens for understanding the processes at work that 
both encourage and limit action.  Goodley & Parker (2000) explain that “There are 
structural limits to change (which) are reflected in and reinforced by patterns of 
discourse” (p.12). This means that when a particular way of talking about something is 
used, it can have the effect of limiting other ways of thinking about (and talking about) 
that thing.  This can seem fairly innocuous on the face of it, but it can be extremely 
powerful. 
For example, the use of the term “illegal alien,” while seemingly just crass or 
politically incorrect, serves a powerful purpose.  It begins by separating the person away 
from the populous – “othering” them – through designating them as different, not human, 
alien.  At the same time the term affixes criminality to their status, removing it from the 
action of border crossing, which might allow some room for discussion of causality or 
sympathy toward outsiders.  In constructing the discursive object (the person one is 
talking about), the discursive practice (the choice of words) can uphold existing power 
structures.  This conception of the relationship between discourse and power is important 
for my study as this dissertation is focused on understanding the way advocates manage 
dilemmas of practice which are themselves shaped by particular ways of understanding 
DV. 
Discourse analysis offers a means of understanding the ways that language is used 
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to construct meaning – socially, politically, and ideologically.  Parker (1992) describes 
how discourse analysis can be used effectively to explore how language is employed to 
re-frame accounts, opening a space for understanding subjectivity – or, the way in which 
people experience the world and understand their place within it.  He outlines a way of 
understanding language as a dynamic process that is both constitutive and reflexive – 
meaning that it both creates and reflects reality. 
This focus on language is appropriate for studying domestic violence issues, for in 
many ways the struggles within the domestic violence movement have been battles over 
words.  Throughout the movement, activists have worked to bring domestic violence into 
mainstream political discourse.  By shifting language describing domestic violence from 
the confines of the heteronormative patriarchal home (wife beating) to the realm of the 
general public (domestic or interpersonal violence) activists changed the domestic 
violence discourse, altering public perception of the problem from a private, inter-
individual, intra-familial issue to a criminal act warranting public attention and public 
sanction.  However, this discursive shift from domestic strife to criminality carried with it 
unintended consequences, particularly around the increased presence of the state in the 
lives of survivors, that served to shape the movement as well. 
It is necessary to understand more than just language in considering how 
advocates manage emerging dilemmas in their work.  In research exploring evangelical 
Christian communities and domestic violence discourse, Haaken, Fussell & Mankowski 
(2007) describe discourse analysis as a way of understanding dynamic fluctuations and 
shifts in meaning, particularly around sites of social conflict.  By recognizing that terms 
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used to describe and understand DV are embedded in larger social processes, it is 
possible to move away from fixed categories to reveal a more dynamic set of possibilities 
for change.  The authors caution, however, against a tendency within discourse analysis 
to stay too fixated on language.  They describe a dialectical approach that brings together 
an analysis of language and the larger material conditions affecting the women of their 
study. 
This emphasis on both discourse and the accompanying context is crucial for my 
analytic strategy.  I use the contextual findings from the case study and employ a 
discourse analysis approach that is focused on examining the narratives of the group to 
see if they use intersectional thinking.  I am interested in understanding the discursive 
frames that delimit or expand the ways advocates are able to speak about potential 
responses to law enforcement/ICE partnerships.  I examine both the language of the focus 
groups and the particular context within which these discussions take place.  This context 
is rooted in a particular history – at the level of both the agency and the larger DV 
movement in which strategic choices have been made around partnering with the criminal 
justice system. 
Discourse analysts stress that the approach is not simply a method, but also an 
approach or orientation (Antaki et al, 2002; Billig, 2001; Cheek, 2004; Parker, 1992; 
Willig, 2003).  This method of analysis encompasses a wide range of practices centered 
on the way meaning is constructed through language (Parker, 1992).  Walton (2007) 
suggests that “doing discourse analysis” (p.118) is less about a pedantic adherence to 
particular steps and more about employing the analytic categories and reporting the 
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analysis in a way that maintains its theoretical foundations.  Discourse analysis (DA) is 
described as flexible, working well with multiple organizing tools for coding and 
managing the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  However, the appeal of the DA method 
brings its own problems as well in deciding what exactly to do. 
My strategy was to combine steps from Braun and Clarke’s (2006) description of 
thematic content analysis with elements of Willig’s (2003) description of Foucauldian 
Discourse Analysis (FDA).  This approach seemed most helpful for the way it brought 
together pragmatic organizational tools while maintaining a focus on discourse through 
the use of FDA.  Braun and Clarke describe a means of managing the data via looking at 
it broadly to determine patterns.  This project is not about pulling out themes, however 
qualitative data can be unwieldy and the sheer volume of the data overwhelming, so I 
found it helpful as an early organizing tool. 
FDA has a strong foundation in Foucault’s theoretical positions, including the idea 
that discourses are historically situated and dictate the social construction of “reality”.  
Discourses operate in both institutional and individual practices (Weedon, 1987).  DV 
work, like all work, is shaped by the discourses that frame it, which themselves are 
products of a larger history.  For example, the notion that DV is a crime, involving a 
victim and a perpetrator who are discrete individuals, is a commonly accepted discourse 
with a history in the larger DV movement; and, the belief that enlisting the criminal 
justice system as an ally to the larger DV movement is a commonly accepted practice tied 
to understandings of how to achieve control over the problem. 
In this project I wanted to understand how DV advocates respond to a dilemma 
69 
 
that calls into question movement practices around collaborating with the criminal justice 
system.  If recommending a survivor enlist the police might result in more harm than the 
survivor is experiencing from her abusive partner, what can an advocate do?  In order to 
understand this question it would not be enough for me to pull out the themes that 
emerged in the focus group, I needed to understand how the discourse worked. 
I began by working systematically through the material and immersing myself in 
the content.  This purpose of this was to produce an overall picture of the data.  After 
transcribing the focus group discussions, I followed Willig’s (2003) description of a 
discursive analytic approach, beginning by listening to the transcripts rather than reading 
them.  She recommends this for the way it requires present and active participation with 
the text.  This allowed me to experience the texts as a conversation and capture the 
nuances of the interactions, that weren’t easily described in a transcript.  Hearing the 
actual length of the pause, or the rush to respond, allowed me to (re)experience the focus 
group event.  Willig (2001) describes the way in which this can allow the researcher to 
“feel” the text and potentially glean understandings that might not emerge in the printed 
word. 
 Because research questions one and two focus on understanding the discursive 
strategies advocates use when working through a complex social problem, I examined the 
structure of the discussion, looking for places where the discussion changed or came to a 
stop.  As I listened I took notes about what I heard, marking places in which the 
discussion halted or made a sudden shift.  I then read the transcripts multiple times in 
working toward what Patton (1990) describes as a rich description of data.  These initial 
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steps allowed me to begin to make sense of the data’s broader meanings and implications 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Braun & Clarke (2006) also describe the way a tangible, hands-on approach, 
though laborious, can be useful when combined with computer organizing programs.  I 
combined a manual coding system that used practices like highlighters and post-it notes 
and actual cutting and pasting, with an Excel spreadsheet (Krueger, n.d.).  I again read 
each focus group transcript several times while listening to the audiotape.  I marked 
places that I recognized as similar across the three focus group transcripts and looked 
closely at how the places were organized in each group.  I then made a copy of the 
transcripts with each place highlighted and cut them into sections, affixing them to a 
board in order to gain a wide overview of the data. 
During this stage I identified patterns in the data suggesting that advocates in all 
three groups were using a common means of structuring their responses at similar points 
in the group discussions.  At various points in each focus group, advocates enlisted an 
implicit decision tree mode of reasoning as a heuristic in organizing their responses.  This 
way of proceeding allowed them to break their responses down into a series of yes/no 
contingencies, with each decision producing a sub-set of yes/no options with 
corresponding courses of actions. 
Willig (2003) describes discourse analysis as proceeding as a result of the 
researcher’s interaction with the text.  Much like grounded theory, in which the merger 
between the method and the findings determines the course of action, my first finding 
structured the next set of methodological choices.  I then created an Excel spreadsheet to 
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organize the data according to the points in which I recognized the decision-tree heuristic.  
This allowed me to focus on specific moments in each focus group and to compare them 
across groups. 
Following this initial organization of the data and findings, I made use of steps 
from Willig’s (2001) delineation of FDA.  I began with her concept of the discursive 
object and looked at the way it was referenced in the text, both implicitly and explicitly.  
Willig describes the discursive object as emerging out of the research questions.  In the 
dissertation, the undocumented survivor occupies the position of discursive object, 
because my research questions focus on how it is that advocates work at the intersection 
of DV work and US immigration policies in advocating for undocumented survivors. 
I began by marking all the places where the group used the words 
“undocumented”, “Latina”, “survivor” and “woman” or “women”.  In the next iteration I 
looked for the implicit references, searching for instances of the word “her”, then reading 
the context to determine the subject.  Was it the survivor they were referencing or another 
advocate?  Finally I looked for ways in which consideration of the discursive object was 
absent.  Were there moments in the text when policies and practices were discussed 
without reference to the undocumented survivor?  Willig (2001) describes the way that a 
text ignores or does not reference the discursive object can offer an indication of the way 
the object is understood by the group. 
I then followed Willig’s articulation of discourses, which focuses on difference.  I 
examined the way the discursive object was constructed and looked at the varying ways 
in which participants talked about undocumented survivors.  Was this an intersectional or 
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more homogenous way of understanding the undocumented survivor and her particular 
needs? 
Research questions one and two ask about what advocates do when confronted 
with a dilemma of practice.  How do advocates work through a key dilemma that has 
emerged in their practice?  What are the discursive strategies enlisted by advocates in 
addressing a dilemma at the border of domestic violence and immigration politics?  In 
designing this dissertation I held the assumption that advocates who make use of an 
intersectional analysis when considering the needs of an undocumented survivor hold a 
more complex articulation of possible responses in light of law enforcement/ICE 
collaborations.  Guided by this theoretical assumption, the analytic process involved 
attending closely to the groups’ use of intersectional ways of considering the survivor and 
her needs. 
An intersectional perspective involves consideration of multiple axes which might 
include (but are not be limited to) immigration and documentation status, being a 
survivor of domestic violence, gender, having brown skin in the Pacific Northwestern 
area of the United States, lower socio-economic status, sexual orientation, and being a 
parent of children with differing documentation status.  These axes are not discrete, but 
inform one another, operating dynamically in different contexts.  Considering these 
varying social dimensions at particular moments in time and in relation to different parts 
of the larger social system could result in radically diverging responses by advocates. 
Throughout the analysis of the data I made use of what Willig terms 
“positionings”– a way of understanding how the person doing the talking is also 
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constructed by the discourse through which she speaks (Willig, 2001 p. 174).  In other 
words, it is not just the discursive object that is affected by the discourse, but the speaker 
as well, who remains bound by the parameters through which she speaks.  For this 
dissertation, the concept offered a means of thinking about how advocates’ responses are 
constructed within a larger DV discursive community.  For example, as I describe in the 
findings, all groups made use of common ways of understanding domestic violence that 
have their foundation in the Duluth Model and the Power and Control Wheel.  This 
implies that advocates in all three groups bring certain similar assumptions to their work 
regarding the criminality of DV. 
This concept of positioning helped illuminate how group responses may be 
shaped and constrained by the context.  I used the idea of border tension to describe how 
advocates potentially carried with them multiple, often conflicting roles.  As described 
earlier, border tension (Haaken & Yragui, 2003; Haaken, 2008; Haaken, 2010) offers a 
means of describing the conflicting ideologies and practices people – individually and as 
representatives of groups or institutions – bring to their work.  This concept emerged in 
the context of research at the intersection of communities with conflicting aims or 
interests.  Advocates take on many roles in their work, depending upon their identity, 
politics, and organizational position at the time.  For example, in working with survivors, 
they can simultaneously represent their agency, their community partner, the survivor and 
themselves.  Negotiating these identities can bring them into conflict and require 
decisions around prioritizing these multiple roles, which can manifest border tension. 
Throughout the analysis I paid close attention to places in the data in which 
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participants would offer responses contingent upon their particular role within the agency.  
I also marked sites in the transcripts where group members identified an impasse – 
moments when there was no negotiation around a response because it was a matter of 
agency policy.  As I worked through each transcript and across groups, advocates were 
experiencing border tension at similar places.  For example, in two of the focus groups 
advocates described feeling forced to respond in similar ways because of their agency 
policies, despite their discomfort with the potential outcome. 
I combined my key theoretical constructs to try and understand what the discourse 
was doing.  How were these moments of impasse – the places of border tension – 
resolved?  Did advocates use an intersectional way of proceeding to work through them 
or did they fall back on a more simplistic telling?  What effect did that have upon the 
discursive object – the undocumented survivor?  Did she disappear from the account or 
did the advocates maintain her presence as they worked through the scenarios? 
Bringing together a method that combined elements of thematic analysis for 
determining patterns in the data, with concepts from FDA around discourse and 
discursive constructions proved fruitful in addressing the research questions. The three 
research questions are: 
1. How do advocates work through a key dilemma that has emerged in their 
practice? 
2. What are the discursive strategies enlisted by advocates in addressing a 
dilemma at the border of domestic violence and immigration politics?   
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3. What is the relationship between each group’s proximity to working with 
undocumented survivors and their decision-making process? 
 In the following section I describe the findings of the focus group in relation to 
these questions.  I begin with the case study, which I used as a means describing context 
and determining each agency’s proximity to work with undocumented survivors.  I follow 
this by describing an overview of the focus groups.  I explain the strategies advocates 
across all groups employ when considering both a crisis call and agency policies in light 
of the dilemma created by law enforcement/ICE collaborations.  I follow this discussion 
with a description of the findings for each group in relation to the focus group scenarios. 
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Chapter Four: Findings 
 In presenting the findings, I begin with the case study, describing the three 
participating organizations. The findings in the case study serve dual purposes.  They 
describe the contexts of the participating organizations, situating them in relation to one 
another and the broader domestic violence movement.  This is necessary for 
contextualizing the agencies and better understanding the participants’ responses during 
the focus groups in relation to research questions one and two.  Additionally, the case 
study describes the proximity construct, explaining each of the group’s closeness to work 
with undocumented survivors.  This is necessary for responding to research question 
three. 
 Using public information, including agency websites and printed materials, 
conversations I had with staff at each organization, and volunteer/staff training manuals, I 
summarize key aspects of the history of each organization in the tri-county area.  I look at 
the agencies’ mission statements or statements of values to better understand their 
orientation to domestic violence work.  This is important for understanding the way in 
which the agency, and its representatives, approach domestic violence intervention.  I 
then describe the current services each agency offers and the collaborative work they do 
in the larger community.  Following this narrative description, I include a table outlining 
agency services related to the dimensions of my study. 
 After the descriptions of the agencies, I explain the proximity each agency has to 
immigrant and undocumented survivors.  This description provides context for 
understanding the collective orientation of each group, as representatives of their 
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respective agencies.  This context includes information members of the focus groups 
bring to the discussions concerning undocumented survivors and the particular risks they 
face because of law enforcement/ICE collaborations.  After describing each group’s 
orientation to domestic violence services and its proximity to undocumented survivors, I 
present the findings from the three focus groups, followed by discussion of how findings 
inform the three research questions. 
Case Study 
Agency One. Portland Women’s Crisis Line (PWCL) is the oldest organization in 
Oregon focused on violence against women.  It began in 1972 as a rape crisis line and has 
operated continuously for forty years.  It was one of the first sexual violence crisis lines 
in the United States to offer a crisis line as its primary program.  Over time the agency 
expanded to offer other services, but the emphasis has remained on the crisis line as their 
main focus. 
 PWCL is an overtly feminist organization with an emphasis on social change.  On 
the history page of their website they offer their definition of feminism, quoting the 
scholar bell hooks (hooks, 1984).  They say, “At (PWCL), we define feminism as a 
movement to end sexism, sexist exploitation and oppression” (PWCL website). 
 This organizational commitment to feminism serves to place them within a 
particular way of understanding violence against women that is situated outside any 
notions of individual pathology.  Instead, PWCL places itself within a larger history of 
the women’s movement – with its recognition that structured gender inequality is the root 
cause of domestic violence and sexual assault (Sokoloff & Dupont, 2005).  In taking on 
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the feminist label, PWCL defines its work as inherently political.  At the same time, by 
choosing to use bell hooks’ (1984) definition of feminism, the agency is aligning itself 
with women of color who have critiqued the mainstream battered women’s movement’s 
myopic focus on gender, calling for a more intersectional perspective that recognizes the 
shifting effect of multiple systems of power and oppression (Bograd, 1999). 
 Throughout their website and printed materials, PWCL emphasizes support and 
empowerment for survivors; however, this commitment to the individual is constantly 
accompanied by support for larger, structural change and a focus on social justice.  In the 
“core values” section of their website they state, “PWCL was also founded as a social 
change organization.  We believe that domestic and sexual violence are widespread in our 
society.  Our purpose is to not only empower those who experience violence, but also to 
end the oppressions and violence which causes them to seek out our services” (PWCL 
website). 
 In the mission statement, the agency describes more clearly how they envision 
creating social change, and by extension, ending violence against women.  The agency 
describes itself as committed to “ending domestic and sexual violence by providing 
confidential support services and education to empower our community” (PWCL 
website).  The choice to include empowerment for the community, rather than focusing 
solely on the survivor level, provides insight into the agency’s political orientation, which 
understands DV as a social rather than a psychological issue.  This carries with it the 
radical feminist assumption that addressing DV requires social and institutional change 
(Schechter, 1982). 
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 They continue in this articulation of their inclusion of the larger community in 
addressing DV via their pledge to do outreach and form collaborative partnerships 
outside the agency.  This is manifest in their list of partnering agencies, which is 
extensive and not limited only to DV service providers.  In my conversation with the 
executive director, she described ongoing partnerships with locally-owned businesses 
within the community, who have made a commitment to the struggle against domestic 
and sexual violence, in the way articulated via her agency. 
 This radical orientation is also evident in their volunteer training manual.  Prior to 
giving any information about domestic violence, the training concentrates on broader 
issues of systemic inequity and the role of advocacy in making structural change.  Only 
after sections on racism and sexism is the topic of domestic violence introduced.  The 
remainder of the training follows in a similar way, with specific education about domestic 
and sexual assault interspersed with elements focused on social class, anti-oppression 
work, and other social change projects. 
  PWCL offers a comprehensive 24-hour crisis line and referral center for both 
domestic violence and sexual assault services, including shelter services.  The agency 
maintains an up-to-date list of available shelter beds and can directly connect callers to 
shelters with space.  This alleviates the need for people in crisis to make multiple calls to 
DV agencies.  Because of this, the organization is closely connected to DV and sexual 
assault service providers in five counties, allowing the agency special insight into current, 
available DV programming in the area.  This allows them potentially to be a liaison for 
communication between representatives of agencies as well as survivors. 
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 In addition to the crisis line, PWCL has other services.  Regular support groups 
for survivors of sexual assault and support services for families and friends of survivors 
are offered.  The organization has an extensive volunteer and outreach and education 
program.  They do not have a housing program, but work closely with multiple other 
agencies in town offering transitional and emergency housing. 
 In an interview with the director, she described the agency’s work with 
marginalized groups as one of the important features of the agency and part of shaping 
the political identity of many of its staff.  One example is their work directly targeting sex 
workers and developmentally disabled survivors.  She also highlighted the outreach they 
do with homeless and LGBTQ advocacy groups providing services to youth experiencing 
domestic violence. 
 Despite the broad scope of their work, PWCL is a small organization with only 
nine staff members, four of whom are full time.  In the focus group, participants discuss 
the way their size often limits their ability to do outreach to organizations not 
traditionally allied with DV organizations, like immigrant rights groups.  Participants also 
described limitations in their training around these issues, due, in part, to recent, ongoing 
budget cuts. 
Agency two.  Un Nuevo Inicio para Concluir el Abuso/A New Beginning to End 
Abuse, or Project UNICA, is part of a larger program that provides a broad range of 
services, including immigration legal services, focused upon the low-income Latina/o 
community.  This program is within Catholic Charities, an established non-secular 
organization that works on issues affecting marginalized populations.  Catholic Charities 
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began seventy-five years ago, advocating for children in foster care.  Over the years, the 
scope of the organization has broadened immensely and there are programs across 
Oregon.  In Portland, the organization offers assistance with housing, refugee 
resettlement, disaster relief, economic counseling, as well as adoption and post-abortion 
therapeutic programs.  They also provide comprehensive services for Latino people, 
including legal assistance for immigration issues, emergency services, children’s 
educational support and DV crisis services, in which participants in the focus group all 
work. 
 Since 1992, Project UNICA has provided the primary 24-hour Spanish language 
domestic violence and sexual assault crisis line in the county.  While other organizations 
offering crisis lines can respond to mono-lingual Spanish speakers, via using outside 
translation services or any bilingual staff, all of Project UNICA’s staff are bilingual 
Spanish speakers and most are bi-cultural (Latina). 
  UNICA offers support groups, as well as outreach and education services, 
parenting support and assistance with restraining and stalking orders.  Although they do 
not have a specific domestic violence housing program, they are able to access the 
housing resources of their larger agency and provide ongoing case management and 
advocacy for survivors as they use the programs.  Additionally, they can refer survivors to 
the immigration legal services provided by their parent organization. 
 The agency also has an advocate as part of a Domestic Violence Response Team 
(DVERT).  As described earlier in this document, DVERT is a coordinated community 
response team, made up of members of the criminal justice system, state agencies and 
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community groups.  This DVERT team follows that model and includes members of two 
local police agencies, the district attorney’s office, the Department of Human Services, 
Child Welfare, Legal Aid and three community organizations, including Project UNICA.  
The DVERT team responds to high lethality DV cases, as determined via a review and 
assessment tool. 
 On their website and in printed information, Project UNICA focuses on the 
problem of partner violence at the individual and family levels, highlighting 
empowerment and their commitment to Latina/o individuals and families.  They state, 
“Our mission is to provide support, advocacy and opportunity for self-empowerment, 
assisting survivors to exercise free and informed life choices free of violence and 
oppression.  We work to ensure that Latino individuals and families have equal access to 
community resources” (Project UNICA website).  This focus is more limited than that 
articulated by PWCL, in which empowerment is described at the survivor level, but 
always in conjunction with community-level change. 
 The website describes working to changes behaviors, with an emphasis on 
alleviating individual abuses of power and control, which are described as resulting 
“when people unjustly exercise power over others.”(Project UNICA website).  Rather 
than attending to larger structural issues related to violence, on their website, Project 
UNICA maintains an analysis at the individual and family levels. In contrast to the other 
participating agencies, no mention of social change appears on the website or any of the 
printed material I was able to procure.  However, Catholic Charities, in which this agency 
is embedded, describes a commitment to creating a society “in which all people: thrive 
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economically, socially and spiritually; cultivate diverse, respectful and just communities; 
recognize the inherent dignity and sanctity of human life” (Catholic Charities website).  
Though more subtle than the other agencies, this turn to social justice is indicated in the 
agency’s description around justice and ensuring equal access to community resources for 
Latinas. 
Agency three. Bradley Angle started the first domestic violence shelter on the 
west coast and has operated continuously for thirty-seven years.  It was founded in 1975 
as a homeless women’s shelter specifically for women experiencing violence from an 
intimate partner.  It began as a peer-to-peer help organization – all staff had past histories 
of abuse – and the expectation was that women using the services would have a role in 
determining the shape of the agency (Sanders, 2004).  Bradley Angle continues that 
practice by emphasizing the experience of survivors on their website. 
 The website is full of the stories of survivors, both written and in video format.  
Each page has a sidebar with a “story spotlight.”  These stories are primarily by adult 
women survivors, but also feature children and siblings of those affected by violence.  
Although Bradley Angle does not evoke an overt feminist label in the same way as 
PWCL, the use of storytelling is part of a long feminist tradition of consciousness-raising 
present since the beginning of the modern battered women’s movement (Haaken, 2010). 
 Like PWCL, on their website and in printed materials Bradley Angle has a 
commitment to both individual and structural change, with an emphasis on the larger 
community.  They focus on community collaboration and state in their mission statement, 
“…mission is to offer survivors of domestic and sexual violence options for safety, 
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empowerment, healing and hope, while collaborating with our communities to create 
social change” (Bradley Angle website). 
 This emphasis on collaboration appears in their work with African American and 
African immigrant survivors.  They offer services specifically for these populations and 
work closely with African-American community organizations, as well as African refugee 
organizations.  The agency offers a drop-in service center in a neighborhood with a long 
history of African-American residents. 
 In other culturally specific services the organization describes themselves as the 
only provider in the state offering lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer 
(LGBTQ) domestic violence services.  These services are also available in Spanish and 
the current primary advocate is a bicultural/bilingual Spanish speaker. The organization 
runs a shelter, crisis line, a transitional housing program, and community-based advocacy, 
which includes out-reach and education services in which bilingual/bicultural advocates 
are available.  They also offer a program addressing economic empowerment; however, 
currently the seminars are currently available only in English. 
 Bradley Angle’s website articulates a mainstream perspective around domestic 
violence when it describes the way DV affects all people, suggesting a universal effect.  
However, their programming belies this homogenization, indicating the application of an 
intersectional framework to much of their work.  In addition to the work they do with 
marginalized communities, this is underlined in their section about awareness training.  
They state, “Bradley Angle is at its core, a social justice agency.  We believe all types of 
oppression are connected, and that liberation from violence takes a concerted community 
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effort toward a just society” (Bradley Angle website).  This emphasis on integrating anti-
violence work with larger issues around injustice suggests awareness of the varied kinds 
of violence people experience depending upon their social location (Sokoloff & Dupont, 
2005).  This is also evident in their staff and volunteer training manual, which, like 
PWCL, prioritizes anti-oppression and anti-racism training along with cultural 
competency theory and practice. 
Summary  of the Agencies’ orientations to DV work. The early battered 
women’s movement was predicated on a feminist orientation that understood violence 
against women as a deliberate course of action used to maintain dominant systems and 
practices around gender, race, class and sexual orientation (Bograd, 1988; Schechter, 
1982).  Each of the participating organization’s ways of doing domestic violence work 
reflects this perspective, through their common focus on alleviating oppression as a 
means of addressing DV.  However, PWCL reflects a more radical orientation through its 
overtly feminist stance.  Bradley Angle may be placed at the center of this political 
continuum in its emphasis on social change, followed by Project UNICA on the other end 
with its commitment to equal access to services for Latinas. PWCL and Bradley 
Angle further demonstrate a shared orientation in their practices around volunteer 
training.  In each of their advocacy training manuals, the prospective volunteer is given 
the choice to take the training with the specific agency in which they will work, or at any 
of the tri-county DV organizations that might be offering a training at that time.  This 
willingness to have volunteers trained at other agencies reflects a common belief system 
around how to do DV work.  I was unable to procure Project UNICA’s volunteer manual, 
86 
 
so I do not know whether they also offer this choice. 
 Another example of the three groups’ shared orientation is in their use of the 
Power and Control Wheel, a ubiquitous model for describing DV that came out of the 
Duluth curriculum for batterers (Pence & Paymar, 1993).  The Power and Control Wheel 
is present in both PWCL’s and Bradley Angle’s volunteer/staff training manuals, and is 
referenced on Project UNICA’s website. 
 The use of the Power and Control Wheel indicates that the groups carry certain 
assumptions in common about how to respond to both survivors and perpetrators of 
domestic violence.  The notion that domestic violence is the result of one person trying to 
gain and maintain control over another person in an intimate relationship emphasizes the 
choice present on the part of the abuser. Rather than constructing DV as an individual 
pathology resulting from an inherent, possibly treatable illness with an external 
component (you get it, rather than do it), an emphasis on power and control maintains an 
abuser’s agency. As described earlier in this document, this way of thinking shifted 
domestic violence out of the therapeutic realm and into the scope of the criminal justice 
system.  Out of this emerged the common practice of grassroots DV organization’s 
collaboration with the State and the criminal justice system (Haaken, 2010). 
 In addition to these common notions about DV, each of the agencies places safety 
at the center of their work.  This is especially evident in the websites of PWCL and 
Bradley Angle.  PWCL requires that each person entering their website read a warning 
describing the way that abusers can potentially stalk a person via the Internet.  It then 
advises, “If you are in immediate danger, call 9-1-1, or call (PWCL at their number)” 
87 
 
(PWCL website).  This evocation of 911 links the police as the first avenue for alleviating 
danger.  Everyone accessing the website is given this connection because in order to 
proceed to the website, the person reading must click a button indicating that they 
understand the advice about calling 911.  This recommendation to enlist 911 comes up 
multiple times during a visit to the website. Each time a link is accessed, the message 
comes up again and the reader must click yes or no to proceed. 
Safety plays a prominent role in Bradley Angle’s website, as well.  When clicking 
on the home page, the viewer is immediately presented with a banner with the word 
“Safety” in large font and it becomes the first thing the viewer sees.  This is extended by 
their mission statement, which is just above the banner and lists safety as the first priority.  
Unlike PWCL, however, there is no connection made between safety and the criminal 
justice system on the website.  Bradley Angle does not offer any indiscriminate 
recommendation to call 911, nor is there any mention of law enforcement or the criminal 
justice system.  Instead, the reader is directed to call the agency crisis line should they be 
in immediate danger. 
 Project UNICA, in contrast, does not have any description of danger or safety on 
their website, nor any mention of the criminal justice system.  Their website is far less 
substantial than the other two agencies, however.  They have a single page on the website 
of the larger organization within which they are embedded.  This page includes a broad 
overview of their program, with no specific partnership listed.  Their only link is to a 
program brochure. They list their direct crisis line number and have no directive to call 
911 on the website.  However, Project UNICA has a DVERT advocate as part of a 
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coordinated community response team with an emphasis on a CJS response to domestic 
violence.  
 The three participating organizations share a similar philosophical orientation to 
doing DV work – as feminist, social change organizations.  Additionally, as the chart 
below indicates, the three organizations offer similar services to survivors. 
Table 1- Summary of Agency Services 
 PWCL Project UNICA Bradley Angle 
Crisis line Yes Yes Yes 
Support Groups Yes Yes Yes 
Emergency Shelter No No Yes 
Housing No Yes (larger agency) Yes 
Outreach and 
Education 
Yes Yes Yes 
Restraining order 
assistance 
No Yes No 
Coordinated 
Community 
Response Team 
No Yes No 
Mandatory 
Reporters 
Some All None 
911 
recommendation 
Yes 
Website; Recorded 
message 
Yes 
Recorded message 
Yes 
Recorded message 
 
 In the following section I describe the proximity of each organization to 
undocumented survivors, particularly in working with Latinas.  Law enforcement/ICE 
collaborations have targeted Latino/a people.  Despite Latinos/as comprising 77% of all 
undocumented people in the United States, they make up 93% of those deported under 
Secure Communities (Kohli et al., 2011). Enlisting the criminal justice system as a means 
of providing safety for survivors of domestic violence may carry a different weight if 
those in the relationship are Latina/o and, particularly if they are undocumented. 
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Proximity to Work with Undocumented Survivors 
 In this section, I explain how closely each of the participating organizations works 
with Latina immigrant populations.  This delineation of each agency’s proximity to work 
with Latina immigrants is necessary for a key research question that guides this 
dissertation: what is the relationship between each group’s proximity to working with 
undocumented survivors and their decision-making process?  This question emerged 
from the preliminary research I conducted with two organizations in a county that had 
just voluntarily entered into the Secure Communities program.  As I noted earlier, agency 
directors held widely differing understandings of the effect of this program on Latina 
survivors.  The issue was very salient for the director of the Latina focused agency, while 
the mainstream shelter director confessed ignorance about the program, itself.  This 
disparate knowledge led me to expect that agency proximity to working with 
undocumented survivors would affect their decision-making process. 
 Understanding proximity can clarify the importance of immigrant issues to the 
work of an agency.  The principle of working closely with immigrant communities has 
been central to work in this field, and also to the salience of dilemmas presented in the 
focus group scenario related to law enforcement/ICE collaborations. 
 In this study, I determined proximity in multiple ways. I examined how closely 
each agency works with undocumented survivors, especially Latinas. I developed a list of 
factors indicating proximity and asked directors via in-person and phone interviews, as 
well as via email correspondence. Additionally, I examined public documents and agency 
websites and determined that the agencies represent a range of proximity to 
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undocumented survivors.  PWCL is the furthest, Project UNICA the most proximal and 
Bradley Angle is in-between.  This connection to proximity in no way implies a 
quantifiable scale but is, instead, a general description of each agency’s focus on work 
with undocumented survivors.  In the following I describe each agency’s proximity to 
work with undocumented survivors.  I follow the narrative description with a chart 
summarizing the data. 
PWCL. PWCL has the least proximity to undocumented survivors.  The agency 
does not have direct programming focused on immigrants or Latinas.  Additionally, they 
do not have any bilingual/bicultural staff.  They report having a strong connection with 
other agencies providing services specifically for Latinas, and work with culturally 
specific agencies focused on several disparate populations including Russian and African, 
although they work only with agencies that are domestic violence focused.  PWCL works 
especially closely with Project UNICA, because their policy is to refer all Spanish 
speakers to Project UNICA, as there are currently few bilingual, Spanish speakers on 
PWCL staff. 
 PWCL does not have printed materials in Spanish, nor is the website fully 
translated into Spanish.  Additionally, when they do work with non-English speaking 
survivors, they must always use translation services from outside the agency.  The 
organization does not offer any immigration-focused programs, nor do they provide 
trainings focused on immigration issues within the agency.  But PWCL does prioritize 
getting staff to attend trainings offered within the community.  However, this priority was 
described by the director as dependent upon staff interest, which vacillates according to 
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the importance placed upon it by current staff members. 
During the focus group with PWCL, staff requested more trainings around law 
enforcement/ICE collaborations.  They also indicated they felt unable to address the 
needs of Latinas contacting the crisis line because of their lack of knowledge and limited 
bilingual/bicultural staff.  They highlighted their collaborations with culturally specific 
organizations but described ways they might increase cultural responsiveness at their 
agency, for example, in providing materials translated into Spanish and hosting anti-racist 
trainings. 
Project UNICA. Project UNICA has the closest proximity to Latina survivors and 
provides the most direct work to undocumented Latinas.  The agency was created to 
address the gap in services to Spanish speaking survivors in Multnomah County.  All staff 
members are bilingual-Spanish and the majority is bicultural-Latina as well.  They all 
have specific training around the rights of immigrant survivors of domestic and sexual 
violence.  Project UNICA collaborates with all other local domestic violence service 
agencies through referrals.  Additionally, they work with non-DV focused organizations 
in the community that work around the Know Your Rights program – a program focused 
on giving immigrant people information about what to do if they are detained by police, 
the FBI, or ICE. 
 The participants had just gone through training around law enforcement/ICE 
collaborations at the time of the focus group.  They were all cognizant of the Secure 
Communities program as well as other legal issues aimed at undocumented people.  They 
also had a broad awareness of legal remedies available to undocumented survivors, such 
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as the U-Visa, a visa option available for undocumented victims of crime (US 
immigration support website). Most of the advocates in the other focus groups were not 
aware of this program. 
Bradley Angle.  Bradley Angle falls in the middle of the three participating 
agencies in terms of proximity.  Like PWCL, they have a website that can be translated 
almost entirely into Spanish and materials that are available in Spanish.  Additionally, 
however, they have five staff members that are both bicultural-Latina and bilingual-
Spanish.  While they do not have any direct focus on Latina survivors, the issues around 
immigration are quite salient due to their work with African refugees.  They collaborate 
with multiple agencies in town that center on immigrant populations, especially 
Immigrant Refugee Community Organization (IRCO) and Catholic Charities’ El 
Programa Hispano or Project UNICA. Bradley Angle does not offer immigration-focused 
trainings within the agency, but does prioritize sending staff to trainings within the larger 
community.  Four advocates attended an immigration-focused training in 2012. 
Summary.  Given the stated focus on work with Latina survivors, shown through 
such practices as a Spanish language crisis line, bilingual/bi-cultural staff, and internal, 
all-staff trainings on immigration issues, Project UNICA is most proximal to work with 
undocumented survivors.  Bradley Angle is the next proximal and PWCL the most distal 
in working with Latinas.  As the table below suggests, Project UNICA, the Latina-
focused shelter, scores highest on all indicators. 
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 PWCL Project UNICA Bradley Angle 
Total number of staff 10 22 21 
Percentage of bilingual staff 1% 100% 24% 
Percentage of 
bilingual/bicultural staff 
0 73% 5% 
Programs/Written materials 
offered in Spanish 
No Yes No 
Immigration assistance 
offered at Agency 
No 
Yes, via their 
larger 
organization 
Yes 
Internal staff trainings 
around immigration 
No Yes No 
Minority (non-Latina) focused 
programs 
Yes 
(sex workers, 
disabled, 
youth) 
No 
Yes 
(LGBTQ, 
African 
refugee, 
African-
American) 
Latina focused programs Yes Yes Yes 
Collaborations with other 
agencies focused on 
immigrant populations 
Yes Yes Yes 
Table 2- Summary of information around proximity 
 
The orientation of each agency is necessary for understanding the relationship 
between each group’s work with undocumented survivors and their decision-making 
process.  As my preliminary research indicated, and Project UNICA’s emphasis on 
trainings around Secure Communities and immigration law support, law 
enforcement/ICE partnerships have a greater relevancy to those working closely with 
undocumented and immigrant survivors.  Because of this I assumed those working most 
closely to undocumented survivors would offer the most complex articulation of how to 
address the effect of law enforcement and ICE collaborations on undocumented 
survivors.  However, as the focus group findings in the following section suggest, 
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advocate responses to crisis line scenarios were shaped less by their proximity to work 
with undocumented survivors than by agency policies around collaborating with the 
criminal justice system and/or the state. 
The next section introduces the focus group findings. The research questions ask: 
1. How do advocates work through a key dilemma that has emerged in their 
practice?   
2. What are the discursive strategies enlisted by advocates in addressing a 
dilemma at the border of domestic violence and immigration politics?  
3. What is the relationship between each group’s proximity to working with 
undocumented survivors and their decision-making process? 
Based on my prior fieldwork, I carried certain expectations into this project.  I 
assumed that those working more closely with undocumented survivors would engage in 
an intersectional analysis.  I believed that this affinity with undocumented survivors 
would result in more creative ideas for managing the dilemma presented by law 
enforcement collaborations with ICE.  
Focus group findings: Overview 
 In the analysis of focus group findings, I engaged in an iterative process with the 
data, based on the research questions.  I examined how the groups take into account the 
undocumented survivor as they consider collaborations between law enforcement and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  I introduced scenarios in which border tensions 
– the negotiation of multiple, often-competing claims – arose.  I found that in each of the 
focus groups, the relationship of the agency to the Criminal Justice System (CJS) shapes 
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the way in which the group can respond to undocumented survivors.  Responses are 
predicated on the assumption that agencies will collaborate with the CJS, which is 
indicated through the participants’ focus on mandatory reporting of child abuse in 
scenario one and their responses to fears of abuser lethality in scenario two. 
 Research question one asks how advocates work through a key dilemma that has 
emerged in their practice.  As advocates considered each scenario, groups responded 
similarly.  Almost immediately, one or more members introduced a strategy of organizing 
the material that used an implicit decision tree format – a way of proceeding that 
organized the potential response by breaking it down into a series of yes/no 
contingencies: If this is happening, then this is the response.  The use of a decision tree in 
this yes/no format appeared to offer the advocates a means of structuring the scenarios I 
presented. 
 This approach is particularly useful when decisions are clear and concrete.  
However, as more complexity, ambiguity and ambivalence are introduced, the limitations 
of the decision tree become more apparent.  By beginning with an either/or framework, 
only one way of proceeding can be entertained at a time, thus limiting consideration of 
less orderly, but perhaps more effective ways of approaching the complex needs of 
undocumented survivors of domestic violence.  This simplification limits the possibility 
of a more creative, nuanced, and strategic approach which could bring about more 
desired outcomes balancing personal safety and institutional liability, while keeping 
survivors or their families from being deported.  Additionally, there is a reliance on a 
mainstream domestic violence discourse that places the CJS at the center of services to all 
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survivors of domestic violence. 
 Research question two asks, what are the discursive strategies enlisted by 
advocates in addressing a dilemma at the border of domestic violence and immigration 
politics?  As they seek to balance competing institutional and ideological claims are they 
able to engage in an intersectional approach, or do they apply a more generalizing 
framework?  Throughout the focus groups, advocates demonstrate varying abilities in 
intersectional thinking in responding to the scenarios.  I recognize intersectional thinking 
as a perspective that considers multiple, dynamic, social dimensions of survivors and the 
way they inform one another at particular moments in time.  The decision-tree heuristic 
employed in response to the issues described in the scenarios appeared to result in 
advocates moving from an intersectional perspective to a more simplistic account.   
 Research question three asks, what is the relationship is between each group’s 
proximity to working with undocumented survivors and their decision-making process?  I 
entered this work with the assumption that advocates who worked more closely with 
undocumented survivors would offer the most nuanced and complex suggestions about 
how best to advocate for this marginalized group.  As I describe in more detail below, 
contrary to this hypothesis, the groups’ relationships with the criminal justice system, 
manifest in policies around mandatory reporting, seemed to be more important.  
 In the following section I describe the findings from the focus groups in more 
detail.  I begin by presenting the scenarios I read to each group, and then explain the 
responses from that group.  I present quotes from the participants, which are followed by 
an identifying number listing the focus group and the transcript line number.  At the end 
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of the section I summarize the findings in relation to each of the scenarios.  An entire 
transcript is included in Appendix F. 
 The first scenario is in the form of a crisis call.  I based its content on an amalgam 
of calls I had experienced as an advocate, case studies from academic papers, and 
recommendations from my community partner.  When the scenario was read at the focus 
groups, advocates expressed familiarity with the description, confirming the ecological 
validity of the script. One advocate asked, “Have you been listening to our crisis 
line?”(1.11). 
Scenario one – A crisis call.  A call comes into the crisis line.  A woman who 
speaks accented English says she is seeking advice.  Referring her to a culturally specific 
crisis line is not an option.  She tells you that her partner is abusive, both physically and 
emotionally.  The abuse is infrequent and has happened since they came to the US ten 
years ago.  They are married with two children.  She has not sought help before but now 
the man is beginning to abuse the children – something he has not done in the past – and 
she is concerned.  He occasionally strikes the oldest child and is emotionally abusive 
(yells) to the youngest.  The children are having trouble at school (she names the school) 
and the teacher (she names the teacher) has recently contacted her with concerns.  She 
does not feel she can leave him because he is the primary economic provider, because 
they are married and because he is the children’s father.  She, her partner and their oldest 
child (11) are undocumented.  Their youngest child (8) is a US citizen. 
Findings.  In each of the focus groups mandatory reporting emerges as a place of 
border tension where advocates struggle with negotiating different responses to survivors 
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according to whether or not they are a mandatory reporter of child abuse.  Mandatory 
reporting refers to the responsibility of an individual to make a child abuse report to the 
Department of Human Services (DHS) if they have reasonable cause to believe that abuse 
to a child (or elder) is currently taking place. 
 The response by the system to a child abuse report varies, depending on many 
factors related to the story, for example, the severity of the abuse, whether the child is 
intervening in the violence between the adult partners, whether there is a risk of 
“substantial harm”, or if the child is impaired by living in a state of fear (DHS, 2013).  
These factors often require a subjective decision on the part of the caseworker taking and 
reviewing the report.  Advocates in the focus group described frustration because child 
welfare reports are handled exclusively through an anonymous hotline with rotating 
respondents.  This means it is impossible to collaborate with specific child welfare 
workers with whom they might have interacted before, or whom they know to be 
sensitive to the dynamics of domestic violence. 
 Haaken (2010) describes how mandatory reporting of child abuse became the 
norm in DV work in the 1980s.  This norm arose as part of the feminist demand that the 
state respond seriously to violence against women and their families.  With the 
advancement of research on the effects of witnessing violence on children, child welfare 
programs across the U.S. began to define exposure to abuse in the home as a form of 
child abuse (Edleson, 1999).  One impact of this broadening of mandatory reporting was 
in its expansion of abuse to include survivors that continued to live with assaultive 
partners. 
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 Oregon statute ORS 419B.015 states in part, 
Any public or private official having reasonable cause to believe that any 
child with whom the official comes in contact has suffered abuse, or that 
any person with whom the official comes in contact has abused a child 
shall immediately report or cause a report to be made… “(ORS 419B.015) 
 
 However, under the law advocates at non-profit organizations providing domestic 
violence and sexual assault services are exempt from being mandatory reporters.  In 
response to the child abuse allegations at Penn State University, the 2012 House Bill 
4016 increased the list of mandatory reporters, adding many groups working with youth.  
At the same time, the bill made special provisions exempting organizations working with 
survivors of domestic and sexual violence.  The law that resulted from this bill codifies 
this distinction, defining some as mandatory reporters and exempting others: 
Employees of public or private organizations providing child-related 
services or activities to youth, excluding nonprofit organizations whose 
primary purpose is to provide confidential services to victims of domestic 
or sexual violence. Emphasis mine. (ibid.) 
 
 Despite this exemption, many agencies require that advocates be mandatory 
reporters as a matter of agency policy.  Advocates in the three focus groups report 
different practices around mandatory reporting of child abuse. At Project UNICA all 
advocates are mandatory reporters, at PWCL some are mandated, and at Bradley Angle 
none are required to report. 
 Mandatory reporting has a profound influence on group responses to the first 
scenario.  Overall the policy acts as a determinant of how advocates proceed in their 
response to the survivor.  Not only does it limit the resources available to the survivor but 
it also shapes the discussion itself, effectively shutting down group consideration of the 
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complexity of the undocumented survivor’s needs. 
 In the following section, I describe how the two groups with a mandatory 
reporting policy consider the policy and its effect upon the survivor of the first scenario.  
Because my research questions are focused on how advocates respond to crisis calls as 
they integrate new information affecting marginalized survivors, I lay out the trajectory 
of the focus groups.  In this way I am able to map the ways that advocates manage this 
place of border tension where agency regulations and commitments to survivors 
potentially conflict. 
In the two groups with mandatory reporting requirements, the outcome is similar, 
despite their varying use of intersectional analyses.  As I describe in more detail in the 
following section, in focus group one, with PWCL, an intersectional analysis emerges 
early in the group discourse but then disappears when a DV discourse relying upon the 
CJS is introduced. In focus group two, with Project UNICA, the group maintains an 
intersectional analysis but is still constrained by the requirements of the reporting policy.  
Both groups invoke a decision-tree heuristic as a means of moving the discussion away 
from considering possibilities for challenging the policy.  I contrast this with the response 
from focus group three, Bradley Angle, in which no advocates are mandated to report, 
explaining how this group is also constrained by the policy but finds a means of 
maintaining an intersectional response to the scenario. This group is able to keep the 
needs of the undocumented survivor at the center of the analysis, while imagining 
alternative ways of intervening. 
Analysis.  I read the scenario aloud to the group and finished by asking, “In light 
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of what we know about current immigration policies like Secure Communities, what shall 
we do?”  At PWCL, some advocates are mandatory reporters and some are not.  This 
determination is related to whether the advocate has a job description specifically focused 
on work with children and youth.  This leads the group to begin focusing both on trying 
to ensure that the survivor speak with an advocate who is not mandated while also 
warning her of the potential repercussions should a child abuse report be made.  An 
advocate in the group explains, 
I’m not a mandatory reporter and that’s easy.  But some of us are around 
here and I would express my concerns about who she talks to, that they 
might be mandatory reporters and the risk there. (1. 64-66) 
 
 This brief statement reveals a great deal about the advocate’s regard for the policy.  
She describes it critically.  She divides the staff into reporters and non-reporters, giving a 
positive account of her role as a non-reporter because it is less constrained than that of the 
reporters.  She offers a criticism of the policy, evoking concerns and referencing the risks 
inherent to reporting, particularly to the undocumented survivor of the first scenario.  
Another advocate joins her, spelling out the specific risks present for the undocumented 
survivor, referencing ICE and invoking the looming potential for deportation.  She 
comments, 
I think that it would be important to talk to her about potentially what happens if a 
report is made…what a mandatory report is, what that might look like, what ICE 
is, and how they could get involved.  Now knowing more information that you’ve 
given us I would want her to know that information, because there are multiple 
threats here…the loss of economic support, abuse to her and her children and 
deportation. (1. 76-82) 
 
 The participant integrates the information she has learned about Secure 
Communities from the introduction to the focus group.  By placing the experience of the 
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undocumented survivor at the center of the analysis, the advocate begins to employ an 
intersectional analysis of the survivor’s needs. 
 Following this initial exchange, however, the group does not continue with any 
articulation of the dangers specific to the undocumented survivor.  And as the group 
continues working through the scenario, the advocates do not take up an intersectional 
way of considering the effect of the policy nor possibilities for mitigating it, but instead 
introduce the decision-tree heuristic, asking only if a child abuse report must be made or 
not.  This way of proceeding effectively erases the particularity of the undocumented 
survivor.  An advocate states, 
If there is child abuse happening…DHS could get involved in that, as 
well, and what we see happening with survivors, regardless of 
documentation, is that if you make a report, if you don’t make a report and 
somebody finds out, then you are often held responsible for putting the 
children in harm’s way. (1. 169-174) (emphasis mine) 
 
 The statement begins by generalizing to all DV survivors, removing the earlier 
emphasis by group members on the dangers specific to undocumented survivors.  In 
disregarding documentation status, there is no need to attend to differences around the 
mandatory reporting policy.  All are implicated equally and mandatory reporters have no 
leeway in imagining alternative responses to child abuse claims.  Instead, advocates must 
concentrate on whether a report will be made or not, in this case through identifying to 
whom the survivor speaks. 
So in the scenario when the woman said, “he hit my child” (name) would stop her 
there…before she had given any more information and offered her another 
advocate. (1.220-223) 
 
 Additionally, the group raises the possibility of advocate liability, despite the fact 
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that there are no legal grounds for such concerns after the 2012 amendment (ORS 
419B.015).  The focus on advocate liability has the effect of moderating the critical 
stance initially articulated in the focus group.  The critical perspective is overridden by 
descriptions of how to negotiate the policy, primarily through silencing the survivor and 
making certain she speaks only with advocates who are not mandatory reporters.  Later in 
the focus group, an advocate explains the ways this is carried out: 
Our policy is if you are a mandatory reporter as soon as somebody 
discloses something that you would have to report you stop the 
conversation.  So in the scenario when the woman said, he hit my child 
(the advocate) would stop her there…before she had given any more 
information, and offered her another advocate or talked to her about, if 
you give me any identifying information, what that would look like, 
so…(1. 217-224) 
 
 Again, all survivors of domestic violence are conflated and the advocate does not 
reference anything particular to the undocumented survivor described in the first 
scenario. For instance, there is no discussion of language barriers or anything that might 
keep someone with limited English or from a different culture from understanding the 
advocate’s warning.  As I describe below, this is in contrast to the other two groups, in 
which the issue of comprehension and its effect upon whether the survivor understands to 
remain silent is very important. 
 The next group, Project UNICA, is able to maintain an intersectional analysis of 
the survivor throughout the discussion.  This may be due to their status as a Latina-
focused agency, which they describe as centered on the needs of Latina survivors.  As one 
advocate states, 
We have a whole program that’s built around this community and that has, 
you know, every service that we’ve been able to gather, you know, under 
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this one roof designed specifically for that community (2.337-339) 
 
 The agency’s focus on serving Latina survivors may account for how their 
responses continually place the undocumented survivor at the center, describing her 
particular needs and the specific effects of enlisting the CJS on her.  However, their 
intersectional orientation does not appear to affect their responses to the issue of 
mandatory reporting.  The issue is particularly salient in this focus group, as their agency 
policy requires that all advocates are mandatory reporters of child abuse.  After hearing 
the scenario read aloud, the first thing that is said is in reference to the policy,  
Well, we’re mandatory reporters here at this agency. So with everything 
that has been shared in this crisis line call, we would be obligated to make 
a report to DHS. And that’s something that we would try to give as much 
information as we could about, and maybe even encourage the caller to 
make a report herself. (2. 188-192) 
 
 In this setting, there is no question of whether or not to report.  Instead, the issue 
becomes one of determining whether the advocate will have to make the report or 
whether the survivor will do it herself.  This point is followed by a discussion of how to 
mitigate the potential CJS response to the agency’s child abuse report.  The same 
advocate adds, 
…and then I think we would probably launch into safety planning around 
– if she also shared that she’s undocumented – safety planning around that, 
and giving...empowering her with the right vocabulary to use if she is 
picked up (2. 192-194) 
 
 As with the first group, the participant brings in the undocumented survivor, 
integrating information about Secure Communities and the likelihood that the survivor 
will be picked up by law enforcement if a report is made.  The advocate’s language is 
halting.  She pauses after “giving” and then changes the word to “empowering”, as if to 
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give agency to the survivor.  She then articulates the potential CJS response to the child 
abuse report, acknowledging that the undocumented survivor may be picked up by law 
enforcement in response to her agency’s report. 
 Her response indicates an implicit recognition of the contradiction in her 
description of their protocol.  For by making the report, the advocate herself is 
introducing potential deportation to a survivor who has called her for help.  In this case, 
safety planning is done to mitigate the effect of the agency’s action, rather than that of the 
abusive partner. 
 Rather than discussing the contradiction inherent to this situation where a 
survivor’s call to a crisis line for help could result in the introduction of deportation, the 
group continues to describe the services available to survivors.  Throughout this process, 
the participants are still able to maintain a complex analysis of the needs of 
undocumented survivors around obtaining DV services.  However, this recognition of the 
survivor’s needs does not result in any alternative propositions to making a mandatory 
reporting.  The group never discusses whether making the report is a good or bad idea.  
Instead they focus on her behavior and their own limited latitude of discretion around 
making a report.  An advocate describes trying to stop survivors from disclosing 
information and articulates her resignation that prevention is unlikely, 
it’s kind of...kind of hard to prevent [laughs], it’s kind of hard to prevent, 
because, you know, when we tell people, you know, “Hey, we’re...I’m a 
mandatory reporter, and this is what that means,” and then they’re like, 
“Well...” You know, usually it’s hard to get to the point where they’ve 
understood where our limit is. (2. 320-324) 
 
 Although the advocate implies that there are problems inherent to the policy, there 
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is still no overt critique of the policy itself.  Instead she focuses on trying to change the 
survivor’s behavior, while simultaneously recognizing that reporting is inevitable, as 
most survivors will inadvertently incriminate themselves.  Ultimately the survivor 
becomes responsible for the outcome of not understanding the rules or what is at stake. 
 This issue is raised again at the end of this section in the focus group, when 
another advocate describes her frustration with the policy in her one-on-one work with 
survivors.  In contrast to the crisis line, where there is anonymity, long-term work does 
not allow for the same kind of protection for the advocate.  One participant describes this 
issue: 
But especially when we’re working, one-on-one...with clients.  We’ve 
already got all their information...And if they blurt something out, then we 
can’t not use it.  Then it breaks trust. (2. 363-365) 
 
 This statement carries with it the clearest critique of the policy.  In her choice of 
words she underscores her frustration with how the policy determines the course of her 
relationships with survivors.  The use of the word “blurt” serves two purposes.  It 
references the way in which long-term work, based on building relationships, can unravel 
in a moment, along with the trust they have carefully cultivated. The term also suggests 
the inefficacy of their explanations of the policy.  Blurting out information connotes 
doing something without forethought, speaking out in the moment without regard for 
consequence.  Regardless of being cognizant of the potential consequences, during the 
course of a conversation a survivor can say something disruptive,  quickly shifting the 
advocate-survivor relationship. 
 At this juncture, the group falls silent.  One advocate jumps in, offering the 
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decision tree heuristic as a way of framing the available actions – either the advocate can 
make the call, or the survivor can make it. This brings the group back to the beginning of 
the discussion in which the report is inevitable and the only decision revolves around who 
will make the call. She explains the dilemma, 
…like somebody mentioned earlier, we also do encourage them to make 
that phone call themselves.  And we can either like meet with them and we 
could...by their side, um, so that they can just feel that support, or they 
could just give them the phone number and they could make the call then 
on their own. Um, that’s really highly encouraged as well. (2. 367-371) 
 
 The advocate (re)frames the choices, placing the responsibility of reporting on the 
survivor, who can make the call either on her own or in their company.  This serves to 
remind the group of the agency policy and the inflexibility it presents, while alleviating 
some of the burden of complying with the policy directly off of the advocate. 
 In contrast to the first two groups, there are no mandatory reporters on staff at 
Bradley Angle.  Their agency policy handbook is very clear about this, referencing 2012 
House Bill 4016 in explaining that Oregon State law does not require staff to report child 
or elder abuse to the state (Bradley Angle handbook).  Despite this explicit guideline in 
the handbook, advocates in focus group three still prioritize discussing the effect of 
mandatory child abuse reporting policies.  However, their concern is with determining 
which agencies have mandatory reporters in order to determine where it is safe to refer 
undocumented survivors. 
 Similar to the advocates of the other two focus groups, this group begins to 
address my question by employing a decision tree heuristic, working through the scenario 
by first determining if the survivor would leave or stay.  This immediately brings up the 
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issue of mandatory reporting and they present the report as unavoidable.  Two advocates 
respond, echoing one another: “And she’s going to get involved with the child welfare 
system. Heck, yeah!” (3. 492-493) 
 Contrary to the other focus groups, however, the agency itself does not pose a risk 
for the survivor.  They will not unavoidably have to make a report and so they do not 
have to worry about keeping the woman from speaking to them and are able to take time 
making sure she understands what is at stake should a report be made.  In the focus 
group, the participants are able to continue in their exploration of  the needs of the 
undocumented survivor.  They maintain an intersectional analysis through much of the 
discussion.  They refer to the needs of the undocumented woman, describing specifically 
the way fears of deportation may shape the decisions she would make.  They offer ideas 
about ways to avoid enlisting the police, focusing on survivors’ fears of losing their 
children when they are deported. 
 However, focus on the mandatory reporting policy that is in place at other 
agencies permeates much of the discussion, primarily for the way it constrains the 
group’s ability to provide services or limits their referral options. The group even returns 
to the topic at the end of discussing scenario two, expressing frustration with how 
mandatory reporting policies leave no room for the nuances of individual cases, requiring 
reporting regardless of the threat it potentially causes to the family. 
…they’re mandated reporters and it’s not up to them to decide. But at the 
same time, it’s like this puts the whole family at risk. (3. 1443-1445) 
 
 At this juncture, members of the group begin to describe a new way of 
approaching survivors around the issue of child abuse reporting.  They do not rule out the 
109 
 
possibility of making a report themselves, describing a balance between getting a 
survivor information about mandatory reporting and having it affect the child’s ability to 
get help. One advocate describes this site of border tension: 
I wouldn’t want to discourage the children from speaking about what 
they’re experiencing. And so it’s a hard thing to manage, because you 
might say like Child Welfare can become involved and this is what’s going 
to happen. At the same time, you don’t want her to go tell her kid, “Don’t 
talk about it, please,” because that just, you know, keeps it in the family. 
(3. 743-746) 
 
 Negotiating the tension between giving a survivor options and silencing them 
requires a way of proceeding that begins with the establishment of trust as well as 
clarification of the advocate’s role and ethical commitments.  One advocate says, 
You have to earn their trust first before you, you know, you have…because 
everybody’s afraid when they see…when I work with women, they all 
think like, you know, you’re maybe a Child Welfare.(3. 763-765) 
 
 This reference brings the border tension experienced by the advocate to the 
forefront by calling into question her alliance with the survivor.  If the survivor 
understands her to be representing Child Welfare, the advocate implies, she will be 
unable to gain the woman’s trust. 
 Throughout the remainder of the discussion conversation revolves around a 
different way of approaching the survivor – one that puts her needs at the center.  This 
intersectional analysis has a different nuance than any present before in the focus groups.  
This not only considers the specific needs of the survivor as she navigates social services, 
the CJS, and other external agencies but it also takes into consideration the relationship 
between the survivor and the advocates. 
 One of the participants focuses on how she and the survivor enter into their 
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relationship, beginning by trying to understand how the survivor understands domestic 
violence culturally, rather than applying the dominant framework onto her experience.  
This moves the discussion around the crisis call away from the specter of mandatory 
reporting and onto what the survivor needs.  An advocate explains how this works in 
practice: 
You know, you don’t bring paperwork, everything. Just talk and listen, and 
say, “Okay, we can do it tomorrow again…and then the person will open 
up. (3. 798-800) 
 
 This approach to DV advocacy promotes slowing down, a possibility mitigated by 
the mandatory reporting rule, which requires getting the information out to the survivor 
as quickly as possible in order to potentially alleviate the advocates’ fears around her 
disclosing something reportable.  In contrast to the other two groups, focus group three 
emphasizes opening up, rather than shutting down the relationship between advocate and 
survivor.  And in contrast to the second focus group, this group focuses on building trust, 
rather than bemoaning the way the mandatory reporting policy potentially breaks it down. 
Discussion.  Research questions one and two asked how advocates responded to 
law enforcement/ICE collaborations and the discursive strategies they employed.  In 
response to scenario one, the use of a decision tree heuristic was unsurprising, as it 
provides a useful ordering device when managing complex information, much like the 
multiple needs of the survivor described in scenario one.  However, this ordering strategy 
can result in the loss of an intersectional perspective, particularly when advocates face 
agency requirements around mandatory reporting of child abuse. 
 Mandatory reporting of child abuse permeates all three of the focus groups’ 
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considerations of scenario one.  However, the groups with mandatory reporting 
requirements respond differently from those without those obligations.  These groups 
spend much of the discussion considering ways to subvert the policy, primarily by 
keeping the survivor from speaking with an advocate mandated to report child abuse. 
They describe referring her away from their agencies to other agencies, which in the case 
of Project UNICA, means denying her an entire program set up to meet the specific needs 
of Latina survivors.  Avoiding the mandatory reporting policy may also mean that 
advocates must stop survivors from talking during a call or have them speak to someone 
who is not mandated to report, but may only speak English.  The time and energy spent 
on these machinations get in the way of advocates’ abilities to imagine innovative ways 
of responding to the particular bind undocumented survivors face through programs like 
Secure Communities. 
 The two groups’ inabilities to consider alternatives to enlisting the state are not 
merely the result of not engaging in an intersectional analysis.  Certainly the Latina-
focused agency manages to hold the particular needs of the undocumented survivor at the 
center of their analysis, underscoring her justifiable fears around deportation, should the 
State become involved.  Instead, this apparent incapacity to consider creative options 
indicates reliance on a particular mainstream DV discourse that places the CJS at the 
center, manifest through agency policies around mandatory reporting. 
 In the agency with no reporting requirements, advocates still consider whether a 
mandatory child abuse report should be made.  However, this consideration has a 
different effect upon advocacy for survivors.  Primarily it influences external referral 
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decisions rather than directly affecting the advocates’ relationships with survivors. 
 The relationship of proximity to work with undocumented survivors, investigated 
in research question three, appears to shape the participants’ responses to undocumented 
survivors less than the agency’s relationship to the criminal justice system.  This 
association to the CJS emerges in response to scenario one in the differing mandatory 
reporting requirements present at each agency. 
 In the following section on the results of the second scenario, findings suggest 
that groups continue to display a reliance on the CJS, which affects the way in which 
advocates respond to dilemmas created by law enforcement/ICE collaborations.  In 
response to scenario two, advocates consider whether to change the recorded message on 
their agency phones as well as the larger issue of referring undocumented survivors to 
law enforcement at all. 
 Just as in the previous section, I begin by presenting the scenario I read to each 
group, and then explain the responses from each individual group.  I present quotes from 
the participants and summarize the findings in relation to each of the research questions. 
 The scenario is a description of policies typical to many domestic violence 
organizations.  The recording recommending survivors call 911 is in place at all of the 
participating agencies.  The advice to call 911 is included on one of the agency websites. 
Scenario Two – Recommending 911.  In many shelters, particularly at the 
administrative offices, the phone goes first to voicemail.  The recorded message is 
generally something like the following: 
“If you are in immediate crisis, please hang up and dial 911.” Additionally, on many of 
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the agency websites, there is the advice to call 911 if in immediate danger or to have your 
neighbors do so, if they are concerned about your safety. 
Findings.  During my preliminary research I called multiple service providers in 
my local area and with very few exceptions, first reached a recording that almost 
immediately instructed, “If this is an emergency, hang up and dial 911.”  This was also 
the advice given on several of the agency websites, particularly on their safety planning 
pages.  This propensity for indiscriminate referral to 911 is very common on the initial 
recorded answer of most human service providers, from therapists to primary care 
physicians and dentists.  However, this undifferentiated recommendation is not typical 
advocate practice when responding directly to crisis calls.  In each of the organizations I 
contacted during my preliminary research, advocates were emphatic that they would 
never indiscriminately recommend that a caller contact the 911 line.  Every advocate I 
spoke with said that survivors could expect to be treated differently by police, depending 
upon their social location. In each of the focus groups, advocates echo this same caveat 
throughout their discussions. 
 In response to scenario two each group begins by suggesting alternative messages 
to the indiscriminate recommendation of 911 described by the scenario.  They describe 
their concerns with both altering the recorded message and leaving it as it is.  Similar to 
the first scenario, all of the groups make use of a decision tree heuristic.  When faced 
with complexity, the group deploys this structuring device, immediately simplifying the 
response – in this case distilling the dilemma to the question of whether the caller risks 
being killed or not.  This framing of the problem has the effect of shutting down the 
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discussion and preventing any further consideration of alternative messages. 
 Additionally, the groups’ ability to come up with changes to the message appears 
to be affected by existing agency policies around collaborating with law enforcement.  
These policies emerge out of a mainstream DV discourse that keeps the criminal justice 
system (CJS) at the center of responses to DV.  This comes from a fear of lethality that is 
predicated on an understanding of the undifferentiated potential dangerousness of all 
forms of domestic violence and of all abusers. 
 The research questions center on how advocates negotiate collaborations between 
law enforcement and ICE through focusing on their discursive practices.  In the following 
section I describe the trajectory of the focus groups, recounting how they all begin with a 
complex description of possible responses to the scenario and then shifting to either/or 
responses with the introduction of the potential for lethality. I pay close attention to how 
this evoking of a lethal threat shapes subsequent discussion of the dilemma. Beginning 
with individual group responses, I then move to a summary of the pattern of responses 
that emerge in the combined groups. 
Analysis.  After the moderator reads the scenario, the first focus group 
immediately responds with a number of members stating that they would like to change 
the message.  The advocates speak over one another until one advocate speaks louder, 
directing the discussion toward an individual analysis that generalizes the behavior of all 
women in crisis.  She explains, 
I don’t think it‘s the worst thing.  Because what I find is people in trauma, 
in really crisis situations, can’t really think as clearly to do that…So, I get 
it why it would be a concern to put it on our voicemail, but at the same 
time sometimes people in crisis situations aren’t thinking as clearly as you 
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would expect them to. (1. 264-265; 269-271) 
 
 By bringing in the idea of individual deficits, the ways people in crisis lack the 
clarity needed to know how to negotiate the system, the group moves away from any 
structural critique, offering instead a homogenous description of women in crisis.  The 
advocate pays credence to the particular needs of undocumented survivors, recognizing 
the necessity for considering the potential danger for undocumented survivors who call 
911, but then dismisses this concern by evoking a generalized account of the irrationality 
of a person in crisis.  In pursuing this line of reasoning, the group conflates all survivors, 
pathologizing them by focusing on their perceived inability to make decisions under 
stress.  This way of thinking implicitly draws on a form of pre-feminist discourse that 
positions the survivor as helpless in her traumatic state (Dutton, 1998; Hughes & Jones, 
2000).  This focus on individual helplessness runs counter to the broader DV discourse, 
as well as PWCL’s feminist orientation. 
 The moderator attempts to direct the group back to thinking about undocumented 
survivors, asking if they would recommend a woman with tenuous immigration status to 
call 911.  In response, there is no discussion of the undocumented survivor. Instead the 
group brings in the decision tree heuristic, evaluating the dangerousness of the situation 
by assessing if the caller will be killed or not.  One advocate comments, “I would, (pause) 
if they were going to get killed“(1. 277). 
 By invoking the possibility of lethality the advocate registers a collective anxiety 
inherent in DV crisis work – that by saying the wrong thing or making the wrong 
assessment, someone may end up dead.  This notion of advocate responsibility is 
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articulated by each group and mirrors my own experience as an advocate.  The advocate 
goes on to explain, “I mean, we are talking to people in really severe domestic violence 
situations with unpredictable partners” (1. 280-281). 
 Once again, crisis work is generalized, categorized by extremes and an inability to 
predict the behavior of the abuser.  Interestingly, this unpredictability offers a kind of 
structure and modicum of control in that the advocates are granted a kind of moral 
imperative in proceeding: all decisions must be based on the assumption that there is a 
looming possibility of death should the advocate make the wrong recommendation.  This 
also presumes that giving the correct advice will potentially save the survivor. The group 
members emphasize their role in determining the gravity of each call.  One participant 
expresses this dilemma: 
I mean, I think the issue is how dangerous is the situation?  If they will be 
killed tonight and they are concerned they will be murdered with their 
kids, absolutely call 911, I don’t care if you are deported at least you aren’t 
murdered. (1. 306-308). 
 
 This statement serves multiple purposes.  One effect of this invoking of lethality is 
that it immediately shuts down the discussion.  At that moment there are murmurs of 
agreement, followed by silence.  The statement is predicated on an assumption that the 
potential lethality of an individual batterer is more salient, and more likely, than the risks 
inherent to deportation.  It also underscores the costs of using the either/or decision tree 
model as a means of resolving complexity.  In applying this discursive strategy, it 
becomes necessary to create a worse this in order to make the problematic that appear 
reasonable.  So, in assessing dangerousness, as soon as death is brought into the equation 
the scales shift and all actions are justified. 
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 This maintains the discussion at the level of the individual through the focus on 
generalized accounts of survivors and perpetrators of domestic violence.  Each time the 
discussion begins to move toward a more complex understanding of the ramifications for 
different survivors of calling 911, someone brings the conversation back to the individual. 
 For example, one advocate asserts that some survivors might be afraid when 
hearing the advice to call 911 on the recorded message and suggests including more 
information.  The discussion is immediately brought back to the idea that survivors in 
crisis share certain impairments.  An advocate responds, 
But it is different with people in crisis and DV, we get that all the time 
regardless of your ethnicity or race. (Murmurs of agreement.) 
Trauma affects your brain and your ability to make certain decisions (1. 
339-342) 
 
 This reasoning places decision-making as the responsibility of the advocate, who 
must base her recommendations on the potential for the caller to be killed.  Accordingly, 
this justifies the continuing inclusion of the police, via maintaining the undifferentiated 
recommendation in the message, as the stakes are too high to consider alternatives. 
 At this point in the focus group, the moderator offers an example of organizations 
that no longer recommend undocumented survivors call the police.  The group responds 
by bringing in a more complex way of thinking about undocumented survivors and law 
enforcement.  Rather than focusing on individual survivors, the group addresses law 
enforcement, with one member stating, “that’s a pretty big breakdown in law enforcement 
if you can’t think of them as an ally” (1. 376) 
 By placing the emphasis on law enforcement, rather than focusing only on the 
individual survivor, the group begins to explore a structural critique.  An advocate 
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comments, 
‘cause I don’t think we’re thinking that way, that the person making the 
report gets arrested too… And it gets messy there because I feel like 
because of this program (Secure Communities) we’ve lost that kind of 
individualized relationship with the cops. (1. 403-404; 409-410) 
 
 This argument highlights the effect of Secure Communities on both the survivor 
and the traditional alliances between domestic violence advocates and law enforcement.  
The recognition of the dissolution of these relationships leads the group back to 
considering the message at their own agency.  One advocate says, 
I think this is really, really powerful and important information to say, 
“this 911 call could lead to your deportation,” despite what we’ve heard 
from certain sergeants.” (1. 434-436) 
 
 This intersectional turn is immediately challenged by another member of the 
group who returns to the element of fear, linking the decision by another agency not to 
recommend contacting the police to the tactics of abusive partners, who also warn 
survivors not to access law enforcement.  She offers an assessment of the dilemma. 
I feel for immigrant people the number one thing that is used to abuse 
them is fear of the law and not reaching out, so their abuser might have 
told them, you can’t call 911, you are going to be deported and they’re 
getting murdered and they are not calling 911, too.  So I think the blanket 
statement that New York used sounds really empowering and awesome, 
but at the same time really scary, because people might actually need that 
resource and they’re not using it. (1. 439-446) 
 
 This reminder, with its evocation of “murder” and “scary” moves the discussion 
away from what could be done and back to insurmountable barriers.  It also returns to the 
decision tree, with its either/or framework, positioning the CJS as the sole resource 
available to immigrant survivors who are constructed as either making use of it or being 
killed. 
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 As with the prior group, Project UNICA begins with an intersectional analysis of 
the effect of the message on an undocumented survivor.  Different participants offer ideas 
for changing the message focused around how accessing law enforcement might affect 
someone who is undocumented.  They describe a range of outcomes they might explain 
to the survivor. When the moderator reminds them that this is a recorded message and 
does not offer a chance for conversation, however, the group becomes silent.  At that 
point an advocate speaks, stressing their inability to act, “I don’t...I mean, I don’t know if 
there’s another option at this point” (2. 464). 
 This response is met with silence.  When the moderator asks if they can come up 
with any alternatives, the advocate goes on to describe the way in which many women on 
the crisis line are hesitant to access 911 already because of past experiences with the 
police or generalized fear around law enforcement.  Rather than continuing with an 
intersectional analysis, she enlists the decision tree heuristic, saying, 
But if their life’s in danger, there’s not much else that...you know, if it’s a 
life and death situation It feels a little bit okay (2. 480-418) 
 
 This, too, is met with silence until the moderator asks the rest of the group for 
input.  At that point the group is quite hesitant to imagine a different message.  When 
prompted they describe giving survivors information about how to present themselves to 
the police as the victim of domestic violence.  Even as this option is suggested, however, 
the advocate questions its efficacy, saying 
But maybe I would feel a little less scared of calling 9-1-1, if I knew that I 
could use that vocabulary, and it would actually be effective in making me 
lower priority. Which is questionable if it even does that. (2. 508-510) 
  
 This distrust of the system is a theme throughout the rest of the discussion.  The 
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group offers a complex critique of the system, explaining that it is not the job of the 
survivor to figure out how to keep herself safe, nor is it the job of the advocates to remind 
the system how to work properly to ensure her safety.  They describe multiple 
problematic issues, addressing specifics like a policy prohibiting native Spanish speakers 
at emergency services to answer 911 calls, and, more general issues such as how 
survivors are expected to navigate an impossible and oppressive system.  Despite this line 
of criticism, the group continues to be unable to generate ideas for change at the agency 
level.  There is no discussion of alternatives outside of reliance upon the criminal justice 
system to provide survivor safety. 
 As the group offers this systemic critique, the moderator brings in the example of 
agencies in other cities that have responded to systemic problems by no longer 
recommending undocumented survivors contact police.  Much like their earlier response 
to changing the recorded message, advocates explain why this change is impossible.  An 
advocate says, 
Well, we have...I mean, we wouldn’t be able to...we have partnerships 
with the city of Portland Police Bureau with DVERT. And the Portland 
Police Department Domestic Violence Reduction Unit,  and it’s part of the 
police that, really tries to work well with us. (2. 7349-749) 
 
 The introduction of agency partnerships with law enforcement immediately halts 
the larger systemic critique.  This shift marks a return to the mainstream DV discourse 
that holds the CJS at the center and focuses on an individual level analysis.  For the 
remainder of the focus group, talk revolves around changing individual officers and the 
possibility of being “inside making change within the Portland police” (2. 803-804). 
 Additionally, reversing what had just been said about the problematic tendency to 
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make the survivor responsible for insuring her own safety, the group returns to the idea of 
teaching survivors particular things to say when getting arrested.  In this case an advocate 
describes how she safety plans with survivors, teaching them to scream “domestic 
violence” in English and Spanish, despite earlier group descriptions of the inefficacy of 
that tactic. 
 The advocates from Bradley Angle begin their consideration of the second 
scenario differently from the other two groups.  Rather than discussing how to change the 
message, the group starts by noting the potential confusion around the message.  One 
advocate recounts a story about a woman who heard the message telling her to call 911 
and immediately hung up, thinking 911 was being called automatically.  She had to wait 
many days before she could physically come to the advocate’s office, as she was afraid to 
call the agency on the phone again.  This anecdote sets the tone for the way this group 
discusses changing the message.  The group employs an intersectional way of 
approaching the problem, considering the effect of the message on disparate marginalized 
groups.  An advocate begins, 
I know I changed mine a while ago to not say that, because I worry 
specifically about the LGBTQ population which is another population that 
has a history of institutional violence (3. 940-942) 
 
 Rather than bringing in the decision tree heuristic and describing the threat of 
lethality, as was the case in the other two groups, this group takes up the issue of 
institutional violence.  An advocate adds, 
Well, also too, I think that like in some communities, it’s…it’s 
institutionalized, they don’t call 9-1-1. So I mean you hear that message 
and you’re like, you know, “Screw you guy—” (3.959-961) 
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 The advocate connects the choice of advocating 911 in the message with the 
practice of institutional violence.  The group maintains this level of analysis, focusing on 
structural rather than individual issues.  This focus leads the group to a rich discussion of 
the meaning of the crisis line.  One advocate brings up the question of what it is that the 
crisis line is supposed to do.  If the crisis line is supposed to be there for survivors to call 
if they are in crisis, why would there be a message telling them to call 911?  Are 
survivors supposed to call the crisis line when in crisis or should they call 911? 
They say,  
I think there’s a lot of just misinformation out there about what crisis lines are 
able to do, or what we……you can and cannot provide. So I think that’s maybe 
some history on why we say…“Call 9-1-1.” I don’t necessarily think we have 
to… (2. 1328-1333) 
 
 This acknowledgement of confusion and unintended consequences is in direct 
contrast to responses of the earlier focus group.  In that discussion the confusion was 
located entirely in the survivor, who was described as unable to make decisions because 
of her traumatic state.  In Bradley Angle’s discussion, however, the confusion is located 
in the structure itself – in the agency practice of recommending 911.  This practice is 
recognized as unclear, specifically for survivors who don’t speak English as a first 
language and misunderstand the disparate uses of 911 (for the hospital, fire and police) 
and more generally, there is a lack of clarity around the function of the crisis line itself. 
 This discussion is different from Project UNICA’s critique.  Although both groups 
consider institutional practices oppressing marginalized survivors, the group never makes 
a direct connection to their own policies.  In contrast, Bradley Angle advocates spend 
most of the discussion talking about their responsibility for implementing larger 
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movement decisions, including the crisis line itself. 
 As this group tries to understand the role of the crisis line, advocates continue 
with a structural critique that includes their own agency’s policy decisions.  When the 
discussion moves to other topics, the group continues to bring it back to the question of 
what they are asking of survivors by offering a crisis line. 
 As the discussion of the crisis line continues, the group brings up possibilities for 
changing the message.  They take up different ideas, discussing what they are able to 
provide and whether it matches up with the caller’s expectations.  As this line of 
reasoning continues, an advocate suggests the possibility of not recommending 911 on 
the recorded message.  At this suggestion, a participant brings up the issue of agency 
liability, telling the story of a caller being severely injured while she was on the phone 
with her.  The advocate reminds the group that the policy directing callers to enlist 911 is 
in place to mitigate agency responsibility for encouraging people to call them when they 
are in crisis in the first place. 
 Although the evocation of potential harm to a survivor does not appear to have the 
same weight as in the other groups’ consideration of lethality, it has a similar effect.  The 
discussion of alternative messages stops and the group moves instead to the idea of 
training individual officers and workers at DHS.  The larger systemic critique continues, 
but there is no concurrent analysis of their own agency’s policies or any ideas for 
working outside the confines of the Criminal Justice System.  Instead the focus is on 
minor reforms within the system in much the same way as the advocates of focus group 
two discussed trying to work to change individual officers within their DVERT and 
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DVRU partnerships. 
Discussion. Similar to the groups’ responses to the first scenario, the arc of the 
focus group discussions is shaped by agency policies around collaborating with law 
enforcement. Enlisting the police in response to fears around abuser lethality and direct 
collaboration with the police, for example, in participation in a Domestic Violence 
Enhanced Response Team (DVERT), emerge as central motifs.  PWCL is able initially to 
imagine a range of ideas for the recorded message recommending callers enlist 911, 
described in the scenario.  These suggestions stop abruptly with the introduction of 
concerns over the risk of death for callers.  With the initiation of this theme, respondents 
turn to a DV discourse focused on individual survivors, constructed as unable to care for 
themselves due to the effects of trauma.  Project UNICA offers a complex analysis of 
larger social systems but remains unable to make any inroads into what to do at the 
agency level.  Additionally, despite the structural critique, all ideas about making change 
are described at the individual level via interventions with individual officers and 
sensitivity trainings for DHS workers. 
 During the focus group, advocates from Bradley Angle pursue an intersectional 
analysis throughout, considering multiple lines of oppression and connecting them to 
their own policy decisions.  They are able to work creatively until discussion abruptly 
stops with the introduction of the agency’s potential liability for harm that might come to 
a survivor who calls the crisis line.  At this possibility, their responses begin to mirror 
those of the other groups, including the focus on individual-level changes and group 
resignation to maintaining the existing 911 recommendation. 
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Overall Summary of the Findings  
The first scenario describes a crisis call in which an undocumented survivor 
presents numerous issues, including potential child abuse by her abusive partner.  In 
response to this scenario the two groups with requirements that some or all advocates 
report suspected child abuse focus primarily on mandatory reporting, framing all 
responses within the limitations imposed by that policy.  Despite conversation revolving 
around how to subvert the policy through controlling the individual survivor’s behavior, 
through keeping her from speaking with specific advocates or contacting certain 
organizations, the policy itself is never explicitly questioned.  However, there are clear 
indications that the groups understand the problems inherent to indiscriminately making a 
mandatory child abuse report, particularly if the person reported is undocumented. 
In the group with no agency reporting requirement there is a more overt critique 
of mandatory reporting and the risks it carries for undocumented survivors. However, 
even in this group, there is no discussion of alternatives.  The discussion remains at the 
individual level, focused on keeping the individual survivor from incriminating herself 
via limiting access to services in which there are no mandatory reporters.  The groups’ 
inabilities to consider policy changes seem to reflect the centrality of the mainstream 
domestic violence discourse with its emphasis on the criminal justice system. 
In the second scenario, the three groups are initially able to consider potential 
changes to current agency practices around both indiscriminately and intentionally 
recommending undocumented survivors call 911 and enlist law enforcement.  Once the 
issue of potential lethality is raised, however, discussion shuts down in each of the 
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groups.  At that point, two of the three groups revert to a decision tree heuristic, 
simplifying the discussion.  They subsequently abandon any consideration of alternatives 
to the criminal justice system for providing safety to callers on the crisis line.  While the 
third group does not employ the heuristic immediately, and is able to engage in a 
discussion about both movement and agency policy decisions, the focus of their 
discussion ultimately ends up back on the individual level describing, for example, how 
an individual survivor’s behavior can be modified within the existing system. 
Throughout all of the focus groups, participants make use of particular 
understandings of domestic violence work that are framed by a larger domestic violence 
discourse – one based on assumptions about the relationship between domestic violence 
crisis work and the criminal justice system.  This discourse centralizes the role of the 
CJS, prioritizing criminal responses to DV over more complex systemic possibilities 
outside the legal realm (Harvie & Manzi, 2011). 
In each of the groups the use of this discourse varies, depending on their 
partnerships with the CJS.  The agencies with mandatory reporting requirements 
primarily enlist a mainstream DV discourse that focuses on criminality and the criminal 
justice system.  The third agency is better able to engage in an alternative, intersectional 
analysis that does not reject using the CJS, but focuses primarily on building relationships 
and providing services to survivors. 
Finally, contrary to my assumptions entering the project, proximity appears to 
have less effect on shaping group consideration of work with undocumented survivors 
than do agency policies around collaborating with the criminal justice system, regardless 
127 
 
of the use of an intersectional analysis of survivor needs.  Throughout discussion of both 
scenarios, the group most proximal is able to maintain an intersectional analysis, keeping 
undocumented survivors as the central focus.  They also are the only group to have prior 
knowledge of Secure Communities and its effect on undocumented survivors.  Despite 
this awareness, they are the least able to consider alternatives to both mandatory child 
abuse reporting and agency policies around recommending 911.  This group is made up 
entirely of mandatory reporters and is the only agency to partner directly with the 
Portland Police Department. 
In response to both scenarios, the group from the agency with no mandatory 
reporting requirement and no partnership with Portland Police Bureau is more able to 
sustain a consistent intersectional analysis and explore the most complex consideration of 
alternatives to both their own agency and larger DV movement practices around working 
with undocumented survivors and the Criminal Justice System. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions 
 This dissertation began with a problem that emerged out of my practice as both an 
advocate in the field of domestic violence and an immigrant and workers’ rights activist.  
As an advocate on a coordinated community response (CCR) team I worked for two 
years in direct collaboration with law enforcement and the district attorney’s office.  I was 
struck by how the voice of the grassroots organization was subsumed under the national 
politics of adjudication, prosecution and incarceration.  At times, advocating for 
marginalized women (generally women of color who experienced the system 
oppressively) to work outside of the CJS was considered a transgression and in 
opposition to the long-term goals of the group.  The tendency to adopt this stance was not 
because members of the team were “bad” or overtly engaged in some kind of concerted 
effort to harm the DV survivor.  To the contrary, I found that the representatives of the 
CJS were committed to providing safety to survivors and were generally sensitive to their 
needs, within the parameters of the criminal justice system.  Any position outside this 
framework was constructed dangerous – for survivors, their families, members of the 
CCR team, and for the larger community. 
 This pairing of the criminal justice system and safety is not limited to DV work 
but occurs in many national policies, especially after the U.S. bombings of September 11, 
2001.  Across the United States, there has been an increase in criminalization, justified in 
the name of safety (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006).  In addition to increased forms of 
social control through legislation such as the US PATRIOT Act, the criminalization of 
immigration has led to increased detention, incarceration and deportation of 
129 
 
undocumented people as well as the massive militarization of the southern U.S. border. 
 As an activist, I followed this shift on border politics closely.  Prior to living in 
Oregon I spent much of my life in the Southwest desert, and lived in Tucson, Arizona for 
many years.  Border issues there are particularly salient and I felt an acute border tension 
between my work around domestic violence and my activism around worker rights and 
border politics.  I carried this interest into my life and work in Oregon.  During the late 
1990s and early 2000s, I witnessed raids and deportations and heard stories of people 
dying in desert crossings.  In both Arizona and Oregon, Latina survivors of domestic 
violence told me their own stories of difficult border crossings, both in leaving their 
home countries and in escaping domestic abuse.  They described a growing distrust of the 
State and an unwillingness to access help on many levels.  In addition to eschewing the 
use of 911, survivors gave accounts of families refusing the public health system and 
opting not to send their children to school, for fear they would be separated from their 
families by detention and potential deportation. 
 At the same time this pressure on Latino families was escalating, I witnessed no 
concurrent policy changes at the domestic violence agency where I worked.  Despite 
discussion among advocates of the increasing limitations to existing services for Latina 
survivors, there appeared to be no sense of how to respond to this challenge among 
mainstream DV providers.  As I left my advocacy work to return to school, however, 
culturally specific programs began to become more common with the promise of more 
relevant and effective services. 
 I continued to consider these problems as I began my study of community 
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psychology.  I was drawn to this field in part for its emphasis on an ecological 
perspective, which looks at whole systems, considering multiple levels of analysis 
(Levine, et al., 2005).  Rather than beginning with a focus on the individual, inquiry 
centers on understanding the social context and the dialectical relationship between the 
forces and pressures of the context and individual dynamics within that setting (Perilla, 
2006). 
 I brought insights to this project formed out of the integration of my practical 
experience and my theoretical understandings of group process derived from community 
psychology.  These areas of praxis shaped the way I created and implemented the study, 
as well as in how I interpreted the results. In this dissertation I examine how advocates 
navigate dilemmas presented in their work with undocumented survivors.  DV advocates 
face multiple and often conflicting pressures as they negotiate the complex dilemmas that 
arise in responding to crisis calls.  This complexity is especially evident in work with 
undocumented people in situations where enlisting the criminal justice system presents 
risks that are difficult to assess.  It is difficult to evaluate a low probability but 
unchangeable risk, such as lethality, with deportation, which has a higher probability. 
While devastating, the risk of deportation includes some possibility for mitigation, 
through legal processes. 
In this dissertation project the research questions focus on understanding how 
advocates respond to law enforcement/Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
collaborations, the discursive strategies advocates employ in managing the difficulty 
inherent to work within this context, and whether the group’s location affects the 
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complexity of their response.  Lewin (1997) suggests that by understanding the barriers 
and forces compelling groups confront as they work through a set of problems it is 
possible to comprehend why it is that individuals and groups behave the way they do.  By 
introducing scenarios that foreground acute border tensions, the places of conflict that 
arise when contradictory claims must be negotiated, we can identify the forces 
compelling DV advocates in this work and better comprehend how decisions are made at 
crisis moments, which could offer a direction for making change. 
 In each focus group, advocates were presented with information about 
collaborations between law enforcement and immigration and customs enforcement.  
They were subsequently asked to incorporate this information into their response to a 
crisis call involving an undocumented survivor.  In addition they were asked to consider 
agency and movement policies about the recommendation survivors contact law 
enforcement through the 911 emergency number. 
 Each effort at integrating the new information about law enforcement-ICE 
collaborations into their practices produced acute border tensions, requiring advocates to 
manage multiple sites of alliances, including the survivor, the agency, the larger system 
and themselves.  Advocates grappled with the question of how to assist a survivor 
without causing additional harm to her and staying within the parameters of agency 
policies.  In both the scenarios, the introduction of ICE mandates complicated standard 
practices involving the State for providing safety for both the survivor and her children. 
 Throughout all three focus groups, advocates made use of an intersectional 
perspective in considering multiple axes of oppression potentially experienced by 
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undocumented survivors.  In creating this study, I asked about the relationship between 
agency proximity to working with undocumented survivors and the group’s decision-
making process.  Based on my preliminary research, I reasoned that advocates in groups 
more proximal to the phenomenon would use a more intersectional perspective in 
working with undocumented survivors.  Further, I assumed that an intersectional 
perspective would be a catalyst for imagining new ways of confronting the dilemma 
presented by law enforcement collaborations with ICE.  However, despite advocate’s 
continual consideration of race, class, gender and other dimensions of social location, 
advocates in two of the three focus groups were unable to imagine alternatives to 
enlisting the State when working with undocumented survivors.  In enlisting the concept 
of border tensions, I sought to work through the forces that shaped advocates’ decision-
making processes. 
 Responses to the two scenarios indicate that advocates bring with them a 
complicated relationship to the criminal justice system that affects their decision-making.  
In response to the first scenario, groups from agencies with mandatory reporting 
requirements end up focusing on compliance with the State, despite their intersectional 
and analysis of domestic violence (right?) Advocates express a profound reluctance to 
indiscriminately refer survivors to law enforcement, yet appear to see no alternative to 
engaging the State in response to perceived violations of mandatory reporting policies.  
This compliance, while understandable in the context of agency policies, contradicts 
repeated assertions by advocates that vulnerable populations seeking services could be 
disproportionately harmed through enlisting the police. 
133 
 
 In negotiating the paradox inherent to recommending survivors seek help from an 
institution they recognize to be potentially harmful, advocates in the focus groups move 
from a complex analysis to a simple one by employing a discursive strategy that reduces 
ambiguity.  The decision-tree practice is quite effective in distilling complex information 
into a simplified, forced choice series of yes/no questions.  This practice may impede 
intersectional analysis and creative thinking, however, in response to the dilemmas that 
arise around crisis intervention. 
 In addition to enlisting a decision-tree process for managing border tensions, 
advocates in the focus groups make use of a range of domestic violence discourses to 
negotiate the contradictions around safety in crisis work. In response to the scenario on 
the use of the 911 emergency number, discussion of safety in all three groups focused on 
lethality. Participants note that most of the calls coming into the crisis line are made when 
a survivor is not in actual danger of being assaulted.  Unprompted, participants tell 
similar stories of calls in which the survivor was in immediate danger.  In each account 
the abuser is beating on the door, threatening the caller, even though discussion in all 
groups included clarification that such calls are exceedingly rare.  In one group, after 
telling this prototypical story, the advocate explains that this even happened four years 
ago at another agency.  In another group, the advocate offers this same story, first 
explaining that it took place somewhere else and that she had never experienced it at her 
current agency.  Despite this admission, the advocate uses this example to explain why 
the agency would be liable should they remove the 911 call message.  She ends her story 
by saying, “That said, we don’t really get any crisis calls (laughs).  Like ever.” (3. 1369) 
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This apparent disconnect between DV dangerousness and the advocate’s experience on 
the crisis line suggests that anxiety and group defenses operate in the field in ways not 
fully recognized.  By examining the larger DV discourse it is possible to understand 
better the contradiction between the expectation of dangerousness and the reality of crisis 
work. 
 Advocate responses to both scenarios emerge out of a discourse of domestic 
violence that places the criminal justice system at the center.  This orientation is, in turn, 
dependent upon a discourse of fear.  In all the focus groups, the advocates are able to 
work through the scenarios, offering ideas that consider the particular needs of an 
undocumented survivor until they are stopped by agency policies and fear of lethality – 
both of which are embedded within an uncritical acceptance of a relationship between the 
movement and the CJS.  This, in turn, is part of a larger discourse of fear, which is 
reflected in indiscriminate reliance upon the criminal justice system. 
 In his work around mass media representations of terrorism, Althiede (2003) 
describes a discourse of fear, an orientation toward the world which is manifest in anxiety 
that carries with it inevitability that we are almost-already victims of crime.  An effect of 
the discourse of fear is that rare events begin to be assumed as common and unavoidable. 
It is not a matter of if we will become victimized but when, despite the rate of violent 
crimes continuing to drop all over the United States (BJS, 2012; Pinker, 2011). 
 Domestic violence work brings another dynamic to this discourse of fear.  The 
work sensitizes advocates to the risk of violence. Stories of violence permeate the 
literature, the agency handouts, and the direct work advocates do with individual 
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survivors – both in-person and on crisis line calls.  And this anxiety related to potential 
lethal violence carries real validity.  Domestic violence homicides account for one third 
of all the murders of women in the United States.  However, like all violent crime in the 
U.S., rates of intimate partner violence have decreased substantially, dropping 64% since 
1994 (BJS, 2012).  However, it is important to note that this reduction has not occurred in 
the same way for domestic violence homicide.  While DV homicides are down 60% since 
1994, this is largely due to a decrease in the rate of abused women killing abusive men.  
The decrease in the rate of DV homicides for women has only dropped 7%.  However, 
this change, though small, represents a decrease in what was already an exceedingly rare 
event (Wells, et al., 2010).  It is more likely for a person to die from illnesses, car 
accidents, or suicide than from homicide. 
 While domestic violence homicide is a real and present danger, it remains a 
relatively infrequent occurrence.  And yet the expectation that domestic violence will be 
deadly influences both policy and practice, some of which may have the unintended 
consequence of putting survivors in additional danger.  For example, the common 
practice of hiding DV shelters is defended as necessary for resident safety.  This policy 
means that survivors must separate from supportive family and friends, isolating 
themselves, thus becoming especially vulnerable just after leaving their partner.  This is 
standard practice for a majority of the shelters in the U.S. despite there being no data 
linking the policy to decreased violence or lethality (Haaken & Yragui, 2005; Rempe, 
2000).   In a similar way, mandatory arrest laws and the policy of indiscriminately 
recommending survivors call 911 are assumed to provide increased safety for survivors, 
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though their efficacy remains equivocal.  For example, Iyengar (2009) finds that in states 
with mandatory arrest laws, DV homicide has increased. 
 There are strategies with proven efficacy.  For example, danger assessment tools 
can be an important first step in determining an increased likelihood for DV homicide 
(Campbell, et al., 2009) but do not appear to be commonly used in the agencies I queried.  
The practices of separating partners that come out of exposure theory can lead to 
decreases in homicide, in, specific populations (Dugan, et al., 2003).  However, the way 
separation is implemented, via orders of protection for example, can have the opposite 
effect, creating fewer, but more highly charged and potentially dangerous interactions 
between intimate partners (Reckdenwald & Parker, 2010). 
 Considering these institutional contradictions, it is not surprising that advocates 
express ambivalence around enlisting law enforcement and communicate a contradictory 
relationship to the CJS.  This ambivalence can be seen in the way advocates describe 
subverting the system in the first scenario and using it in the second.  Advocates in all 
three focus groups reach an impasse when considering mandatory reports of child abuse 
and abusers’ potential lethality.  In the first instance, the question centers on whether a 
report must be made, and in the second on whether or not the caller is likely to be killed.  
Each of these sites of concern marks a moment in which the larger CJS is enlisted.  In one 
case the focus is on subverting the system, while in the other the system is employed. 
 In regard to both scenarios advocates articulate suspicion of the system, 
describing its inherent flaws, especially for marginalized populations.  When discussing 
making a mandatory child abuse report, however, the advocate response revolves almost 
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entirely around ways to get around the requirements of the system, through keeping 
survivors from relating things that might be reportable, to referring them to other 
agencies where there are not mandatory reporters. 
 Conversely, the fear of lethality manifests itself in turning to the police as a 
defensive response.  In this case, the criminal justice system becomes the ally and 
protector, despite advocate recognition of its inherent flaws and potential dangerousness 
to different populations.  The participants seem able to hold two contrary positions 
simultaneously, much like the advocate in my preliminary research that said when I asked 
if they referred callers to the police, “I would not necessarily recommend someone call 
911.  Definitely the police are our strong allies.”
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Figure 1 
 Advocates’ ambivalence around working with law enforcement is reflected in all 
three focus groups.  This conflict emerges in the discussion of the first scenario. In the 
two focus groups with mandatory reporting requirements, advocates attempt to resolve 
this conflict by describing how they would work with particular officers they knew 
(group one) or work from within the system via DVERT partnerships to train officers to 
be more sensitive to DV issues (group two). In the third group, with no agency reporting 
requirements, participants explain how they are affected by the policy, specifically how it 
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limits referral possibilities for survivors.  They describe an increased burden on their own 
agency, within a context of diminishing services for survivors. 
 Additionally, my expectation that agency proximity to undocumented survivors 
would lead to more complex decision-making was not supported by the findings of the 
study. Findings suggest that agency collaboration with the CJS are more determinant of 
responses to border tensions in the field.  Advocates in the Latina-focused agency 
describe being bound by their agency’s connection to the CJS, unable to imagine ways of 
making change that do not rely on the CJS as the primary response to survivors seeking 
services, despite the advocates’ recognition of the potential dangers raised by enlisting 
law enforcement.  Perhaps this can be explained in part because the group is one that 
experiences threats and insecurities from the dominant system, which can serve as a 
barrier to feeling able to make systemic change or even address the system at all.  The 
consequences of questioning the dominant paradigm are greater for marginalized groups 
who already are cast as outsiders and subject to racist beliefs about cultural acceptance of 
abuse (Sokoloff & Dupont, 2005). 
 Another way of explaining the responses at the Latina-focused agency is that 
advocates confront a larger struggle for legitimacy.  The group’s alliance with the CJS 
might be carry with it a promise of conformity to the rule of law and greater security for 
the Latino population.  Much like the early battered women’s movement’s strategic 
alliances with the criminal justice system, coordination with the State might be seen as 
offering more powerful sources of help than that offered by grassroots organizations. 
 The findings in this dissertation suggest that reliance on the criminal justice 
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system diminishes advocate’s abilities to consider creative responses for service provision 
to undocumented survivors, regardless of their use of an intersectional perspective.  
Participants adopt an intersectional perspective throughout the focus groups, considering 
the multiple constitutive factors that come together in undocumented survivor’s lives.  
However the findings indicate that an intersectional analysis of survivor needs is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for progressive crisis work. The findings are part 
of a larger body of literature calling for reconsideration of the role the CJS plays in DV 
service provision (Richie, 2008; Smith, 2008; Sokoloff & Dupont, 2005). 
 Parker (1992) describes the difficulty people face in trying to work outside the 
dominant discourse.  Creating an alternative DV discourse requires (re)framing the CJS 
as only one of myriad tools available to the survivor seeking services.  Rather than 
uncritical recommendation that a survivor call 911, for example, strategies for educating 
callers on the possibilities inherent to engaging the State must be developed.  This could 
be as simple as saying something like “If you are in danger, call 911.  As a reminder, 
current laws require that in the case of arrest, immigration will be notified, as well”. 
 The findings reported here suggest that domestic violence agencies committed to 
structural change benefit from partnering with agencies outside traditional DV services.  
Advocates in all groups describe partnerships outside traditional DV services, but explain 
that they feel unable to develop alternative collaborative relationships because they are so 
over-extended by their agency work.  Agencies are under-staffed and many DV agencies 
are closing, often due to lack of funding.  This attrition places a greater burden on the 
remaining agencies.  At the same time the needs of survivors increase.  In 2011, local DV 
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agencies reported a 4% increase in calls for help from survivors of domestic and sexual 
violence (OCADSV, 2013). 
 One way of achieving the aim of structural change would be through creating 
coordinated community response (CCR) teams that are reflections of the larger 
community, rather than replications of the criminal justice system.  Instead of forming 
CCRs that revolve around law enforcement, DHS, and the DA’s office, a truly effectual 
CCR would enlist multiple community partners, including faith communities, 
neighborhood associations, Rotary-like clubs, immigrant rights groups, healthcare 
providers - including mental health, and others.  By partnering with the community DV 
agencies would move from their liminal positions, hiding on the margins of community 
(Wallpe, 2010). 
 In the final section I explain some of the challenges to this study, including 
generalizability.   I follow this with suggestions for additional research and practice. 
Limitations to the Study and Possibilities for Future Research 
 One limitation of the study centers on the follow-up responses with agency 
directors. In the case study section I was able to ask two of the three groups follow-up 
questions about their practices around advocacy and training.  Two of the groups 
provided volunteer and staff training manuals and spoke with me about their agency’s 
political orientation and history.  The remaining group did not respond to repeated phone 
calls and emails.  This problem with follow-up limited my ability to gather the same level 
of detail about this agency’s orientation to DV work as I was able to achieve with the 
other two agencies. In addition, this group did not fill out the demographic information 
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following the focus group so I was unable to include more extensive information about 
the participants. 
 Another limitation relates to sample size and generalizability.  This study is based 
on a sample of three focus groups made up of twenty six participants, held with advocates 
from three agencies in a large urban area in the Pacific Northwest.  It is therefore difficult 
to generalize my findings to other populations or settings. In this study, I sought to 
provide readers with an opportunity to assess the possibility for inferential generalization 
– how findings of studies can be applied to other settings or contexts (Lewis & Ritchie, 
2003). This concept suggests that findings much be reported in enough detail and with 
sufficient description of the context of the study for readers to decide if the findings can 
be transferred to other contexts.   In this study, I have included extensive description of 
the participating agencies as well as the larger framework around domestic violence and 
immigration.  In addition to providing quotes from the focus groups within the findings, I 
have appended an entire transcript of one of the focus group transcript (see appendix F).  
Potential readers include academics, advocates and activists engaged in work with 
survivors of domestic violence and/or immigrants.  These might include those doing 
policy work or creating multidisciplinary teams and working in direct service. 
 Additionally, in this study I consider the concept of provocative generalizability 
as described by Michelle Fine (2006).  Provocative generalizability refers to the way in 
which a piece of research can provoke readers to make change and to imagine what could 
be, rather than remaining in the current paradigm – to “rethink and reimagine current 
arrangements (Fine, 200p. 98). Provocative generalizability also evokes Lewin’s (1997) 
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question, “What shall we do?” (p. 143) by challenging researchers to create projects that 
compel the readers to imagine transformative responses to empirical findings. 
 As I wrote this report I kept a quotation attached to my computer from a 
conversation I had with the executive director of one of the participating agencies.  She 
had just returned to DV work after taking a fifteen-year break.  When I asked her what it 
felt like to be doing this work again, she said that she was struck by the way that we (the 
DV movement) are still engaged in the same discussions we were having when she left 
many years ago.  She asked, “Why are we still having the same conversations?” (personal 
communication). 
 The findings around proximity speak to the way in which DV activists continue to 
struggle with the same problems faced by those in the earlier movement.  In my study, I 
expected the group with the closest proximity to undocumented survivors to bring the 
most complex analysis to the conundrum created by law enforcement/ICE collaborations.  
However, these advocates were least able to imagine alternatives to engaging the CJS.  
This group also had the closest proximity to the CJS.  Perhaps it is this relationship that is 
more important in determining the propensity for advocates to come up with creative 
solutions to challenging problems faced by marginalized survivors.  This insight leads to 
imagining a restructuring of the relationship between the DV movement and the CJS 
through challenging current assumptions.  These include the belief that the relationship 
between the CJS and the DV is benign and that the CJS is the only way of providing 
safety to survivors and their families. 
 This dissertation was conceived as an action research project.  As such, it fulfills 
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an aspect of Lewin’s articulation of action research through providing a description of the 
forces acting upon groups – in this case the way alliances with the criminal justice system 
shape the decision-making processes of the groups as they consider new collaborations 
between law enforcement and ICE.  A next phase in this action research project might 
enlist Lewin’s change model in focusing on alternatives to CJS alliances.  A research 
project could be developed in collaboration with the creation of a community focused 
coordinated response.  One element of the research would be to test the groups’ efficacy 
in creating more safety for survivors, which could be done both qualitatively and 
quantitatively.  Another direction might be to measure the use of an intersectional 
orientation systematically, looking at whether other community members employed this 
perspective as well as the relationship of an intersectional perspective to the trajectory of 
the team. 
 Another research direction might focus on agencies that do 
caution undocumented survivors on  collaborations between police and ICE. Interviews 
with members of these agencies could help elucidate what is different about these 
agencies and why they established these policies, as well as what alternatives they 
recommend to undocumented survivors.  Information could also be gathered as to any 
cases of intimate partner homicides with their clients and the rate of deportations, an 
understudied phenomenon particularly in relation to DV (Reina, Lohman & Maldonado, 
2013). 
 Finally, this work is part of a larger body of research looking into the effects of 
fear of crime.  Even as crime is dropping all over the U.S., people describe increased 
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levels of fear.  These are associated with multiple public health issues, including both 
mental and physical health (Jackson & Stafford, 2009).  DV crisis workers hear daily 
accounts of dangerous situations, as survivors recount stories of their experiences.  This 
can lead to a perception of dangerousness within advocates’ daily work.  However, the 
reality is considerably more mundane, as much of what advocates do involves assisting 
survivors in accessing services, such as housing and financial assistance.  The findings of 
this study suggest that perceptions of dangerousness provide a stumbling block to more 
complex problem solving.  It would be interesting to see if something as simple as 
providing advocates with detailed information about actual dangerousness would be 
sufficient to bring about change in their decision-making process. 
 The findings from this research could also be used to create a workshop for DV 
advocates from multiple agencies where they explore more deeply the costs and benefits 
of engaging with the CJS.  Starting from the insights gained from this study, advocates 
could imagine ways for responding to DV that take place outside the CJS.  This could 
also offer a space for collaboration with other advocates engaged in similar practices to 
think strategically about ways of responding to DV that make use of alternative models, 
including such things as restorative justice and community accountability strategies for 
increasing safety for survivors (Arnold & Ake, 2013; Smith, 2006). 
 Fine et al. (2004) describe the responsibility of the researcher engaged in a 
participatory project to consider both the potential and actual effects of her work in all 
aspects of the process.  Although this is more of a researcher-centric than participatory 
project (Hamberger & Ambuel, 2000), this insight remains true given the context of this 
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dissertation project.  Domestic violence advocacy creates a small community of people 
engaged in work that is loaded, both symbolically and practically, with tension and 
urgency.  It is not surprising that metaphors of war and battle resonate strongly with 
advocates (Haaken, 2010).  The images of conflict and battle fatigue embraced by 
advocates creates a strong alliance among people doing that day-to-day work, who 
become comrades in the struggle to support individual survivors and address larger 
structural violence against women.  This alliance can manifest itself in a long-term 
commitment to domestic violence advocacy work. 
 Many advocates in this study have been in the domestic violence field for a long 
time, in multiple positions and in different agencies. Many advocates involved in this 
research know each other well, despite working in different settings. When the data was 
gathered I removed any names and overtly identifying statements from any public data.  
However, I recognize that it is impossible in such small groups to truly separate the 
person from the utterance.  Because of this restriction, it is impossible to offer any real 
confidentiality.  Consequently I have chosen to make this process as transparent as 
possible.  In my conversations with the executive directors of all the agencies, I explained 
the research trajectory and described the agencies chosen to participate and the reasons 
for this decision.  Additionally, I worked closely with an advisor who has many years 
doing domestic violence research and has worked directly with several of the agencies.  
She has worked diligently with me as throughout the research process. 
 Stein & Mankowski (2004) describe the need for researchers to consider the effect 
of their research findings on the participants, both now and in the future.  As I performed 
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my analysis and wrote my discussion I tried to maintain consideration of what was at 
stake in this project.  Hidden within these theoretical constructions are the lives of real 
people.  The discursive object is an undocumented survivor of domestic violence – a 
woman who left her home, most likely crossed a desert, enduring unimaginable hardship 
to come to a country that wanted only her labor, if that.  Simultaneously she is the victim 
of domestic violence who has experienced violence from the hands of her partner.  As a 
researcher I did not want to lose her subjectivity in the jargon of theory or the objectivity 
of analysis.  Similarly, I wanted the same for the advocates.  Each day these women 
perform complicated jobs, involving endless frustration and requiring boundless 
compassion for very little compensation.  I wanted to honor their struggles, not simply 
critique them. 
 This work is important on multiple levels.  First, it offers a means of examining 
how groups with a shared identity navigate a common social problem. Second, it 
foregrounds the difficulties for groups in working through complex decisions based on 
competing mandates.  One of the key concepts in this study relates to the decision-tree 
heuristic as a strategy for simplifying decisions, especially in cases involving potential 
child abuse or lethality.  The balance between benefit and harm which make decision 
processes like this so challenging can be seen in other instances, ranging from large scale 
policy decisions to one-on-one interactions. 
 In analyzing how advocates talk about the intersection of immigration, domestic 
violence and the State it is possible to understand the processes through which groups 
manage highly charged issues, such as safety and lethality. Findings from this study 
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indicate that when presented with complicated questions, groups rely on a heuristic that 
effectively simplifies complex and emotionally evocative information.  In losing 
complexity, however, they potentially limit consideration of less manageable, but perhaps 
more effective strategies for approaching the complex needs of undocumented survivors. 
 This work is significant for the way it calls attention to a current social problem 
affecting a historically oppressed minority in the United States.  This project potentially 
creates space for advocates to come together as an epistemic community (Assiter, 2000), 
linked through a common commitment to advocacy for people experiencing domestic 
violence and dedicated to systemic social change. The DV movement continues to rely 
heavily on the CJS, despite its disparate effects on communities.  This reliance on law 
enforcement continues to be accepted, at least in part because of concern that questioning 
the trade-offs would mark a return to an earlier time when women experiencing violence 
were, at best, ignored by the CJS.  I believe that the ceaseless work of the DV movement 
has created space for critically assessing dependence on the State and the costs to 
minority communities. 
 In his work on group process, Kurt Lewin describes the interdependences of 
human life.  A group exists when those within its fold recognize that their fate depends 
upon the fate of the group as a whole (Lewin, 1997). By (re)imagining who it is that 
makes up the DV “group” it will be possible to recognize and access our constitutive 
power, setting in motion the possibility for progressive change for all women.  
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Appendix A – Group Scenarios 
Scenario 1: A crisis call 
A call comes into the crisis line.  A woman who speaks accented English says she is 
seeking advice.  Referring her to a culturally specific crisis line is not an option.  She tells 
you that her partner is abusive, both physically and emotionally.  The abuse is infrequent 
and has happened since they came to the US ten years ago.  They are married with two 
children.  She has not sought help before but now the man is beginning to abuse the 
children—something he has not done in the past—and she is concerned.  He occasionally 
strikes the oldest child and is emotionally abusive (yells) to the youngest.  The children 
are having trouble at school (she names the school)  and the teacher (she names the 
teacher) has recently contacted her with concerns. She does not feel she can leave him 
because he is the primary economic provider, because they are married and because he is 
the children’s father.  She, her partner and their oldest child (11) are undocumented. Their 
youngest child (8) is a US citizen. 
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Scenario 2:  The recorded message 
In many shelters, particularly at the administrative offices, the phone goes first to 
voicemail.  The recorded message is generally something like the following: 
“If you are in immediate crisis, please hang up and dial 911. “ 
Additionally, on many of the agency websites, there is the advice to call 911 if in 
immediate danger or to have your neighbors do so, if they are concerned about your 
safety. 
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Appendix B – Focus Group Letter for Consent 
Dear NAME OF PARTICIPANT, 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in a research study conducted by Diana Rempe from 
Portland State University, Department of Psychology, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
a doctoral degree, under the supervision of Dr. Jan Haaken.  
The purpose of this study is to assess how advocates within the domestic violence movement are 
responding to law enforcement-Immigration and Customs enforcement partnerships within the 
tri-county area of Portland, Oregon. The focus group will be audio recorded and will take about 
90 minutes.  The study will be held during a regularly scheduled staff meeting and will be 
composed entirely of staff members from the organization.   
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary, and you may withdraw from it at any 
time with no penalty. There is minimal risk to participants. Risks include being identified with a 
quote or statement that may cause concern or in some way affect your position in the field. 
Although participants will not be named in any published reports or documents unless the 
participant requests to be identified, there is some risk that you could be identified by your quote. 
Quotes from the interview may be used in future publications, for example, in journals, and in 
papers for conferences. You may not receive any direct benefit from taking part in this study, but 
the study may help to increase knowledge, which may help others in the future. 
A code will be created for your name so that your name does not appear on the transcript. This 
code key will be kept in a separate password protected file and only the principal investigator and 
her advisor will have access to this key. All additional records and transcripts will be kept 
confidential and in a locked file. 
 This study is important because it may support on-going dialogue and creative 
brainstorming among advocates who work with particularly vulnerable members of the 
community.  Participation in the focus group may also lead to improvement in domestic violence 
service practices for women experiencing violence from an intimate partner, especially those who 
may lack legal citizenship status in the U.S. 
 Please sign a copy of the consent form and keep one copy for your personal records. 
Thank you again for taking part in the interview. If you have any concerns or problems about 
your participation in this study, please contact Diana Rempe at (503) 819-9845 at Portland State 
University, or the Human Subjects Review Committee, Office of Research and Sponsored 
Projects, 111 Cramer Hall, Portland State University, (503) 725-4288. 
 
              
Name of Participant      Date 
 
I understand that the interview will be audio recorded and agree to be audio recorded as part of 
my participation in the interview. 
 
            
Name of Participant      Date 
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Appendix C – Focus Group Script 
 Introduction and information about Secure Communities (20 m) 
 Welcome participants and provide introduction of self and co-moderator.  
 Explain the consent form and ask each person to sign and date. Give a copy to 
each to keep. 
 Explain the general purpose of the discussion and why the participants were 
chosen.  
 Explain recording equipment and talk about pausing recorder at any time. 
 Outline general ground rules and discussion guidelines such as the importance of 
everyone speaking up, talking one at a time, and being prepared for the moderator 
to interrupt to assure that all the topics can be covered.  
 Address the issue of confidentiality.  
 Inform the group that information discussed is going to be analyzed as a whole 
and that participants' names will not be used in any aspect of the project. 
Example script 
 Hello, I am Diana Rempe and I am doctoral student at PSU’s department of 
community psychology.  I am also a former advocate.  I worked most recently at 
Clackamas Women’s Services and as relief staff at Bradley Angle.  I also worked for 
many years in Arizona prior to moving here. I am meeting with you all today as part of 
my research around the intersection of domestic violence advocacy and recent 
collaborations between law enforcement and immigration and customs enforcement or 
ICE. 
 Before beginning I want to explain the process a little more and lay out some 
basic ground rules for the conversation.  To begin with, this is my co-moderator, Amy.  
(Amy does introduction).  Amy will be leading the discussion today and I will be taking 
notes.  We will be audio taping the meeting.  If at any time you would like to say 
something that you don’t want to be taped—something “off the record” just let me know 
and I will turn off the tape. Following this meeting, the audio will be transcribed.  In the 
transcription of the meeting, numbers will be substituted for your names, in order to offer 
some confidentiality in the written documents.  
 As for confidentiality, I will do my best to keep what you all say today 
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confidential.  However, I have no control over what happens once you all leave the room.  
I ask each of you to keep the connection between what we talk about today and those 
participating in the conversation, here in the room.  Not to say that you are expected to 
refrain from talking about our discussion, but rather that you not connect what is said to 
those who said it.  In other words, if you want to tell you roommate or partner that you 
learned about a new law enforcement/ICE collaboration today, that is great.  Just don’t 
then say that your co-worker had this to say about it.  Also, I will do everything I can to 
keep your identities disconnected from the quotes I use in my dissertation.  However, the 
local DV advocacy community is a small one, so there is a chance that you will be 
recognizable in print, but I will do all I can to avoid that, including returning the full 
transcript to you all so that you have an opportunity to read over the quotes and ask that 
any be stricken that you feel are too identifying. 
 In the group today, you will be given two scenarios to work through as a group – 
it is a situation that you might encounter during your work as an advocate.  You all will 
read through them and be asked some questions.  Prior to this, however, I would like to 
share some information with you about a current program that is operating here in 
Oregon. 
 Secure Communities is a federal program that links local law enforcement and 
ICE.  What it is means, practically, is that when a person is arrested their fingerprints are 
sent to both the FBI database and the ICE database.  If there is a match in the ICE 
database, a hold is placed on them and even if the other charges are dropped, they can be 
held by immigration.  This program is supposed to be focused on high level offenders – 
people who have outstanding warrants for things like rape, felony assault, etc…  What it 
has meant in practice has been much more indiscriminate: people pulled in for traffic 
violations, or an outstanding check, or a misdemeanor DV charge are being deported, 
even if the criminal charges are dropped.  Janet Napolitano who heads the Dept. of 
Homeland Security announced that in 2010 we had the highest number of deportations on 
record. 
Do you have any questions?  Great, let’s move on. 
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Focus group discussion begins: (50m) 
First Scenario. 
 Each person is given a copy of the first scenario  
 The first scenario is read aloud by the moderator who then asks the group to read 
over it and consider it for a minute or two. 
 
Q: In light of what we know about current immigration policies like Secure 
Communities, what shall we do? 
 Prompt: Safety planning:  “there is a range of ways of thinking about safety 
planning.  In light of Secure Communities, how might you go about creating a 
safety plan? 
 
Q: In this scenario the school is already aware of the children’s abuse by the father, how 
might you help her determine how to respond to the school? 
 Prompt:  
 What might be at stake in enlisting the neighbors or the schools?  Are there ways 
of working  with others that might be more effective?  What strategies have you used 
in your practice as  advocates that have worked well?    
  Q:  What is your role as a mandatory reporter? how might this new information affect 
the way you respond to her report of her child’s abuse? 
 Prompt: 
 Even if you are not a mandatory reporter how do you handle the ethical issue of 
 having child  abuse reported to you? 
 
Second Scenario. 
 Each person receives a copy of the second scenario 
 The second scenario is read aloud by the moderator who then asks the group to 
read over it and consider it for a minute or two. 
Q:  Given our discussion, what do you think about this message? 
 Prompt:   How might you modify the message? What might be gained in changing 
it?  What might be lost in changing it? 
 Prompt:  Recently the largest DV agency in New York City announced that 
because of Secure Communities, they would no longer be recommending 
undocumented people contact the police.  What do you think about that decision?  
What other ways might there be to address this issue?  Are there other agencies 
you might work with in the Portland area? 
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Thank you, that was great. 
Reflection 15m 
Q:  How might this discussion affect your work?  
Q: Let’s go around and each say what stands out in your mind about what we have talked 
about today.  Say what comes to mind in about 30 seconds.  
Thank you all very much.  Please fill out this brief demographic sheet.  
 Hand out compensation 
Moderator Notes: 
 Treat this like a clinical interview, do not intervene if possible. 
 After some discussion or if one or two answer somewhat comprehensively and 
there is silence, say something like:  “a number of you have responded, is there 
anything else you would like to add” (wait 30 seconds) 
 If one or more people answer definitively or are held up as the experts in the 
room, say something like “In this room there are people with differing degrees of 
knowledge and experience who are able to bring different perspectives to the 
issues.  It can be helpful to hear the thoughts of those who are closer and farther 
away from the issue.” 
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Appendix D - Resources 
Diana Rempe:  dianarempe@gmail.com 
503-819-9845 
 
Local organizations:  
ACT for Safety and Justice:  http://actforjusticeanddignity.org/ 
Activists Coming Together for Justice and Dignity (ACT) advocates for the social, 
political, and economic inclusion of immigrants and disenfranchised communities, 
regardless of their immigration status. 
 
American Friends Service Committee: http://afsc.org/office/portland-or 
A Quaker organization that includes people of  various faiths who are committed to 
social justice, peace, and humanitarian service. 
 
Causa:   causaoregon.org 
Oregon’s statewide Latino immigrant rights organization. Causa works to defend and 
advance immigrant rights by coordinating with local, state, and national coalitions and 
allies. We are the largest Latino civil and human rights organization in the Pacific 
Northwest.   
 
Center for Intercultural Organizing:  http://www.interculturalorganizing.org/ 
A statewide organization of locally-based groups that work to create communities 
accountable to a standard of human dignity: the belief in the equal worth of all people, 
the need for equal access to justice and the right to self-determination. 
 
Jobs with Justice(JwJ): jwjpdx.org 
A national campaign for workers’ rights. Working through coalitions of labor, community, 
religious and constituency organizations, Jobs with Justice is fighting for workers’ rights 
and economic justice. 
 
The National Lawyers Guild: http://portlandnlg.org 
A group of lawyers, legal workers and students dedicated to the need for basic and 
progressive change in the structure of our political and economic system. 
 
Oregon ACLU: http://aclu-or.org/ 
A non-partisan organization dedicated to the preservation and enhancement of civil 
liberties and civil rights. 
 
Oregon New Sanctuary Movement: http://www.oregonsanctuary.org/ 
An interfaith coalition of individuals, faith leaders and congregations, called by our faith 
and conscience to respond actively and publicly to the suffering of our immigrant 
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brothers and sisters residing in the United States 
 
Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste (PCUN):  http://www.pcun.org/ 
Oregon's union of farmworkers, nursery, and reforestation workers, and Oregon's largest 
Latino organization. 
 
Portland Central American Solidarity Committee (PCASC):  http://www.pcasc.net/ 
Educates and mobilizes the community, workers, and students in the fight for human 
rights and social justice in the Americas 
 
Rural Organizing Project (ROP):  http://www.rop.org/ 
A statewide organization of locally-based groups that work to create communities 
accountable to a standard of human dignity: the belief in the equal worth of all people, 
the need for equal access to justice and the right to self-determination. 
 
VOZ workers’ rights education project: http://portlandvoz.org/ 
A worker-led organization that empowers immigrants and day laborers to gain control 
over their working conditions through leadership development, organizing, and 
community education. 
 
National:  
Turning the Tide:  http://altopolimigra.com/ 
Turning the Tide seeks to create a coordinated network of community organizations to 
build power in our communities in order to turn the tide against criminalization. 
 
Women’s Law:  
http://www.womenslaw.org/laws_state_type.php?statelaw_name=Immigration&state_cod
e=US 
A project of the National Network to End Domestic Violence (NNEDV),  
providing legal information and support to victims of domestic violence and sexual 
assault. 
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Appendix E – Demographic Information 
Age:_____ 
Race/Ethnicity:______ 
Gender:_____ 
How long have you worked at _______? 
 Please describe your current job: 
 
 How long have you been in this position?    
Have you had other jobs at this agency?  Yes  No 
 If so, please describe them and indicate the months  and/or  years you were in 
those positions: 
 
 
 
Have you done DV work prior to coming to this agency?   Yes   No 
 If so, for how long?                 
 
 What sort of things did you do? 
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Appendix F – Transcript of a focus group 1 
 2 
I: Well, if you consider it in light of what I’ve told you about Secure 3 
Communities and the possibilities that occur there, what shall we do? 4 
 5 
F1: Legal protection. Legal protection, like documents to stay until they 6 
finish with our case. One of those I think that I say, ah, they got in Italy, 7 
like deportations, so involved with…I mean…In this cases, he…even if 8 
he is legal, or especially when they are legal, the man is legal, he can 9 
ask for the custody of the kids. And of course the mother’s going to be 10 
freaking about leave the…the house because he is legal for sure, or he 11 
speaks better English than her, or maybe she doesn’t know.  12 
 13 
I2: And in this case, where we’ve got both parents are undocumented… 14 
 15 
F1: And in your… 16 
 17 
F2: So she doesn’t qualify for (common law 26:51), she doesn’t qualify (? 18 
26:52). (?). 19 
 20 
F1: So I heard years ago that even if they are not legal in here, but 21 
they…they are marry, and…and if they’re…I mean, the abuser and the 22 
victim, they are married. And even if either one is legal, it’s something 23 
that come up. But I never hear again about it. Like the view…the…the 24 
victim can say that to what…like, “I’m married with this person who is 25 
my abuser,” and blah-blah-blah, and then they protect the family. So 26 
that’s what we’re looking for. Like even if not both parties are legal… 27 
 28 
I: As far as I’m… 29 
 30 
F2: The only one who’s legal is the kid. You can’t…I mean, they have to 31 
wait till he’s 18 and then he can petition for the family. Or she. 32 
 33 
I: What do other folks think? What would you guys do? 34 
 35 
F1: (? 27:44). 36 
 37 
I: Okay. 38 
 39 
F1: And then from…there might be…you can connect the legal system. 40 
 41 
F2: Encourage her to buy a fake social security number [laughter]. 42 
 43 
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F3: I would ask her what she wants to do.  44 
 45 
F2: And obviously she doesn’t want to leave. She doesn’t feel like she 46 
could move. So…exploring options she thinks she has in front of her 47 
first, for what she would ideally like to have happen, and then also by 48 
exploring options, things that I know about. 49 
 50 
F3: And she’s going to get involved with child welfare system. 51 
 52 
F2: Heck, yeah. 53 
 54 
F1: And maybe…maybe (? 28:38). Like maybe has something to…issue 55 
going on that he needs help. 56 
 57 
F2: So when you what we can do or what you are asking us to do, it’s you 58 
as the parties of immigration law or you as a party… 59 
 60 
I: No, just… 61 
 62 
F2: …oh, okay. 63 
 64 
I: …thinking of the safety planning and what we could give advice to this 65 
woman, what…what we think that she could do, what steps she might 66 
take. Like what would you say? 67 
 68 
F1: You know, that’s fine. But I was confused, I… 69 
 70 
I: Yeah. 71 
 72 
F1: I’m so excited about immigration, talking about immigration [laughter]. 73 
This is what you should do, because this is… 74 
 75 
I: Yeah. 76 
 77 
F1: …what we need. But, no.  78 
 79 
I: But if she comes to you here, if you’re her case manager? 80 
 81 
F1: I would look for (? 29:14), first of all, and see what her options are. 82 
If…because she has a one child born in the United State, I will see her 83 
resources that she qualify. It’s not very much. I mean, working with, 84 
participating with childrens that only one of the childrens has 85 
documents, and her hope is really low. 86 
 87 
165 
 
I2: She’s like what? 424 in Taniff? 88 
 89 
F1: Yeah, it’s nothing. So… 90 
 91 
I2: Uh-huh. 92 
 93 
F1: …encourage the family to see their resources, like what kind of 94 
experience of what they have, what they can do, how do they can get 95 
some support. I mean, I will be given what I can. Like a food, yes, we 96 
have food once a week, we can provide for the family. If we can find 97 
some resource of housing, like in my kids, if I have an opening, I will 98 
put it in the housing. I mean, I interview and do all the (? 30:01) for 99 
sure. And then if we have any other resources, for rental assistance, of 100 
course – encourage her. If she has a rental history, she can, she cannot, 101 
how do we can advocate for her for that. And so we get housing for 102 
her. If she has family, friends, where she can be supported, or go to the 103 
shelter or all that stuff. So the thing is put her in a safety place, and 104 
make…And this has been happen to us. I been working with so many 105 
immigrants, and then it’s not only Latinas. But we have that…we’ve 106 
been working with escaping women. Like they still with abuser, and 107 
they need to leave. 108 
 109 
I: Right. 110 
 111 
F1: So fortunately, we…we can help them at the time. But sometimes 112 
maybe we don’t have the money, maybe we don’t have the space. But 113 
always is looking for all the resources. 114 
 115 
F2: We can find resources, maybe calling Catholic Charities, (? 30:40) 116 
immigration (for down there), or Legal Aid. 117 
 118 
I: Right. 119 
 120 
F2: Sometimes even call 2-1-1 and get some information. 121 
 122 
I: What about safety planning? You mentioned safety planning. So how 123 
do you safety plan in this…in this context? In other words, part of 124 
safety planning has often been, talk with your neighbor about, you 125 
know, having them call 9-1-1 if…if they hear something going on. 126 
 127 
F1: But you’re afraid then, (that’s true 31:19). 128 
 129 
I: Right. So what do you do? 130 
 131 
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F2: You don’t want to be deported, and you… 132 
 133 
I: Right. 134 
 135 
F2: …if you’re deported, your child will be staying here… 136 
 137 
I: Right. 138 
 139 
F2: …and then he can be put into foster home. 140 
 141 
I: Yeah.  142 
 143 
F2: So…that’s the main…One of the main concerns that women have, 144 
Latin—or…Latina women that they’re undocuments, like “Who’s 145 
going to take care of my child?” 146 
 147 
I: Right. 148 
 149 
I2: Um-hum. You look like you have something to say. 150 
 151 
F3: Yeah, um, okay. So the scenario sounds like she’s not really ready to 152 
leave him, doesn’t feel like she wants to leave him, being that he’s the 153 
primary economic provider. So I think safety planning around, um, 154 
other options that she may have other than like calling the police. Like 155 
are there other family members that she can maybe contact that would 156 
maybe show up and be able to get her out of the house, or somewhere 157 
that she can go. Um, and then just giving her information, or offering 158 
her information about, um, like other options for her when she is ready 159 
to leave. And, you know, somewhere along talking about like 160 
documentation about the abuse, that she can, um, have other forms of 161 
documenting the abuse that might be able to help her later on if she 162 
does chooses to proceed in a legal manner against, um, her abuser, um 163 
or child custody issues that she might have in the future. So even if the 164 
police is not involved just being able to help her document that abuse. 165 
Um, having other family members involved, maybe, um, if she does 166 
have other family members that can maybe help her with like, you 167 
know, code words, or something, or someone checking in with her. Or, 168 
you know, if he shows up at home and, you know, it’s going to escalate 169 
or something, how can you evacuate your house with the kids, and do 170 
you have somewhere to go? Um, just other ways of…of just, you know, 171 
safety planning with her that doesn’t involve the police, because it 172 
doesn’t sound like she wants to get the police involved, and it doesn’t 173 
seem like she wants to leave him yet. So…that’s kind of what I would 174 
explore. And then I would also, um, maybe talk to her about, um, like (? 175 
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33:44) said, like, you know, now that you have the teachers involved 176 
and they’re being concerned, what does that mean?, and maybe 177 
explaining to her that this also means that DHS could be involved and 178 
maybe talking to her a little bit about that scenario and how that 179 
happens, you know. They can show up at your…at your kid’s school 180 
without your permission, they can question your kids… 181 
 182 
I: Um-hum. 183 
 184 
F3: Like just preparing this participant to what might happen and just 185 
informing her and having her have that information so she knows what 186 
to do when she’s presented in that situation. Um, and… 187 
 188 
I: Are you a mandatory reporter? Are you all..? 189 
 190 
Voices: No. 191 
 192 
I: Nobody is. 193 
 194 
F1: Officially, no, (we said 34:25)… 195 
 196 
I: Officially, no. What about your crisis line people? 197 
 198 
Voices: No. 199 
 200 
F2: And it’s all anonymous. 201 
 202 
I2: Yeah. Because the issue’s when you start bringing structures in, like the 203 
school and DHS and Child Services, then things start getting much 204 
trickier. I’m sorry, you were going to say… 205 
 206 
F1: No, I was saying that maybe she can qualify for a DV grant… 207 
 208 
I: Um-hum. 209 
 210 
F1: …And if she knows somebody in another state, she can relocate… 211 
 212 
I: Right. 213 
 214 
F1: …you know, with the kids and get the benefit when she has kids. 215 
 216 
I: Does she have to go the Gateway to get the grant, or can she get 217 
through (? 34:57)…? 218 
 219 
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F2: She can go to any DHS station. I think the other thing too is kind of like 220 
if he’s the main economic provider and that’s one of the hindrances, and 221 
just letting her know that there are resources available, that she doesn’t 222 
have to have a social security number, that she doesn’t have to be 223 
documented to leave, like to access the DV grants or that even like a 224 
shelter is available, or transitional housing for grants – that there are 225 
other options that can give her some time and some space so she can 226 
figure out what she wants to do. 227 
 228 
I: Um-hum. 229 
 230 
F2: And like for (? 35:22), maybe he just needs help, or maybe they can get 231 
somebody involved in the community who can help facilitate that, as 232 
opposed to bringing in law enforcement, or traditional structures. 233 
 234 
I2: Yeah. 235 
 236 
F1: I have an issue with one…it says “Refer her to cultural…specific crisis 237 
line is not an option”? 238 
 239 
I: Oh, that…only for this scenario. 240 
 241 
F1: Oh. 242 
 243 
I: Just to…I want to hear how you all work through the problem. And one 244 
of the things that I think I would do is say, you know what…Project 245 
Unica…Unica knows a lot of stuff and can provide a Spanish speaking 246 
if this a Spanish speaker. Or finding a different culturally 247 
specific…depending on… 248 
 249 
F3: And sometimes that’s a problem (? 35:59)… 250 
 251 
I: …where the person’s from. 252 
 253 
F3: …because a small community… 254 
 255 
F2: Um-hum. 256 
 257 
I2: Yep. Um-hum. 258 
 259 
F3: …and then like the second they call that crisis line, then they say, oh, to 260 
that interpreter, then like, hey, back to let the family in… 261 
 262 
I: Right. 263 
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 264 
F3: … “Did you know that your sister’s calling, and she’s saying… 265 
 266 
I2: Um-hum. 267 
 268 
F3: …that’s not…” you know… 269 
 270 
I2: Right. 271 
 272 
F3: But that (? 36:08), “Is there nay problems?” 273 
 274 
F4: And I think it’s also important to know that whoever you’re referring 275 
them to, or what agency you’re referring them to, that they’re not 276 
mandatory reporters, or if they are, they’re sort of informing the part… 277 
 278 
F2: Just have (? 36:19). 279 
 280 
F4: It just depends if they are mandatory reporters, that what you do share 281 
with them, you know, you’re saying that he’s abusing the kids, then that 282 
could result in a report being made. 283 
 284 
I: Yeah, because Clackamas Women’s Services was when I worked there. 285 
 286 
F1: Well, the…the options are more…the options are more (? 36:35) when 287 
the families are already out of the house. In this case, it’s the first they 288 
will be like asking her what she wants to do and tell her the options. 289 
She can stay, and we’re going to start talking and supporting her, and 290 
what she can do, how do she can manage this, and how long she…Until 291 
she decided to leave. So that’s one of those…the first thing she plans. If 292 
she really wants to go, she wants to move out and leave this person, so 293 
see what is her options are. So, ah, once she’s out, it’s more foc(used) 294 
because, yeah, we can refer her to more resources, because they are 295 
mandatories and all that. But if we’ll report her…if we refer this family 296 
to someone who report, they must be reported to DHS and Child 297 
Welfare become involved, because she is living in the house with 298 
abuser, where she is exposing the kids, and then teacher move the kids, 299 
and all that stuff. It’s kind of two different safety plans, depends what 300 
she wants to do – she want to stay, she want to go.  301 
 302 
I: Sounds like for this case, what information gets handed out is going to 303 
be really crucial… 304 
 305 
F1: Um-hum. 306 
 307 
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I: …who gets to hear what, what agencies are involved, what you tell the 308 
neighbors or the school or which…which agencies you refer to. So 309 
information management for this one seems to be pretty crucial. 310 
 311 
F2: And at the same time, I wouldn’t want to discourage the children from 312 
speaking about what they’re experiencing. And so it’s a hard thing to 313 
manage, because you might say like Child Welfare can become 314 
involved and this is what’s going to happen. At the same time, you 315 
don’t want her to go tell her kid, “Don’t talk about it, please,” because 316 
that just, you know, keeps it in the family ends. 317 
 318 
I: Do you all have that connection… 319 
 320 
F1: That… 321 
 322 
I: …that Child Welfare…go ahead. 323 
 324 
F1: And so it’s okay, can I explain. No, I want to say the first thing is trust, 325 
and also women who English is their second language or cultural 326 
specific, I think the first thing normally you ask is, “How do you do 327 
domestic violence in your own country, where you came from?” And, 328 
you know, in forcing them into, let’s say, you know, American culture, 329 
how do you deal with that, if for them it being kind of (? 38:27), “We 330 
are going to help you.” But I think trust… 331 
 332 
I: Um-hum. 333 
 334 
F1: …You have to earn their trust first before you, you know, you 335 
have…because everybody’s afraid when they see…when I work with 336 
women, they all think like, you know, maybe a Child Welfare. 337 
 338 
I2: Um-hum. 339 
 340 
I: Right. 341 
 342 
F1: So they don’t know the difference. So you have to start with the trust, 343 
and then… 344 
 345 
F2: Trust in the culture, you say? 346 
 347 
F1: Yeah. And they’ll find out, you know, how do you do domestic violence 348 
in your culture. Their culture, you know, that both parents will meet and 349 
talk, and try to solve the problem and give the guy a warming and tell 350 
the guy, “Well, if you’re not going to be with this woman, just divorce 351 
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here,” and others so like, “We don’t do this.” Others believe in abuse. 352 
 353 
I: Um-hum. 354 
 355 
F1: You know, it’s maybe the culture they came from. So I think… 356 
 357 
F2: And then like in a lot of cultures, it’s super taboo to even discuss what 358 
was happening in your family. 359 
 360 
F1: Exactly, yeah. Exactly, yeah. 361 
 362 
F2: So I mean like a lot of it too is just saying like, “I’m so grateful that you 363 
called today,” like just offering like a practical level of appreciation 364 
that…something like that. 365 
 366 
F1: And…and letting…You don’t rush. Just take time… 367 
 368 
I2: Um-hum. 369 
 370 
F1:…like, you know, you don’t bring paperwork, everything. Just talk and 371 
listen, and say, “Okay, we can do it tomorrow again, it’s not (? 39:29),” 372 
and then the person will open up. 373 
 374 
I2: Um-hum. 375 
 376 
F1: And that’s how you can earn their trust. 377 
 378 
I2: Um-hum. 379 
 380 
I: Yeah, that’s great. Anybody that hasn’t spoken? Everybody has 381 
different levels of expertise, and I’d love to hear from everybody.  382 
 383 
I2: You have some pretty great ideas.  384 
 385 
I: So do you want to go on to the second one? 386 
 387 
I2: Yeah. 388 
 389 
I: And this is not one we’re passing out. We’re just going to read it. So the 390 
second scenario is really brief, and I just want you all to kind of grapple 391 
with what you would do in this situation. 392 
 393 
F2: Hm… 394 
 395 
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I: And you don’t have that. 396 
 397 
F2: Don’t think I do. 398 
 399 
I: Okay. Ah…tsh-tsh-tsh-tsh…I might have left it at home. Um, I think I 400 
can remember it [laughter]. It ends on the end, on… 401 
 402 
F1: Ah, yep. 403 
 404 
I: …what I did last… 405 
 406 
F1: Because you… 407 
 408 
I: …yeah. Because you’re the one that does homes. Sorry, everybody.  409 
 410 
I2: Um, so, um…thinking about the… 411 
 412 
I: I did (? 40:36) leave it at home. 413 
 414 
I2: Oh, look at you…they’re perfect [laughs]. In many shelters particularly 415 
at the administrative offices, the phone goes first to voicemail. The 416 
recorded message is generally something like, “If you’re in immediate 417 
crisis, please hang up and call 9-1-1. Additionally, on many of the 418 
agency websites, there’s the advice to call 9-1-1 if in immediate danger, 419 
or to have your neighbors do so if they’re concerned about your safety.” 420 
So we want to kind of think about this message that’s being put out 421 
there, and what…what are some of the problems with it, how you 422 
would change it, what you might do about it, thinking about the Secure 423 
Communities issue. 424 
 425 
I: What’s good about it? Why should it stay? You know, negatives and 426 
positives. So any thoughts? And we can read that again if you want. 427 
 428 
F1: I had somebody [laughs]…I’m just laughing because this somebody, 429 
they call in, they got to 9-1-1, so they thought if they call 9-1-1, police 430 
will come straight. That’s where… 431 
 432 
I: Ah… 433 
 434 
F1: …because they don’t have documents. 435 
 436 
I: Um-hum. 437 
 438 
F1: So it’s…it’s…it’s a good in a way. In a way it’s people who are 439 
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culturally specific, they don’t understand. 440 
 441 
I: Um-hum. 442 
 443 
F1: So it’s 50-50. 444 
 445 
I: So in this case somebody thought that by calling 9-1-1… 446 
 447 
F1: Um-hum. 448 
 449 
I: …immediately the police will come. 450 
 451 
F1: The police will come. 452 
 453 
I: So then they didn’t call? 454 
 455 
F1: Um-hum. 456 
 457 
I: Yeah. So…I think that they… 458 
 459 
F1: So they had to take two days… 460 
 461 
I: Uh-huh. 462 
 463 
F1: …to all go back to the Gateway and talk to me. 464 
 465 
I: Yeah. 466 
 467 
F1: Yeah.  468 
 469 
I: So, yeah. This is somebody who avoided calling and said, “Not to call” 470 
because they wouldn’t take the risk of having the police come. And 471 
they thought that was the way to talk to you also? 472 
 473 
F1: Yeah. 474 
 475 
I: Yeah. 476 
 477 
F1: They were trying to get hold of me and I wasn’t there. It was a Friday… 478 
 479 
I: Right. 480 
 481 
F1: …evening, and it went and, you know, it goes all…So they couldn’t 482 
leave a message, even though I have a voicemail. 483 
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 484 
I2: Uh-huh. 485 
[together] 486 
I: Right. 487 
 488 
F1: So when it says 9-1-1, she got afraid… 489 
 490 
I: Um-hum. 491 
 492 
I2: And just…Yeah. Gotcha. Yeah.  493 
 494 
F2: I think…I think ours doesn’t say that anymore, does it? Or was…I 495 
know my voicemail is… 496 
 497 
F3: I think ours does. 498 
 499 
I: It does. 500 
 501 
F2: Oh, really? Mine is (? 42:27). [voices together] 502 
 503 
F1: I think all of them says, all DV. 504 
 505 
I2: Um-hum. 506 
 507 
F2: I think it’s…yeah, even the crisis line. 508 
 509 
I2: Could we change and say, “If 9-1-1 is a safe option for you.” 510 
 511 
F4: Yeah. 512 
 513 
F3: I know I changed mine a while ago to not say that, because I worry 514 
specifically the LGBTQ population which is another population that 515 
has a history of sexual violence… 516 
 517 
I2: Um-hum. 518 
 519 
I: Um-hum. 520 
 521 
F3: …on (? 42:51). I didn’t realize the crisis line (? 42:56). 522 
 523 
I: So what do you think? Should it stay that way on your messages here? 524 
 525 
F1: I think what Adam said is valuable, like “Call 9-1-1 if it feels like a safe 526 
option for you.” 527 
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 528 
I: Um-hum. 529 
 530 
I2: And I’m not sure what to think [light laughter]. 531 
 532 
F2: Well, also too, I think that like in some communities, it’s…it’s 533 
institutionalized, they don’t call 9-1-1. So I mean you hear that message 534 
and you’re like, you know, “Screw you guy—” like… 535 
 536 
I: Right. Yeah. 537 
 538 
F2: …yeah. So, um, my option is talking to a recording or calling 9-1-1 and 539 
I’m just going to stick I it out. 540 
 541 
F3: So what example (? 43:27). 542 
 543 
F4: Well, they’re in crisis so that’s why they call them. So it’s not generally 544 
(? 43:31). 545 
 546 
I: Say the last part again. You said they’re in crisis… 547 
 548 
F4: You don’t call them because they’re in crisis… 549 
 550 
I: Right. 551 
 552 
I2: Um-hum. 553 
 554 
F4: …so you send…they…or they’re immediate danger, so they’re calling. 555 
And if you tell them that if they’re in immediate danger, call 9-1-1, then 556 
I don’t know. 557 
 558 
I: That’s a really good point. 559 
 560 
F4: Well, if they’re calling, they get that recording. So that’s all right. 561 
 562 
F5: Right. 563 
 564 
F1: And I think it’s…when you say people, if they (? 43:51), when you say 565 
9-1-1… 566 
 567 
I: Yeah. 568 
 569 
F1: People assume 9-1-1 is going to go straight to the police. 570 
 571 
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I2: Um-hum. 572 
 573 
I: Right. 574 
 575 
F1: And then police will come and get you. People, especially people who 576 
English is a second language. 577 
 578 
I: Um-hum. 579 
 580 
F1: So I think that’s…the language is the main…I know what you say… 581 
 582 
F4: I don’t get that, what you’re saying. 583 
 584 
F1: No, I’m saying like people who English is their second language, when 585 
they hear 9-1-1 and they don’t have documents, they know it’s the 586 
police, because even their own kids are told, if anything happen at 587 
home, make sure you call 9-1-1. So they involved everything with the 588 
police. 589 
 590 
Voices: Um-hum. 591 
 592 
F4: So they don’t think like paramedic might come out. 593 
 594 
F1: Might come, yeah. 595 
 596 
F4: Or, you know, a fire or apartment? Yeah, might come or…They don’t 597 
understand that their…their phone calls can be screened, (you guys ? 598 
44:31). 599 
 600 
F1: Exactly, yeah… 601 
 602 
I: Um-hum. 603 
 604 
F1: …they have option of the men will only do these option, right? 605 
 606 
I: And I think that you’re saying is – tell me if this is right – is that people 607 
who are calling this number are in crisis. And so you’re giving them a 608 
direction to call 9-1-1. 609 
 610 
F2: Well, they’re supposed to be in crisis. I mean, we get a lot of phone 611 
calls every… 612 
 613 
I: Yeah. 614 
 615 
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F2: …who are really not in crisis, just need housing. But they’re supposed 616 
to be, that’s what it’s there for. 617 
 618 
I: Right. 619 
 620 
I2; Um-hum. 621 
 622 
F2: And then they’re in crisis or in immediate danger, and now you’re 623 
telling them, if you’re in immediate danger, call 9-1-1… 624 
 625 
I: Exactly. 626 
 627 
F2: ...Are they supposed to call the crisis line if you’re in danger, or are you 628 
supposed to call 9-1-1 if you’re danger. 629 
 630 
I2: Yeah. So why am I calling you, if I’m supposed to called 9-1-1? 631 
 632 
I2: Right. 633 
 634 
I: Yeah. 635 
 636 
I2: I think you make a really good point. We talked…there was an option 637 
somebody said, um, what if it said, ah, “If it’s a safe option for you, call 638 
9-1-1.” What about folks whose English is very basic, or whose cultural 639 
background, they don’t really understand how the 9-1-1 process works 640 
here. Does that make…does saying if it’s a safe option for you, does 641 
that cover these folks? 642 
 643 
F2: Also, if they’re in crisis, are they able to determine what the safe option 644 
would be these days? 645 
 646 
I: Yeah. 647 
 648 
F2: Because nothing feels safe… 649 
 650 
I: Yeah. 651 
 652 
F2 …you know. 9-1-1 doesn’t feel safe. We’re supposed to be a warm 653 
person on the other line. 654 
 655 
I: Yeah. 656 
 657 
F3: So are there trained 9-1-1, about the (response 45:40), do they have 658 
someone, like if they get a call from…? 659 
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 660 
I: No.  661 
 662 
?: Not… 663 
 664 
I: There is, as part of the Secure Communities initiative or whatever 665 
program, they have…States tried to opt out of being part of Secure 666 
Communities. So, um, New York, Illinois, a lot of places said, “We are 667 
not participating in this.” Because in addition to advocates not want to 668 
be part of Safe Communi—Secure Communities, and activists in the 669 
communities, saying this problematic, police departments find it very 670 
problematic too, for some of the same and some different reasons. For 671 
one…some of the same, because how do you do community policing if 672 
your community is scared to call you? 673 
 674 
F1: Um-hum. 675 
 676 
I: That’s not very effective. So it’s really expensive for…for the county 677 
jails to become the housing places for detained immigrants. So there 678 
was a lot pushback from law enforcement also. I mention this because, 679 
um, then the Obama Administration came forward and said, “Sorry, you 680 
can’t opt out. We said you could opt out, and not be part of this, 681 
but…but you can’t opt out. And in fact, by 2013, every single state will 682 
have implemented this. But – and this is why I bring this up now – 683 
we’re going to put in some more protections and we’re going to put a 684 
thing for, um, for domestic violence victims that goes under what is 685 
called prosecutorial discretion. So when the prosecutor…prosecutor 686 
gets your case, if there’s domestic violence involved, they have the 687 
right to be…to act discretionary and to let you out of the system.  688 
The problem is, is that you don’t always get to the prosecutor at that point. 689 
You get set…if you get detained in Tacoma, you may never see 690 
anybody. And so that’s…So, yes, there are provisions for people 691 
experiencing domestic violence. Are they effective? We don’t really 692 
know yet. They’ve just put them into place, they’re called prosecutorial 693 
discretion. We don’t know. That’s the thing. There’s so much unknown 694 
about this. The only thing that’s known are the numbers I gave you, 695 
which is rates of deportation and…up to now. So, yes, hopefully, there 696 
will be things for people who are experiencing domestic violence. It 697 
sounds like in a case that you had, you know, they let that woman out 698 
because she had experienced domestic violence, they closed her case. 699 
But I don’t know how broadly you can say that. 700 
 701 
I2: So this is an issue that a lot of people are trying to figure out in talking 702 
about it, because it kind of…it’s very, very complicated and there’s no 703 
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good solution for it. Um, there is a…the biggest agency in New York 704 
recently decided to not DV agency…DV agency, sorry. Decided to not 705 
keep sending women who are experiencing DV, asking them to call the 706 
police. So their new policy became to not do that. This was back 707 
last…in 2011. They may…issued a statement saying they would not 708 
recommend that undocumented people contact the police. And they got 709 
a lot of pushback from that. 710 
 711 
F1: Um-hum. 712 
 713 
I2: And I’m not sure that person that I’m supposed to talk to today is from 714 
that agency. And so I’m not sure of what happens after that because 715 
since then they…New York tried to opt out of the program, and then all 716 
the stuff I just said happened. So I don’t know where they stand with it. 717 
But I would love to hear what you all think about telling undocumented 718 
people not to call the police. I mean, we have police…We have all these 719 
partnerships in place, right? So they…this was a blanket statement. It 720 
wasn’t…it wasn’t…it wasn’t…it was “Don’t call the cops.” And, um, I 721 
wondered if…what you guys thought about that too. 722 
 723 
I: Is that the way to go? Is that a good option? 724 
 725 
F1: Well, the first thing is, you…if you’re people of color, are they going to 726 
treat you…? 727 
 728 
I2: Um-hum. Anybody who’s not documented, do we tell them to not call?  729 
 730 
I: So they can’t use the police anymore. You know what I mean? They… 731 
 732 
F2: Understand, I’m not going to tell anybody not to call the police… 733 
 734 
I: Um-hum. 735 
 736 
F1: Yeah. 737 
 738 
F2: I’m not. That’s…that’s my only kind of (interest 49:45). 739 
 740 
I2: Um-hum. 741 
 742 
F3: I think as an organization, we operate under the assumption that the 743 
survivor knows what’s safest for them. So it feels like I would be 744 
depriving them of an option that they had. So it seems unfair for me to 745 
say you cannot call the police, when it might be what they want to do, 746 
and what’s safest for them.  747 
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 748 
I2: Um-hum. 749 
 750 
F3: So giving them the option makes more sense to me, rather than saying, 751 
“Do not call the police.” 752 
 753 
I: Right. 754 
 755 
I2: Um-hum. 756 
 757 
F4: But you let them know what the potential ramifications are… 758 
 759 
F3: Yeah, definitely. 760 
 761 
F2: Yeah, probably be…and… 762 
 763 
F3: Like if you get… 764 
 765 
F5: And it could be about making informed choices… 766 
 767 
F3: Yeah. 768 
 769 
F5: …about your own situation. 770 
 771 
I: How would you let them know about it? Like what would you do? 772 
 773 
F3: Well, (? 50:17) crisis line… 774 
 775 
F2: Straight up. 776 
 777 
F3: Just call, just kind of let, you know, the police is an option if they’re 778 
like at the heightened level of danger. Um, if they happen to be the one 779 
that’s arrested, these will be the following resources to contact, you 780 
know – try to (? 50:31) immigration lawyer, like he’s going to do a pro 781 
bono or something. But like that that’s…that’s the potentiality. 782 
 783 
F1: So what is the differen’ with crisis and emergency? I mean, crisis and (? 784 
50:42). 785 
 786 
F3: Emergency is like when you’re actually getting bed is broken or, you 787 
know, you’re physically… 788 
 789 
F1: What about dangers in crisis, what is the difference? 790 
 791 
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F2: It’s all the same thing. 792 
 793 
F1: Dangers in crisis? 794 
 795 
F3: I was in crisis this morning, but I wasn’t in any (? 50:55). 796 
 797 
F1: Of course. You didn’t was in dangers, right? 798 
 799 
F3: I wasn’t in danger now. 800 
 801 
F1: You and I might call 9-1-1. 802 
 803 
F3: No. I might call 9-1-1. 804 
 805 
I2: Okay [laughs] 806 
 807 
F3: But that’s just a personal thing [laughing]. 808 
 809 
F1: So that’s one of…one of those things that I really say, cri—immediately 810 
crisis. Maybe just change that? Like if you feel like safe or that are you 811 
are immedial dangers, call 9-1-1. 812 
 813 
F2: I think that… 814 
 815 
F1: I mean, the education of the 9-1-1, it’s different. It’s a…the big issue. 816 
But we don’t have a time to educate everybody, like, yeah, call 9-1-1. 817 
It’s really safe, look. But we cannot promise that it’s going to be safe, 818 
because it depends of the police. Sometimes police guys come, officers 819 
came, and they’re very kind and very nice. They understand the 820 
situation, and they don’t do anything. Some of them, they are very rude 821 
and really bad, and they just arrest you. And they are just because you 822 
are immigrant. 823 
 824 
F4: Well, and the other thing too though is… 825 
 826 
F1: But anyway… 827 
 828 
F4: …if their partner too is deported, and that’s…you know, and that’s their 829 
financial person, or that’s their father of their children, I mean, like 830 
there’s so many reasons that calling 9-1-1, just immediately involving 831 
the police, isn’t maybe what they want to do. 832 
 833 
I: So how do you get that across in the message? 834 
 835 
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F4: Um-hum [laughter]. 836 
 837 
F3: I…[more laughter]. 838 
 839 
I2: And in easy-to-understand language where somebody’s calling over the 840 
phone, have very basic English… 841 
 842 
I: They’re in crisis [laughing], they’re in danger. 843 
 844 
F1: Some, the kids are screaming… 845 
 846 
I: How do you…? 847 
 848 
F1: So one of the…sorry… 849 
 850 
F2: I think everybody’s definition of crisis and danger is going to be 851 
different. 852 
 853 
I: Um-hum. 854 
 855 
F2: Because to me, I say crisis should be she really is in danger. I mean… 856 
 857 
I: Um-hum. 858 
 859 
F2: …you know, but that’s my opinion and that’s how I feel, you know.  860 
 861 
I: Um-hum. 862 
 863 
F2: So I think… 864 
 865 
F1: That pretty much… 866 
 867 
F2: …I think it’s going to be different with…with each situation. 868 
 869 
F3: Is there a message could be like, “If you are physically getting hurt or 870 
assaulted… 871 
 872 
I: [laughs] 873 
 874 
F3: …right now, AND you’re legal,” or “have documentations on you, we 875 
would recommend… 876 
 877 
[laughter] 878 
 879 
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F3: …that you maybe call 9-1-1 if you feel like that’s a safe option for 880 
you.” Yeah. 881 
 882 
I: If you had a job, is that what you said? [laughter] 883 
 884 
F4: I think not to defend why we say “Call 9-1-1”, but I think there was 885 
some level of liability, agency… 886 
 887 
I: Um-hum. 888 
 889 
F4: …liability, um, tied in with why we said “Call 9-1-1.” 890 
 891 
I: Yeah. 892 
 893 
F4:  Because I think there is…there is some level of, um, responsibility that 894 
we take on if we’re encouraging folks to call us in their…in the midst 895 
of their danger. 896 
 897 
I: Um-hum. 898 
 899 
F4: We are…we are not immediate responders, we are not focused, I can 900 
navigate you through maybe an immediate crisis… 901 
 902 
I: Um-hum. 903 
 904 
F4: …We’re not someone that can provide for your physical safety. 905 
 906 
I: Um-hum. 907 
 908 
F4: We are so…And…and maybe that’s just being clear on…on the things 909 
that we can do for someone, um, if they’re expecting to call a crisis line 910 
and for someone to come out and help them. 911 
 912 
I: Um-hum. 913 
 914 
F4: I think there’s a lot of just misinformation out there about what crisis 915 
lines are able to do, or what we… 916 
 917 
I: Um-hum. 918 
 919 
F4: …you can and cannot provide. So I think that’s maybe some history on 920 
why we say… 921 
 922 
I: Um-hum. 923 
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 924 
F4:  “Call 9-1-1.” I don’t necessarily think we have to. 925 
 926 
I2: And I think that’s the situation that a lot of agencies find themselves in, 927 
is how do we handle our responsibility, how do we keep people safe, 928 
and also make sure that we’re covered. 929 
 930 
F4: Because I think, I mean, I’ve been on crisis line calls – not here but – 931 
the woman was literally being attacked in the midst of the crisis line 932 
call, and she’s like, “I’m not ready to call…I don’t want to call 933 
any…like I just want you to talk me through this.. I just want you…” 934 
And like, “Dude’s in the other room, like pounding down the door. Now 935 
he’s got a gun. I…like I helped her to get into the tub, like “Go in here, 936 
do these things,” da, da, da, da, da, right? Like, she could have been 937 
injured, and if…if she was injured because she was on the phone with 938 
me, or because I was the service provider that was helping her in that 939 
situation, that’s our agency on the line. 940 
 941 
I: Um-hum. 942 
 943 
F4: That us either not protecting her, not…not that we have any sort of 944 
claim that we wouldn’t do those sorts of things. But I do think that’s 945 
something that we need to like be thoughtful of, and…and what our 946 
responsibility is legally and in providing services over the phone. 947 
 948 
F5: I mean, I think back in the day, like I had…we had several calls like 949 
that. And we used to have a policy where it’s like we always had (? 950 
55:03) one staff… 951 
 952 
I: Um-hum. 953 
 954 
F5: …if you got a phone call with somebody who is in the middle of 955 
getting injured, somebody else would call the line, they’d trace and run 956 
back to – this is back when we had landlines, and the police would 957 
come. Because honestly, like when somebody’s getting hit and you’re 958 
talking to them on the phone, it’s like the shittiest feeling in the world. 959 
 960 
I: Um-hum. Um-hum.  961 
 962 
F5: That said, we don’t really get any crisis calls [laughs]. Like ever. 963 
 964 
I2: I think…and what’s important I think also there is that… 965 
 966 
F3: Other than (? 55:31). 967 
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 968 
I2: …is you’re talking about your individual response to a woman, and you 969 
were talking…or a man or a survivor. Argh! And I really wish I’d get 970 
myself to be more mindful and thoughtful about this. But, um, but I 971 
think that…that maybe…So are there other intervention points that you 972 
as an agency can…other places for intervention that you as an agency 973 
can do? Because you’re right, the change…from what you’ve said, 974 
changing that call, especially the way you described it, to this lengthy 975 
message that explains everything and might not work for somebody 976 
who doesn’t…who has limited English, or a woman…or a different 977 
cultural understanding, it doesn’t seem like it might be the most 978 
practical and effective thing to do. So where could you, as an agency, as 979 
a group, intervene and try to work on this problem also? I mean, are 980 
there…Do you see other places?  981 
 982 
I2: We’ve talked about how hard it is to handle this much information, this 983 
complicated, in the middle of a crisis. You could think about rape 984 
education (coverage 56:46). 985 
 986 
F4: I think too, when I…I can totally (? 56:49) if I’m wrong, but I think that 987 
we’re trying… 988 
 989 
I: Um-hum. 990 
 991 
F4: …to kind of more work with systems and more with systems. So, but 992 
other agencies, or partner agencies, are working with like DHS, or 993 
working with like theoretically the law enforcement – that they would 994 
understand that, you know, this is what’s occurring, or these are signs 995 
of, or this is what the person is experiencing when they make that 996 
phone call when that referral’s made, or when they have contact. So if 997 
systems were better informed, ideally, they would know…I don’t know, 998 
because then we have the mandatory arrest law, which I think is really 999 
great. At the same time, I think it’s amazing it gets reported. 1000 
 1001 
I: Um-hum. 1002 
 1003 
F4: I mean, sometimes it’s really great. But sometimes it really isn’t. 1004 
 1005 
I: Um-hum. What about working with non-domestic violence systems? In 1006 
other words, there’s a lot of people in the community doing work 1007 
around Secure Communities, but they’re not related to domestic 1008 
violence at all. I mean, they’re related, because I think everything’s 1009 
related, and structurally, I think everything’s really related. But at least 1010 
my experience has been, and I would love to hear what you all’s is, 1011 
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that…that domestic violence work is kind of done over here, and then 1012 
there’s…And we don’t traditionally align with labor organizations, 1013 
with, um, immigrant rights organizations, with different community 1014 
groups that might traditionally be more patriarchal, more traditional in 1015 
U.S. culture. I don’t know. I mean, whatever words you’d want to call 1016 
it, but that…that there’s…That…but these people are doing this work 1017 
right now, so…I don’t, I don’t know what, as an agency you all feel like 1018 
you do or are interested in doing. I don’t know. I’m curious. Is that 1019 
beyond the scope, or is that…is there just not enough time for it? 1020 
What’s…what’s up? 1021 
 1022 
F3: I think time and funding, and…I mean, I think that we all…I mean, and 1023 
we’re all out against (? 59:03), we all are kind of maxed out. And so at 1024 
the end of the day, like I don’t want to go home and talk about domestic 1025 
violence. 1026 
 1027 
I: Um-hum. 1028 
 1029 
F3: I don’t want to go to my local grocery store and talk about domestic 1030 
violence. I saw this woman who like had this bruised up face the other 1031 
day at (Fred 59:14) Meier’s, and I was like, “Hey!...so…” And she was 1032 
like, “I fell.” And I was like, do I give her my card, like I don’t really 1033 
know. But, you know, it’s like I think at the end of the day like maybe 1034 
that’s going to be a priority, or maybe that’s something that not in the 1035 
advocate realm to like make those connections with community 1036 
organizations. I mean, I think that like…like just even working with 1037 
like the schools, like and educating them and trying to help them decide 1038 
when they’re going to make a child abuse report and when they’re not. 1039 
Like their mandated reporters and it’s not up to them to decide. But at 1040 
the same time, it’s like this puts the whole family at risk. 1041 
 1042 
I: Um-hum. And do you think the teachers know about or DHS knows 1043 
about Secure Communities and the affect on immigrant people? 1044 
 1045 
F2 (? 59:56) they don’t care. 1046 
 1047 
F3: I doubt it. 1048 
 1049 
I: Because we’re…we were talking about informed choice before, and the 1050 
person making the informed choice of whether they want to call 9-11 1051 
and get the police involved. But even reporters, the ones that are not 1052 
mandated, should have the ability to make an informed choice. They 1053 
should know that when they call, it’s likely that they’re buying 1054 
somebody a deportation. So like Diana was saying, the option of just 1055 
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saying, “Well, let them sort of it, I’m taking both, and then we’ll let the 1056 
court sort it out,” isn’t really an option. So if DHS doesn’t know that 1057 
they might be getting somebody into deportation, they’re not making an 1058 
informed choice. 1059 
 1060 
F4: And I think that, I mean, um, I work with…this…we basically work 1061 
with Title X, the homeless kids. Um, and I don’t think that they have 1062 
the awareness. I struggle a lot with like, do we make a referral or not, 1063 
because this family’s homeless. And teachers come to them. And so like 1064 
that’s the weird point is the lay teachers are coming in and saying, 1065 
“Like I don’t know.” And then their response is like, “Well, the hotline 1066 
makes the decision.” “Which hotline are you talk—?” Like it’s always 1067 
like somebody else makes that decision… 1068 
 1069 
I: Um-hum. 1070 
 1071 
F4: …so we just do our job. 1072 
 1073 
I: Um-hum. Do you feel like that happens here because of resources and 1074 
time? And I don’t mean to slam Bradley Angle I mean just in terms of 1075 
all…all crisis work is so…you’ve got…you all are doing such amazing 1076 
things every day, and they’re exhausting and you’re not paid well, and 1077 
you…and you’re constantly trying to find like the last four dollars to 1078 
offer somebody, you know, for a bus ticket or something like that. So I 1079 
feel like, it seems to me that it would make a lot of sense to be like, oh, 1080 
that goes to that – so to compartmentalize, to be like that work goes 1081 
over there to those people, because it’s a way of…of managing an 1082 
unmanageable load.  1083 
 1084 
F4: Um-hum. 1085 
 1086 
I: I mean, I don’t know if that’s your experience, and I’m bringing my 1087 
own stuff into it, but that’s it felt to me a lot of the time. Like I did a lot 1088 
of saying “Sorry, there’s nothing I…we can do.” Or, “These are 1089 
the…these are the options.” And the idea of going out and doing like 1090 
some political organizing if you don’t exactly like something I wanted 1091 
to get involved in. 1092 
 1093 
F4: Yeah. What…because of the econ—economy, agencies are competing 1094 
for funds. So, you know, we don’t have the resources. 1095 
 1096 
I2: Um-hum. 1097 
 1098 
F4: We…whatever resources we have, that’s how we’re going to help our 1099 
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participants. 1100 
 1101 
I2: Um-hum. 1102 
 1103 
F4: And, if, you know, you’re taking re—funds from my agency to help 1104 
yours, it’s like it’ll prevent me, or… 1105 
 1106 
I2: That seems like a good place to…to stop. Do you guys have any 1107 
questions, anything to add about this? Um, anything, any feedback at 1108 
all, anything like that? 1109 
 1110 
F1: Thank you so much for your ideas. 1111 
 1112 
I2: Yeah. 1113 
 1114 
F1: This is really, really valuable. 1115 
 1116 
I: It’s really helpful. And I want to offer to you all some resources. 1117 
Because I think what…what you said is really, really important, 1118 
that…that nowadays there’s a struggle for the tiny pot of money 1119 
that…And it’s…it’s unethical and it’s...not the struggle but the fact that 1120 
we’re having to do this struggling and that distribution is the…of 1121 
money and resources is the way it is. But it is right now this way. So I 1122 
want to offer you some resources in the community that you can turn to 1123 
perhaps for work on this…this issue specifically. And I know many of 1124 
you don’t…don’t run into this issue in your daily work. 1125 
 1126 
F2: Um-hum. 1127 
 1128 
I: But you may know somebody that does. Or you may talk to the crisis 1129 
line person and…and say, “Hey, here’s something I learned,” or 1130 
something like that. But, um, so I’ll…so I put together a little resources 1131 
sheet of, um, places in the local organizations, um, that are working 1132 
on…on secure communities and specifically. And then the Oregon New 1133 
Sanctuary Program, which is on here, actually has a program that works 1134 
specifically with people that are in deportation hearing right now, and 1135 
they give you sort of like an advocate to walk through it who knows a 1136 
whole lot about the deportation process. And so I would urge you to, 1137 
um – I’m speaking directly to you, because you brought up that 1138 
question – but I would urge you to contact them, um, and I’m writing 1139 
on your sheet the name of the main person about that program. 1140 
Because, um, I think…I think that one thing that happen… 1141 
 1142 
F2: And this is for, um… 1143 
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 1144 
I: This is immigration. 1145 
 1146 
F2: …DV situations or just immigrant… 1147 
 1148 
I: This is immigration issues in general. This is… 1149 
 1150 
F2: Oh. 1151 
 1152 
I: …these are organizations that are not generally connected with 1153 
domestic violence. Because a lot of…like I said, there are tons of 1154 
people doing things in the community right now about this issue. There 1155 
are not a lot of domestic violence service providers that are connected 1156 
with all of the people that are doing some pretty great work right now. 1157 
There was an immigration forum last Friday at the Unitarian Church 1158 
that was really interesting. But I don’t think there was anybody there 1159 
from the DV community. 1160 
 1161 
F2: Hm. 1162 
 1163 
I: And the voice is missing, because it’s really an issue that affects 1164 
survivors in a way that, you know, is…is very, very profound, and so 1165 
it’s a shame to have that voice not at the table. Um, I went to…the 1166 
county commissioners have just decided to…they just made a statement 1167 
requiring the county to…the county prosecutors to engage in 1168 
prosecutorial discretion. So they don’t want…they want the county out 1169 
of doing immigration work. They can’t do it because of Secure 1170 
Communities, so they’re looking for ways to do that. And the 1171 
organization – some of them are listed here – have some great ideas 1172 
how they can do that. There, of course, it’s a government agency. 1173 
They’re not there yet. But their first step was to make a statement about 1174 
prosecutorial discretion. So the…the (? 1:05:47) County district 1175 
attorneys will not…will not be enforcing Secure Communities if they 1176 
can… 1177 
 1178 
F2: Um-hum. 1179 
 1180 
I2: If they can, yeah. 1181 
 1182 
I: It’s mostly a…it’s mostly just a – what’s a word? – a symbolic gesture, 1183 
but it’s a… 1184 
 1185 
I2: Yeah. 1186 
 1187 
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I: …a nice first step. But I testified there about domestic violence. And 1188 
there was…and it was a packed room. And one other person mentioned 1189 
DV, but that was it. And everything else was more about, um, about 1190 
undocumented students, about day laborers, about really, really 1191 
marginalized populations. But DV was missing. So I think your voice 1192 
would be welcomed there. And if there’s anybody, any survivors that 1193 
you work with who want to testify, who are in that place, they would 1194 
love that too, because there’ s a lot of stuff going on at the county level, 1195 
that’s going to, I think make a difference hopefully ultimately around 1196 
this. So there are places to get involved. And that’s my last spiel to you 1197 
all.  1198 
  And then I have a demographic sheet, if you don’t mind filling it out 1199 
anonymously, don’t put your name on it. And fill out what you want to 1200 
of it, and you can leave blank what you want to. And thank you. So do 1201 
you guys have any questions? Anything that I can do? Anything you 1202 
want to know about immigration that I can put together and email to 1203 
you? Anything like that, that didn’t get touched on today? 1204 
 1205 
F2: I just would like to know how it works in general. And I don’t mean 1206 
saying it slow, but I really am…this is not something that I know a 1207 
great deal about. 1208 
 1209 
I: Yeah. 1210 
 1211 
F2: But I hear you, so… 1212 
 1213 
I: Right. 1214 
 1215 
F2: Just… 1216 
 1217 
I: So let me see if I can put a basic fact sheet together for you about 1218 
immigration, or send you…there’s a website on the back page… 1219 
 1220 
I2: Resource list. 1221 
 1222 
I: …resource list that says “National Women’s Law Center” that has a lot 1223 
of basic information. 1224 
 1225 
F2: Okay. 1226 
 1227 
I: There’s also, um…there’s also a really great national study about, 1228 
um…about Secure Communities, and I can send you…Are you a…are 1229 
you an internet person? 1230 
 1231 
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F2: Um-hum. 1232 
 1233 
I: So you want to…you want to give me your email? And I’ll send you 1234 
just a few, um…a few links for you to look at on your own time, and 1235 
then I’ll try to sort of write out the process for you in the next week or 1236 
so. Anybody else questions? 1237 
 1238 
F1: I got…I got a really (stop 1:08:03) on the phone call type of thing. 1239 
Because I want to…things that have come through my mind. I think it’s 1240 
a…it’s…it would be a good idea, like I say, and maybe I’m wrong, and 1241 
you can say it better than I…but, um, when someone calls to the crisis 1242 
line, they can say like, “If this is a dangerous situation or in the middle 1243 
of dangers or something, like it means physical,” because… 1244 
 1245 
I: Um-hum. 1246 
[together] 1247 
I2: Um-hum.  1248 
 1249 
F1: We can maybe help somebody by phone like a supporting them talking 1250 
with them, planning with them, tell them where to go, what…who to go 1251 
something. But if they are in dangers, like physical, they can call 9-1-1. 1252 
 1253 
I: Right. 1254 
 1255 
F1: And…and it will be nice to have like a…options, like a…if you  need a 1256 
support or agencies or other kind of resources, you can dial 1 for 1257 
support, 2 for agency. So you leave different numbers of agencies that it 1258 
can help peoples with different planning thing or something. 1259 
 1260 
I: Um-hum. 1261 
 1262 
F1: So that would be a good idea. 1263 
 1264 
I: So to really…really piece…parse out what…what danger means in this 1265 
situation, like really make it specific. 1266 
 1267 
F1: And…and…and clarify. Like if you feel safe calling 9-1-1, they…they 1268 
have (? 1:09:10). 1269 
 1270 
I: Um-hum. That’s great thank you. Thanks. And my email’s on the top of 1271 
the resource list so you’ll see… 1272 
 1273 
F2: Oh, okay. 1274 
 1275 
192 
 
I: …you’ll see that’s what it’ll come form, my gmail account. 1276 
 1277 
F2: Okay. 1278 
 1279 
I: Thanks. 1280 
 1281 
F2: Thank you.  1282 
 1283 
[long pause / paper shuffling] 1284 
 1285 
I: Okay, then…thank God it works. Oh, it was two…two…we’re 1286 
still…take your time. 1287 
 1288 
I2: Was he okay? 1289 
 1290 
F? Yeah, I think she’s the participant. 1291 
 1292 
F?: Did you guys hear there was like…something on NPR. It might have 1293 
been “This American Life” where they interviewed this like police 1294 
chief maybe, in I want to say Alabama, somewhere where they like 1295 
really heavily started enforcing this, and he was talking about how he’d 1296 
been one of the people who really pushed for it, and then was realizing 1297 
that, oh, this is terrible. Like it makes my job way harder and it’s also 1298 
really terrible for the people that we’re doing this to. And the interview 1299 
was like, “So, you know, what (do you expect 1:11:07), do you think 1300 
Jesus would have voted to pass this?”  1301 
 1302 
F?: Oh, wow. 1303 
 1304 
F?: And I was like, well, to be honest, no [laughs]. 1305 
 1306 
I: That was…yeah, that was “This American Life.” 1307 
 1308 
F? I mean, that was like I totally pushed her in like (? 1:11:17) were like.. 1309 
 1310 
I: Yeah. I think…I think that’s…that’s…that was really inten—Alabama 1311 
is a mess, and I don’t know if you all know that, that Alabama’s like 1312 
Arizona on steroids. And they actually…And the police officers 1313 
are…they talk about this in that…in that also, that they’re doing their 1314 
job. And like there was a guy from Daimler…whoever makes Mercedes 1315 
and also freight line—things for big trucks and stuff like that, they 1316 
moved a plant to Alabama. And he was a German man who was there 1317 
visiting a plant executive, and they pulled him over and he didn’t have 1318 
his…his… 1319 
193 
 
 1320 
I2: Oh, yeah, his… 1321 
 1322 
F1: Yeah. 1323 
 1324 
I2: Yeah, yeah, yeah. 1325 
 1326 
I: …proper identity with him and they took him to jail. And so 1327 
they’re…you know, they’re really doing the…the ident—you have to 1328 
have your proof of identity with you. At all times, you have to carry 1329 
your papers. 1330 
 1331 
I2: Even if you’re…in that one case, right. 1332 
 1333 
I: And in one…in some way, you’re like, okay, at least they’re doing it 1334 
indiscriminately. At least it’s not just all brown people, you know. 1335 
But…but it’s crazy. My mom… 1336 
 1337 
F2: (? 1:12:13) Did that just happen? 1338 
 1339 
I: Yeah, just happened. And it happened twice. 1340 
 1341 
F2: Did they report her missing or something? 1342 
 1343 
I: Hm... 1344 
 1345 
F2: It was a guy recently that they just…I think his dad or somebody 1346 
reported…reported her missing that I guess deported him on accident. 1347 
 1348 
I: Yeah. There was a young… 1349 
 1350 
F2: It was on the news. 1351 
 1352 
I2: A young girl. 1353 
 1354 
I: …there was a…in Texas… 1355 
 1356 
F1: Yeah. 1357 
 1358 
I: …there was a wom—a girl, a teenager, 15 years old. She ran away from 1359 
home.  1360 
 1361 
F2: Oh. 1362 
 1363 
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I: She got arrested… 1364 
 1365 
F2: I heard about that. 1366 
 1367 
I: …They, um, they…her name matched in the Secure Communities 1368 
database. Her name came up with an immigration hold on it. They 1369 
deported her. I’m laughing not at her. 1370 
 1371 
F2: But that was for a minute, though. 1372 
 1373 
I: They deported her to Colombia. 1374 
 1375 
Voices: Wow. 1376 
 1377 
F2: She was working and everything. 1378 
 1379 
I: She didn’t speak any Spanish. She was African American and she was 1380 
15.  1381 
 1382 
F2: Um-hum. 1383 
 1384 
I: And she came back pregnant. So who knows… 1385 
 1386 
F3: Whoa! 1387 
 1388 
I: I mean, it’s a big mess. 1389 
 1390 
F1: They’re being sued though. 1391 
 1392 
I: Yeah. Are they? 1393 
 1394 
F1: Yeah. 1395 
 1396 
I: Yeah. It’s good. So I wanted to thank you all and I knew you were close 1397 
to New Seasons, and I thought, well, you could always get coffee or 1398 
something to eat or something, so I got you a little gift card that you 1399 
see. 1400 
 1401 
Voices: Oh!! Wow. 1402 
 1403 
I: And just like in your situation, I was buying all these gift cards and the 1404 
woman behind the counter who I kind of know from shopping there at 1405 
Interstate, I…I…this is still…There’s enough people there, I’m not 1406 
going to add anybody. But she said, “What are you doing?” And I said, 1407 
195 
 
“Oh, I’m buying these for going and talking to a group of advocates at 1408 
Bradley Angle,” and she’s like, “Oh! I just had to go to the Gateway 1409 
Center,” and she just like told me this whole DV story. And she’s like, 1410 
“And I…this was the first time. I never have had anything like this 1411 
happen. I…” you know, and I was just like…it was crazy. It was 1412 
though…it was the same thing. Like it just…the minute you open up 1413 
anything, it’s there. Yeah. Thank you again. 1414 
 1415 
F1: Thank you so much this was wonderful. 1416 
 1417 
I: Yeah, it was really, really helpful for…for me, and I hope you all 1418 
learned something and hope it was decent use of your time to think 1419 
about these things and talk about them, because it really was for me. So 1420 
thanks. Okay. 1421 
 1422 
I2: We have just a little bit of time if anybody wants to make… 1423 
 1424 
The End 1425 
